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Introduction
Cette thèse est constituée de quatre essais en économie industrielle. Les deux premiers
relèvent de l’économie de l’innovation et de la propriété intellectuelle. Ils exploitent l’idée
qu’un brevet est un titre incertain et cherchent à en tirer quelques conséquences aussi
bien sur le choix du régime de protection que sur le prix d’une licence. Le troisième essai
analyse un aspect particulier des programmes de clémence utilisés depuis quelques années
par les autorités de la concurrence dans la lutte contre les cartels. Le quatrième essai, enfin,
étudie certaines propriétés d’un mode spécifique de régulation des entreprises, à savoir la
régulation à partir des performances des autres entreprises du secteur considéré.
Avant de présenter ces différents travaux, les développements qui suivent ont pour
objet de rappeler brièvement le cadre conceptuel général dans lequel ils s’inscrivent. Nous
présentons successivement dans cette introduction les cadres d’analyse de la notion de
brevet probabiliste, des programmes de clémence comme instrument de politique de la
concurrence, et du mécanisme de la régulation relative.
1
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Brevet probabiliste : qualité, protection et licences
Un brevet d’invention n’est pas un droit de propriété ordinaire, comme celui lié à un
bien physique. En tant que droit de propriété intellectuelle, un brevet porte sur un bien
intangible beaucoup plus difficilement identifiable: il protège la connaissance incorporée
dans un objet ou un procédé et exprimée à travers les revendications (claims) formulées
par le demandeur du brevet. De ce fait, un certain nombre d’incertitudes pèsent sur les
brevets.
Le premier type d’incertitude se situe au niveau de l’office des brevets lui-même. Un
examinateur doit estimer la nouveauté du projet par rapport à l’état de l’art (prior art) au
moment du dépôt, son inventivité par rapport à ce même état, selon le jugement qu’il s’en
fait, et son utilité en tant qu’application industrielle. Ce sont là des critères d’appréciation
difficiles pour lesquels il n’existe pas en général de métrique reconnue. De plus, ce jugement
doit porter sur chacune des revendications du brevet, dont le nombre peut être très élevé.
Comme le nombre de dépôts n’a cessé de croître durant ces vingt dernières années dans
les trois principaux offices (USPTO aux Etats-Unis, JPO au Japon et EPO en Europe)
et que le temps consacré par un ou deux examinateurs à l’appréciation de ces critères
difficiles dépasse rarement trente ou quarante heures, on ne s’étonnera pas que les offices
de brevets soient souvent amenés à accorder un brevet à une demande qui ne satisfait
pas pleinement ces critères. On est alors en présence de brevets de mauvaise qualité ou
de brevets "faibles". Certains auteurs ont ainsi avancé l’argument que la qualité d’une
innovation étant une information privée, les détenteurs de "mauvais" projets sont incités
à demander un brevet sachant que s’ils le font tous, l’office des brevets sera surchargé et la
qualité de son examen s’en ressentira (Caillaud & Duchêne, 2005).
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Le deuxième type d’incertitude concerne le détenteur du brevet. Un brevet ne devient
exécutoire que si son détenteur parvient à identifier et poursuivre en procès un tiers dont
il présume qu’il est un infracteur. Ce n’est là ni une activité aisée ni peu onéreuse. Par
ailleurs, le détenteur n’est pas non plus à l’abri d’une contestation par un tiers qui remettrait
en cause le caractère novateur ou inventif du brevet. En tout état de cause, le détenteur du
brevet est en possession d’un droit que certains auteurs ont qualifié de "droit probabiliste"
(Lemley & Shapiro, 2005).
Le troisième type d’incertitude se situe au niveau du tribunal. Au cours d’un éventuel
procès en infraction, l’accusé peut contester la validité du brevet sur la base des critères de
brevetabilité mentionnés plus haut. Le tribunal doit se prononcer alors sur cette validité, et
ceci au niveau de chacune des revendications protégées. Non seulement c’est là une tâche
dont le résultat peut être incertain, dans la mesure où la notion d’étendue du brevet est
elle-même relativement ambiguë, mais en plus, les doctrines juridiques utilisées peuvent
elles-mêmes être différentes. Par exemple, selon la doctrine juridique dite des équivalents,
l’infraction peut être présumée dès qu’elle porte sur un item qui remplit la même fonction
que celui qui est breveté alors qu’une doctrine plus stricte qui ne protègerait que ce qui est
parfaitement décrit pourrait ne pas retenir l’infraction.
Enfin, le quatrième type d’incertitude se situe au niveau de la société. Premièrement,
il s’agit de prendre en compte le fait que la mise en œuvre du système de protection
par le brevet est longue et coûteuse. On peut alors faire une analyse coûts-bénéfices
de ce système. Deuxièmement, l’intérêt du brevet en tant que mécanisme d’incitation à
l’innovation, diffère sensiblement entre secteurs. Dans les secteurs où la connaissance est
suffisamment bien codifiée pour que sa reproduction puisse être considérée comme étant peu
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coûteuse et facilement accessible à un tiers,1 il semble que le brevet joue un rôle crucial en
tant qu’instrument d’incitation à l’innovation. Par contre, dans les secteurs où l’innovation
procède de manière continue et où une innovation présente ne doit son existence qu’à une
succession d’innovations qui la précèdent (secteur des logiciels par exemple), la justification
du brevet est beaucoup plus problématique.
La qualité des brevets
Même si la notion de qualité d’un brevet n’est pas appréhendée de façon identique par
tous les économistes qui s’y sont intéressés, il ressort de la littérature qu’elle renvoie en
général à la difficulté qu’a l’office des brevets à sélectionner parmi l’ensemble des demandes
déposées celles qui satisfont les critères de brevetabilité. La qualité d’un brevet est ainsi
définie par la probabilité qu’il survive à une contestation juridique de sa validité (Shapiro
2003, NAS, 2004). Si on conçoit le verdict d’un tribunal chargé de juger un litige por-
tant sur un brevet comme le résutat d’un ré-examen approfondi des caractéristiques de
l’innovation et de leur adéquation aux critères de brevetabilité, un brevet de bonne qualité
a ainsi peu de chances d’être invalidé alors qu’un brevet de mauvaise qualité a de fortes
chances d’être invalidé. Hall & Harhoff ( 2004) avancent une autre raison pour justifier
cet indicateur de qualité du brevet. Ces auteurs défendent l’idée que du point de vue
du bien-être social, un brevet de bonne qualité doit revêtir peu d’incertitude quant à sa
validité et à la largeur de son champ de protection, dans la mesure où une incertitude de
ce genre pourrait amener le détenteur du brevet à sous-investir dans la technologie qu’il
développe, pousser les concurrents potentiels à réduire leurs investissements dans les tech-
nologies concurrentes et entraîner des litiges coûteux une fois que le détenteur du brevet
1C’est le cas par exemple dans le secteur pharmaceutique.
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et ses concurrents ont réalisé leurs investissements.
Scotchmer (2004) insiste sur le fait que la notion de qualité d’un brevet est intimement
liée à sa configuration (design), en termes d’étendue (scope) ou de largeur (breadth) des
revendications accordées. Sachant qu’une des difficultés inhérentes à la mission de l’office
des brevets est de devoir interpréter les standards de brevetabilité pour chaque nouvelle
technologie, le demandeur d’un brevet insistera naturellement sur l’interprétation qui lui
est la plus favorable, tandis que l’examinateur essayera de circonscrire l’étendue de la pro-
tection en fonction de son appréciation de l’état de l’art, appréciation difficile notamment
dans les nouveaux domaines ouverts à la brevetabilité. De ce fait l’arbitre ultime con-
cernant l’adéquation aux standards de brevetabilité reste le tribunal. L’office des brevets
doit donc essayer d’anticiper l’issue d’un litige ou d’une contestation du brevet, et prendre
lui-même les décisions concernant les conditions de brevetabilité lorsque la loi n’est pas
claire. A titre d’exemple, l’office des brevets américain (USPTO) a publié en 2001 des
lignes directrices (Utility Examination Guidelines) sur la brevetabilité des séquences géné-
tiques. L’office des brevets a donc, selon Scotchmer, aussi bien une responsabilité dans
la configuration des brevets que dans l’application de la loi. Ainsi, la mauvaise qualité
d’un brevet peut être due à la pratique de l’office qui ne sélectionne pas correctement les
innovations selon les standards définis par la loi, ou causée par le fait que les standards en
question sont trop bas.
Causes et manifestations de la baisse de la qualité des brevets
Plusieurs considérations suggèrent que la qualité des brevets délivrés a diminué lors des
dernières années. L’élargissement du domaine du brevetable, notamment aux Etats-Unis,
aux logiciels, aux "business methods" et aux "research tools" a été souvent cité comme
INTRODUCTION 6
une des causes et manifestations du déclin de la qualité des brevets. Le fait qu’une grande
partie de la connnaissance dans ces domaines existait sous la forme de secrets commerciaux
et de produits et services non protégés, rend plus difficile la découverte d’antériorités et
donc l’appréciation de la nouveauté et du degré d’inventivité des innovations relevant de
ces domaines.
Par aileurs, comme cela a été dit plus haut, le nombre de demandes adressées aux prin-
cipaux offices de brevets (les offices américain, européen et japonais) n’a cessé de croître2,
tandis que les ressources affectées à l’examen de ces demandes a plutôt eu tendance à stag-
ner ou à décliner. A titre d’exemple, le rapport de la NAS (2004) décèle une baisse de 20%
dans le nombre d’examinateurs par millier de demandes entre 1985 et 1997. Par ailleurs,
le délai d’attente à partir de la date de dépôt et le stock de brevets en attente n’ont cessé
de croître durant les deux dernières décennies.3
Une autre raison pouvant expliquer la baisse de la qualité des brevets est le relâchement
des standards de brevetabilité, notamment en ce qui concerne le seuil d’inventivité (Barton,
2000). Pour expliquer ce relâchement, Merges (1999) met en cause la structure d’incitation
financière des examinateurs de l’office des brevets américain.4 D’une part, les niveaux des
salaires sont insuffisants pour retenir les examinateurs les plus expérimentés, conduisant
ainsi à un taux de turnover important. D’autre part, le système de bonus accordés aux
examinateurs favorise la délivrance par rapport au rejet. Enfin, il n’existe aucune mesure
de sanction des examinateurs en cas d’erreur avérée de leur part (erreur révélée par un
jugement ultérieur rejetant la validité totale ou partielle du brevet).
2Le nombre de demandes de brevets auprès de l’office américain en 2006 a été de 425966 (World Patent
Report 2008).
3L’office des brevets américain comptait en 2006, 1.051.502 dossiers qui n’avaient pas encore été examinés
(World Patent Report 2008)
4La structure d’incitation financière des examinateurs de l’office européen des brevets est examinée dans
un rapport récent de l’Institut d’Economie Industrielle (IDEI, 2006).
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La perception générale d’une baisse de la qualité des brevets, notamment aux Etats-
Unis, est en général illustrée par quelques exemples. Le cas probablement le plus célèbre
est celui du "one-click" d’Amazon mais d’autres brevets tels que celui accordé à un système
de file d’attente pour accéder aux toilettes dans un avion, ou celui couvrant le sandwich
sans croûte, renforcent l’idée qu’une innovation peut obtenir un brevet sans vraiment sat-
isfaire le critère d’inventivité. Par ailleurs, les litiges sur brevets, dont le volume ne cesse
d’augmenter depuis les années 1980, avec une accélération significative depuis le début des
annés 1990,5 conduisent souvent à des invalidations.6 Au cours d’un litige, une entreprise
confrontée à l’accusation du détenteur d’un brevet, peut, au regard d’une antériorité trou-
vée dans l’état de l’art qui remet en cause la nouveauté ou la non-évidence de l’invention,
demander l’invalidation du brevet en question. Un procès peut également être initié par
un tiers qui conteste la validité d’un brevet et c’est alors le détenteur du brevet qui se
retrouve dans le rôle de la défense. Dans les deux cas, une invalidation remet en cause
la décision de l’office des brevets et conduit à une appréciation différente de celle donnée
par les examinateurs. De ce point de vue, l’accroissement du nombre de brevets invalidés
par les tribunaux constitue un indice de la baisse des standards de brevetabilité appliqués
par les examinateurs, et par conséquent de la baisse de la qualité des brevets accordés par
l’office.
Il faut néanmoins noter que certaines études empiriques portant, entre autres sur la
qualité des brevets délivrés, ne détectent pas de dégradation significative de cette qualité.
5Le nombre de procès en infraction et/ou invalidation d’un brevet est passé de moins de 1200 procès
par an avant 1990 à 2896 procès en 2007. Deux études empiriques récentes montrent que l’augmentation
du nombre de litiges sur brevets n’est pas due uniquement à l’augmentation du nombre de brevets délivrés.
Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004) trouvent que le nombre moyen de procès portant sur un brevet a augmenté
de 21% entre la période 1985-1990 et la période 1991-1995. Bessen & Meurer (2005) montrent que le nombre
de litiges par brevet détenu par une entreprise publique a augmenté de 11% entre 1987 et 1999.
6Allison & Lemley (1998) font état de 46% d’invalidations à la suite de litiges portant sur l’infraction
ou la validité d’un brevet.
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Selon les audits de qualité de l’office des brevets américain, les taux d’erreurs des examina-
teurs ont fluctué entre 3,6% et 7% depuis 1980, connaissant une tendance à la hausse dans
les années 1990 mais une tendance à la baisse depuis (NAS 2004). Utilisant des données sur
182 brevets ayant fait l’objet de litiges entre 1997 et 2000, Cockburn et Henderson (2003)
ne trouvent pas de preuve soutenant que l’expérience des examinateurs et leur charge de
travail permettent de prédire les décisions d’invalidité.
Conséquences de l’existence de brevets de mauvaise qualité
La baisse de la qualité des brevets s’accompagne d’une augmentation de l’incertitude
aussi bien chez les inventeurs que chez ceux qui se chargent de la commercialisation des
inventions. Elle peut de ce fait créer une baisse du rythme de l’innovation ou du niveau
d’investissement dans la commercialisation des nouvelles technologies.
Par ailleurs, la crainte d’un litige peut pousser les entrants potentiels de faible taille à
éviter les secteurs où les firmes en place détiennent un grand nombre de brevets, même s’il
y a une forte présomption que ces brevets soient de faible qualité (Lerner ,1995). Les coûts
d’un litige juridique éventuel jouent dans ce cas le rôle de barrières à l’entrée entravant
l’émergence de solutions technologiques alternatives.
De plus, l’absence de procédures rapides pour résoudre les problèmes de validité des
brevets peut freiner le rythme de l’innovation dans des secteurs caractérisés par des innova-
tions cumulatives (Hall & Harhoff ,2004). Dans de tels secteurs, les innovations dépendent
des avancées techniques précédentes ou des avancées dans des technologies complémen-
taires. Si ces avancées sont couvertes par des brevets douteux ou d’une largeur excessive,
les coûts des innovations qui en dépendent peuvent être plus élévés qu’ils ne devraient l’être,
et de ce fait ces innovations peuvent être découragées. Par ailleurs, l’existence d’un grand
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nombre de brevets de mauvaise qualité peut entraîner une augmentation considérable du
niveau de "fragmentation" des droits de propriété intellectuelle couvrant des technologies
antérieures ou complémentaires, donnant lieu à une augmentation des coûts de transaction
des innovateurs voulant avoir accès à ces technologies (à travers des licences par exemple).
On retrouve là la thèse des "anti-communs" développée par Heller & Eisenberg (1998).
Enfin, Hall & Harhoff (2004) affirment que la délivrance d’un grand nombre de brevets de
mauvaise qualité augmente l’incertitude du détenteur sur le niveau de protection que lui
confère son brevet, freinant ainsi ses propres améliorations de la technologie brevetée.
Caillaud & Duchêne (2005) soulignent un autre aspect négatif de l’existence de brevets
de mauvaise qualité. Ils suggèrent que face à un processus d’examen superficiel dû à
l’engorgement des dossiers, les entreprises sont encouragées à déposer des demandes peu
fondées en misant sur l’attention moindre portée aux dossiers par les examinateurs. En
effet, la délivrance de brevets de mauvaise qualité peut augmenter le volume des demandes:
les "innovateurs" sont d’autant plus incités à déposer une demande qu’ils savent que leurs
chances d’obtenir un brevet sont importantes. En conséquence, la charge de travail des
examinateurs augmente, ce qui les contraint à effectuer un effort d’examen plus faible pour
chaque demande, et à étudier les antériorités de manière moins approfondie, accroissant
ainsi le risque de commettre des erreurs de jugement er d’accorder plus de "mauvais"
brevets. Se crée ainsi un cercle vicieux qui se nourrit de la mauvaise qualité des brevets
pour en produire d’autres de pire qualité.
Ford et al. (2007) essaient de quantifier le coût social de l’existence de brevets ne
satisfaisant pas aux standards de brevetabilité. Les auteurs tentent de mesurer l’impact
de l’existence de tels brevets sur les innovateurs, en partant de l’idée qu’à l’instar de la loi
de Gresham, les "mauvais" brevets chassent les "bons" brevets. Ils mettent en évidence le
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mécanisme suivant: les mauvais brevets permettent à leurs détenteurs d’imposer des coûts
de litige ou des coûts de licences suffisamment élevés pour que des innovateurs ultérieurs se
découragent au point de réduire leurs investissements en R&D, ce qui donne lieu à moins de
"bons" brevets et donc à une augmentation de la proportion des "mauvais" brevets. Pour
mesurer le coût social de ces "mauvais" brevets, Ford et al. (2007) utilisent des données
comparatives sur les brevets accordés aux Etats-Unis, en Europe et au Japon, en faisant
l’hypothèse que les offices européen et japonais accordent moins de mauvais brevets que
l’office américain. Ils aboutissent à une évaluation de la perte sociale due à la prolifération
de mauvais brevets aux Etats-Unis de l’ordre de 25,5 milliards de dollars. Ils trouvent
également que le coût social des litiges sur brevets est d’environ 4,5 milliards de dollars.
Bessen et Meurer (2008), quant à eux, estiment à 16 milliards de dollars par an le coût
privé des litiges, niveau plus élévé que le coût social calculé par Ford et al. (2007). Ils
trouvent que la valeur boursière des firmes poursuivies pour infraction décroît en moyenne
d’un demi point de pourcentage à la suite du déclenchement d’un litige sur brevet, ce qui
correspond en moyenne à 28,7 millions de dollars. Ce montant est largement plus élevé que
celui des frais juridiques qui sont d’un demi-million de dollars en moyenne. Ils expliquent
ces coûts indirects élévés, avant même que l’issue du litige ne soit connue, par plusieurs
raisons. D’abord les chercheurs et managers de l’entreprise doivent consacrer une part
importante de leur temps à produire des documents, à faire des dépositions et à monter des
stratégies avec leurs avocats. Ensuite, un litige a en général des conséquences néfastes sur
les relations entre le détenteur du brevet et l’infracteur potentiel. En particulier, il réduit
considérablement la possibilité de coopération sur d’autres fronts. Enfin, une entreprise
en mauvaise posture financière peut voir son coût du crédit augmenter significativement à
cause du risque de faillite auquel elle peut être exposée suite au litige.
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Le choix du régime de protection de la propriété intellectuelle
Le brevet n’est en aucun cas le seul moyen de protéger une innovation. En fait, dans la
majorité des industries, il n’est pas l’instrument de protection de la propriété intellectuelle
favori des entreprises. Un grand nombre d’études empiriques, dont celles de Mansfield
(1986), Levin et al. (1987), Harabi (1995), Veugelers (1998), Arundel et Kabla (1999) et
Cohen et al. (2000), montrent que le pourcentage des innovations brevetées varie d’une
industrie à l’autre à cause notamment d’une différence inter-sectorielle dans la capacité
des brevets à empêcher l’imitation. Ces études suggèrent également que le secret, l’avance
acquise par l’innovateur par rapport à ses concurrents et les efforts de promotion et de
vente fournissent souvent une meilleure protection que les brevets.7 A titre d’exemple, les
600 entreprises européennes sur lesquelles porte l’étude d’Arundel et Kabla (1998) n’ont
breveté en moyenne que 36% de leurs innovations de produit et 25% de leurs innovations
de procédé. L’industrie pharmaceutique fait figure d’exception avec un taux de dépôt de
brevets de 79% pour les produits pharmaceutiques.
Etant donné l’importance de la protection contre l’imitation dans la stratégie de pro-
tection intellectuelle des entreprises, il n’est pas étonnant que les articles théoriques ayant
traité à ce sujet aient essentiellement porté sur les aspects stratégiques de la divulgation
d’information lors du dépôt d’un brevet.
Crampes (1986) montre dans un modèle de duopole que le secret peut être préféré au
brevet lorsque l’innovation est peu profitable ou lorsqu’elle est très profitable. Dans ce
contexte d’une innovation isolée, c’est la limitation de la durée de protection par le brevet
qui peut pousser une entreprise à vouloir garder une innovation (très profitable) secrète
7A titre d’exemple, le responsable de la propriété intellectuelle de Nokia a déclaré en 1998 que Nokia
ne dépose un brevet sur une innovation que lorsqu’elle ne peut pas la garder secrète (Teknikka & Talous
2.4.1998).
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quitte à subir un coût de protection privée pour empêcher sa diffusion et son imitation.
Scotchmer & Green (1995) se placent quant à eux dans un cadre d’innovation cumulative
et étudient la décision de déposer un brevet ou de garder le secret lors d’une étape de la
course à l’innovation. Les auteurs montrent qu’il est possible qu’un innovateur ne dépose
pas de brevet pour éviter de divulguer de l’information et conserver ainsi son avantage
concurrentiel dans la course.
Horstman et al. (1985) considèrent que l’innovateur détient de l’information privée
quant à la rentabilité d’une imitation et étudient les conséquences stratégiques de cette
asymétrie d’information sur la décision de breveter dans un contexte où la protection
conférée par le brevet est limitée. Ils établissent que les innovations ne sont pas toutes
brevetées mais que celles qui le sont sont imitées alors que celles qui ne sont pas brevetées
ne sont pas copiées. Le brevet joue ainsi, à l’équilibre, le rôle d’un signal de non-rentabilité
d’une imitation.
Une autre raison pour laquelle l’option du brevet peut être écartée par un innovateur
découle de la nature probabiliste du brevet. En effet, l’incertitude quant à la validité du
brevet peut rendre le secret plus attractif et inciter l’innovateur à ne pas breveter ou à ne
breveter qu’une partie de la connaissance incorporée dans son innovation. Il s’agit là du
contexte dans lequel se placent Anton & Yao (2004) qui conçoivent le brevet comme un
mécanisme de transmission de l’information: la quantité d’information brevetée et donc
divulguée par l’innovateur donne la possibilité aux concurrents de réviser leurs croyances
concernant l’importance de l’innovation, et d’adapter leur agressivité sur le marché et leur
comportement d’imitation en conséquence.
Contrastant avec cette littérature, Saarenheimo (1994) s’attelle à expliquer la régularité
empirique relevée par Schmookler (1966) selon laquelle la propension à breveter est plus
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importante au sein des petites entreprises que chez les grandes entreprises. L’explication
qu’il propose est la suivante: les petites firmes préfèrent breveter des innovations intermé-
diaires et avoir ainsi la possibilité de les licencier, au lieu de chercher à se maintenir en
tête durant toutes les étapes de la course à l’innovation car la probabilité d’y parvenir est
plus faible pour elles que pour leurs concurrentes de grande taille. Cependant, il faut noter
que l’étude d’Arundel et Kabla (1998) remet en cause l’observation de Schmookler (1966)
et son explication par Saarenheimo (1994) . Utilisant un échantillon de 600 entreprises
européennes, ces auteurs montrent que la propension à breveter a tendance à croître avec
la taille de l’entreprise.
Les licences: une source de tension entre politique de l’innovation et
politique de la concurrence
Un grand nombre de détenteurs de brevets autorisent l’exploitation de leurs innovations
par des tiers à travers des accords de licences. Cockburn & Henderson (2003) trouvent
que 17.6% des brevets détenus par les entreprises questionnées dans un sondage de la
Intellectual Property Owners Association sont licenciés à d’autres entreprises. De plus, un
huitième des firmes sondées déclarent avoir déjà développé une technologie uniquement
dans la perspective de l’exploiter à travers des licences.
Les licences permettent aux firmes détentrices de brevet de s’approprier, au moins
partiellement, les rentes liées à leurs innovations même lorsqu’elles ne les exploitent pas
elles-mêmes à des fins productives ou commerciales. Les licences constituent de ce fait un
puissant instrument incitatif en faveur de l’innovation. Par ailleurs, elles permettent la
diffusion de la connaissance, et surtout la diffusion de l’utilisation de la connaissance, con-
tribuant ainsi à la réalisation d’un autre objectif important de la politique de l’innovation.
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En particulier, dans un contexte d’innovations séquentielles ou cumulatives, les licences per-
mettent d’intégrer la connaissance incorporée dans une innovation en tant qu’input pour
la mise au point d’une autre innovation. Par ailleurs, les accords de licences permettent
souvent d’éviter ou de mettre fin à des litiges juridiques coûteux portant sur l’infraction
potentielle du brevet d’une entreprise par un tiers.
Enfin, les licences sont des accords de transfert de technologie qui affectent la production
et le prix des biens impliqués. De ce fait, au-delà de l’effet bénéfique sur le détenteur du
brevet et le licencié, ces accords peuvent aussi affecter positivement les consommateurs.
C’est le cas par exemple lorsqu’une cession de licence permet la production d’un bien par
une firme plus efficace que l’entreprise détentrice du brevet.
Mais les accords de licence peuvent également contenir des clauses anti-concurrentielles.
On peut citer par exemple des clauses de vente liée, de royalties qui continuent au-delà
de la date d’expiration du brevet, de restrictions sur les réparations par les licenciés des
machines incorporant la technologie licenciée, ou encore des clauses d’épuisement de droit
ou de restrictions géographiques. Dès 1920, en déclarant qu’une clause de vente liée dans
un accord de licence violait les lois antitrust, la Cour Suprême américaine mit fin à l’idée
que le détenteur d’un brevet pouvait imposer toutes les restrictions qu’il voulait dans un
accord de licence. Se posa alors la question de savoir quelles restrictions devaient être
autorisées. Le procès U.S. vs General Electric Co. fournit un début de réponse: pour être
légales, les restrictions contenues dans une licence doivent être "raisonnablement adaptées
à la récompense pécuniaire du détenteur du brevet". Dans les Antitrust Guidelines de 1995,
le Département de Justice américain et la Federal Trade Commission proposent une règle
de raison stipulant qu’une licence ne doit être autorisée que si elle permet au détenteur
du brevet de tirer des bénéfices de "l’exploitation la plus efficace possible de sa propriété
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intellectuelle", justifiant le préjudice éventuel infligé aux consommateurs. Le problème que
pose ce principe, qui revient essentiellement à comparer l’effet ex post d’une licence sur
la perte sèche et l’effet ex ante sur l’incitation à innover, est qu’il ne donne pas de règle
directement utilisable par les tribunaux. L’étude de Maurer & Scotchmer (2006) apporte
une réponse à la façon dont ce problème est résolu en pratique. Ils affirment que la jurispru-
dence américaine dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle repose essentiellement sur
trois principes: le principe de neutralité du profit (profit neutrality principle), selon lequel
le bénéfice tiré par un innovateur du brevet qu’il détient ne doit pas dépendre de sa capac-
ité à exploiter lui-même son innovation, le principe d’une rémunération dérivée (derived
reward principle) qui stipule que dans la mesure où une licence augmente la valeur sociale
d’une innovation, le détenteur du brevet a droit à une part de ce surplus social, et enfin le
principe du minimalisme (minimalism principle) selon lequel une licence doit contenir le
minimum de clauses restrictives afin que les deux premiers principes soient satisfaits. Par
ailleurs, Maurer et Scotchmer (2006) proposent d’adopter un certain nombre de règles per
se parmi lesquelles la présomption de légalité de toute licence ne faisant intervenir qu’une
redevance fixe et des redevances variables unitaires (royalties) constantes.
Or dans un contexte de brevets dont la validité est incertaine, ce type de licences
peut avoir un effet anti-concurrentiel comme le montrent Farrell & Shapiro (2007). En
effet, ils permettent au détenteur d’un brevet faible d’éviter un litige tout en imposant
un taux de royalties relativement élevé que les firmes licenciées répercuteront, au moins
partiellement, sur leur prix de vente. Les consommateurs paient ainsi un prix élevé à cause
de l’existence d’un brevet qui n’aurait pas dû être accordé par l’office des brevets. Dans
ce cas, la dégradation ex post du surplus des consommateurs n’est pas compensée par une
augmentation de l’incitation ex ante à innover. Au contraire, Farrell & Shapiro (2007)
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montrent que la possibilité pour le détenteur d’un brevet d’imposer un niveau de royalties
élévé même lorsque le brevet est faible peut diminuer les incitations à investir dans les
innovations satisfaisant aux critères de brevetabilité.
Programmes de clémence: procédures et effets
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.”
Adam Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
Wealth of Nations, 1776, chapter X part II.
Mesures de clémence aux Etats-Unis et en Europe
La lutte contre les cartels a connu un changement majeur dans les années 90 avec
l’instauration de nouveaux programmes de clémence aux Etats-Unis. Bien que le Départe-
ment de Justice américain (DoJ) disposait depuis 1978 d’une politique de clémence à l’égard
d’une entreprise dénonçant un cartel auquel elle participe (ou a participé), les programmes
de 1993 (Corporate Leniency Policy) et de 1994 (Individual Leniency Policy) ont fonda-
mentalement bouleversé le contexte de la lutte contre les cartels. En effet, ces nouveaux
programmes ont été plus généreux que les précédents aussi bien en termes de réduction
de sanctions (allant juqu’à l’exemption complète) qu’en termes de conditions d’éligibilité.
Ils ont également été plus transparents puisque le pouvoir discrétionnaire qu’avaient les
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autorités de la concurrence dans la décision d’accorder ou pas une réduction d’amende à
un candidat au programme de clémence a été grandement réduit. Plus précisément, la
section A du Corporate Leniency Policy accorde automatiquement l’immunité complète
contre des poursuites de l’Etat au premier dénonciateur d’un cartel lorsque celui-ci ne fait
pas encore l’objet d’une enquête. De plus, même si un cartel est déjà sous le coup d’une
enquête, un membre du cartel peut obtenir une exemption d’amende s’il est le premier à
le dénoncer. Ceci est le cas si l’autorité de la concurrence n’a pas déjà en sa possession des
preuves suffisantes pour entraîner la condamnation des membres du cartel.
Ces changements opérés par le DoJ eurent un impact sans précédent sur le nombre
de dénonciations de cartels et sur le montant des amendes imposées. Ainsi, le nombre
d’entreprises postulant aux nouveaux programmes de clémence américains entre 1995 et
2000 a augmenté plus de dix fois par rapport à la période 1988-1993 précédant leur mise
en oeuvre et le montant des amendes payées par les participants aux cartels dénoncés a
atteint des sommets.8 Spagnolo (2006) souligne que cet effet positif est probablement dû
en partie à la création du cercle vertueux suivant: grâce aux dénonciations de cartels par
certains de leurs membres et leur coopération durant le procès intenté par les autorités de la
concurrence américaines, ces dernières ont été capables de faire condamner les partenaires
"trahis" à payer des amendes plus élevées dont le montant, évidemment public, a encouragé
d’autres membres de cartels à dénoncer leurs partenaires.
L’Union Européenne a été parmi les premiers à emboîter le pas aux Etats-Unis en
mettant en place dès 1996 un programme de clémence. Ce premier programme se révéla
inefficace dans l’incitation des membres d’un cartel à dénoncer leurs partenaires, probable-
8Parmi les cartels dénoncés par l’un de leurs membres, on peut citer le cartel de la vente d’art aux
enchères dénoncé par Christie et celui des électrodes en graphite dénoncé par Carbide/Graphite. Mais
le cas le plus célèbre reste celui du cartel mondial des vitamines. Suite à la dénonciation de ce dernier
par Rhône-Poulenc, Hoffman-la-Roche a été condamné à payer 500 millions de dollars et Basf à payer 225
millions de dollars aux Etats-Unis.
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ment à cause du pouvoir discrétionnaire important laissé aux autorités de la concurrrence
quant à la réduction d’amende accordée. En 2002, l’Union Européenne opéra une révi-
sion profonde de son programme dans l’esprit de la révision des programmes de clémence
opérée aux Etats-Unis en 1993. Depuis cette révision, le premier membre d’un cartel à
dénoncer ce dernier avant l’ouverture d’une enquête obtient automatiquement une exemp-
tion d’amende. Si la dénonciation intervient après le début d’une enquête sur le marché
concerné, le dénonciateur obtient une réduction d’amende allant de 30% à 100% selon
l’impact des informations fournies sur le déroulement de l’enquête. Entre février 2002,
date d’entrée en vigueur des nouveaux programmes de clémence européens, et décembre
2005, la Commission Européenne a reçu 167 demandes de clémence, dont 87 intervenant
avant l’ouverture d’une enquête et 80 après l’ouverture d’une enquête. Le nombre de
ces demandes a ainsi dépassé celles adressées au Département de Justice américain et les
amendes imposées aux cartels dénoncés ont atteint des records.9
Une des différences fondamentales entre les programmes de clémence américain et eu-
ropéen concerne la possibilité laissée à une entreprise impliquée dans un cartel d’obtenir
une réduction d’amende même lorsqu’elle n’est pas la première à dénoncer le cartel. En
Europe, cette possibilité existe alors qu’elle est absente aux Etats-Unis: un second infor-
mateur peut obtenir une réduction d’amende de 30% à 50% si aucune enquête n’a été
ouverte par la Commission Européenne et de 20% à 30% si une enquête a déjà été ouverte
alors qu’il ne peut pas prétendre à une réduction d’amende aux Etats-Unis, où prévaut une
9En février 2007, la Commission Européenne imposa une amende totale de 990 millions d’euros à 5
membres du cartel des ascenseurs et escaliers mécaniques suite à la dénonciation de ce dernier par Kone.
Le 12 novembre 2008, ce record a été battu par l’amende totale de 1,4 milliard d’euros imposée aux
entreprises Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, Asahi et Soliver. Saint-Gobain a écopé de la plus forte amende
jamais prononcée par Bruxelles contre une entreprise reconnue coupable d’une entente, à 896 millions
d’euros. Asahi a obtenu une réduction d’amende de 50% pour sa collaboration avec la Commission après
qu’une enquête ait été ouverte.
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approche de type "winner-take-all".10
Une seconde différence entre les mesures de clémence américaines et européennes réside
dans le traitement de l’instigateur d’un cartel. Aux Etats-Unis, une telle entreprise ne peut
pas prétendre au programme de clémence alors qu’en Europe ce n’est pas systématique.
En effet, l’instigateur d’un cartel n’est écarté de la procédure de clémence européenne que
s’il a usé de coercition vis-à-vis des autres membres du cartel.
Une autre différence entre les deux procédures concerne la possibilité pour une en-
treprise d’obtenir une réduction d’amende pour un cartel qu’elle n’a pas dénoncé si elle
fournit des informations sur un autre cartel dans lequel elle est, ou a été, impliquée. Le
programme Amnesty Plus aux Etats-Unis prévoit cette possibilité alors qu’aucune mesure
similaire n’existe en Europe.11 Par ailleurs, la dénonciation d’autres cartels est encouragée
aux Etats-Unis par l’omnibus question. Toute entreprise impliquée dans le procès d’un
cartel se voit poser la question suivante: "Détenez-vous des informations, qu’elles soient
directes ou indirectes, relatives à l’existence d’accords de fixation de prix, d’ententes lors
d’enchères, etc... portant sur d’autres produits dans cette industrie ou dans une autre
industrie?". Si une firme postulant au programme de clémence ne répond pas correcte-
ment à cette question ou refuse d’y répondre, elle perd l’immunité qui lui a été accordée.
Cet outil semble avoir joué un rôle important dans la détection de certains cartels aux
Etats-Unis tels que celui du gluconate de sodium qui a été révélé aux autorités lors de
l’enquête sur les cartels de l’acide citrique et de la lysine (First, 2001). Harrington (2006)
soutient que l’efficacité de cet instrument de détection des cartels provient essentiellement
10Il est déjà arrivé plusieurs fois aux Etats-Unis que le membre d’un cartel se présente au DoJ pour
dénoncer un cartel qui l’a été à peine quelques heures plus tôt par un de ses partenaires (Hammond, 2004,
2006). En tant que second à la "course vers la dénonciation", ce membre n’a droit à aucune réduction
d’amende.
11L’analyse de l’effet du programme Amnesty Plus sur la formation de cartels sur plusieurs marchés fait
l’objet du troisième chapitre de cette thèse.
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des incitations individuelles qu’ont les managers à répondre corrrectement à cette question.
Ceci nous mène à une autre différence de taille entre les programmes de clémence améri-
cain et européen à savoir l’introduction aux Etats-Unis d’un programme de clémence pour
individus à cause de la responsabilité pénale des managers d’entreprises participant à un
cartel.12
Effets potentiels des programmes de clémence
Les programmes de clémence ont essentiellement quatre objectifs. Le premier est de
dissuader la formation de cartels, en les rendant moins profitables. Le second est de pousser
des entreprises à interrompre leur participation à un cartel. Le troisième est de détecter des
cartels grâce aux informations fournies par les entreprises ayant recours aux programmes de
clémence. Et le quatrième est de faciliter les poursuites judiciaires d’entreprises participant
à un cartel.13
Une littérature récente s’est intéressée au fonctionnement des programmes de clémence,
à leurs effets potentiels, aussi bien positifs que négatifs, et à la configuration (design) opti-
male de tels programmes.14 S’inscrivant dans la lignée de la littérature sur les négociations
de plaidoirie, l’article pionnier de Motta & Polo (2003) porte sur l’effet d’inclure dans
les mesures de clémence les entreprises fournissant des informations sur un cartel après
qu’une enquête sur le cartel en question ait été ouverte. Les auteurs montrent qu’accorder
l’éligibilité aux programmes de clémence à ce stade peut avoir un premier effet, négatif, sur
les incitations ex ante des entreprises à former le cartel en réduisant les amendes qu’elles
auront à payer. Mais un second effet, positif, peut également se produire: celui de dissuader
12Un tel programme n’existe évidemment pas en Europe puisque les managers impliqués dans un cartel
ne subissent pas de sanctions pénales.
13Ce dernier objectif est particulièrement important aux Etats-Unis où le DoJ doit poursuivre les mem-
bres d’un cartel devant un tribunal et convaincre un jury du bien-fondé de son accusation.
14Pour un survey détaillé de cette littérature, voir Spagnolo (2006).
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la formation d’un cartel du fait que les poursuites par l’autorité de la concurrence devien-
nent moins onéreuses, plus rapides et plus efficaces. Motta et Polo (2003) soutiennent que
le second effet domine le premier et en concluent que l’inclusion de firmes collaborant avec
les autorités de la concurrence après l’ouverture d’une enquête est justifiée. Rey (2003)
et Spagnolo (2004) mettent en lumière un autre effet déstabilisateur des programmes de
clémence: ils peuvent augmenter le gain d’une entreprise qui dévie d’un accord collusif et
dénonce le cartel par rapport à une firme qui dévie du cartel mais ne le dénonce pas. Cet
effet, appelé par Spagnolo (2004), "protection from fines effect" et par Harrington (2008),
"deviator amnesty effect" rend l’option de dévier plus profitable et peut ainsi dissuader
les entreprises à former un cartel. Spagnolo (2004) identifie un autre effet positif potentiel
des programmes de clémence en montrant qu’ils peuvent rendre la création d’un cartel
plus "risquée" au sens de la dominance par rapport au risque d’Harsanyi & Selten (1988).
Ellis & Wilson (2003), quant à eux, montrent que les programmes de clémence peuvent
être utilisés par les firmes pour causer des dommages à leurs partenaires dans le cartel,
qui n’en restent pas moins leurs concurrents, en augmentant leurs futurs coûts à travers
les amendes payées et l’éventuel emprisonnement de leurs dirigeants. Si les partenaires en
question anticipent ces incitations créées par la procédure de clémence, il est clair que cette
dernière peut avoir un effet de dissuasion concernant la décision de former un cartel. Par
ailleurs, Aubert et al. (2006) montrent que les programmes de clémence comprenant une
clause de récompense monétaire aux personnes physiques dénonçant un cartel, diminuent
la valeur du cartel (et donc sa stabilité) car ils obligent les entreprises à "indemniser" leurs
employés pour leur "manque à gagner" s’ils ne dénoncent pas le cartel.
Mais les programmes de clémence n’ont pas que des effets positifs. Nous avons men-
tionné précédemment que Motta & Polo (2003) identifient un effet négatif potentiel des
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programmes de clémence sur la dissuasion à former un cartel à cause de la réduction de
l’amende espérée en cas de création d’un cartel. Un second effet négatif provient de la
possibilité pour des firmes formant un cartel d’utiliser le recours à un programme de clé-
mence comme menace crédible vis-à-vis d’un membre du cartel qui ne respecterait pas
l’accord collusif. Ce renforcement de la sanction en cas de déviation a un effet stabilisateur
et peut faire qu’un cartel qui n’était pas stable en l’absence de programmes de clémence
le devienne en leur présence (Bucirossi & Spagnolo, 2001, 2006, Ellis & Wilson, 2003 et
Brisset & Thomas, 2004). En ce qui concerne les programmes de clémence comprenant la
possibilité de récompenses monétaires pour les individus, Aubert et al. (2006) montrent
qu’ils peuvent dissuader des formes de coopération socialement désirables. En effet, ces
dernières pourraient être dénoncées par des employés aux autorités de la concurrence et
leur être présentées comme étant de la collusion.
Régulation relative : avantages et limites
Dans certaines industries, un régulateur fait face à plusieurs monopoles locaux. On
peut trouver cette structure de marché dans des secteurs tels que celui de la distribution de
l’eau ou du gaz, de la collecte des déchets ménagers ou encore dans le secteur hospitalier.
Dans une telle situation, le régulateur peut réguler un monopole local sur ses propres
performances mais il peut également choisir de tenir compte d’informations sur les autres
monopoles locaux pour réguler le monopole local en question.
Shleifer (1985) montre que la mise en place d’un schéma de régulation où le prix régulé
pour chaque monopole local est égal à la moyenne des coûts réalisés des autres monopoles
locaux, permet de mettre en oeuvre la solution de premier rang lorsque des transferts de la
part du régulateur sont possibles. Un tel schéma crée en effet une "concurrence artificielle"
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entre les firmes (d’où le nom de yardstick competition donné à ce type de régulation) qui
entraîne une réduction de coûts par les firmes régulées jusqu’au niveau socialement op-
timal. L’intuition derrière ce résultat tient au fait que le prix fixé pour chaque firme et
la compensation qu’elle reçoit ne dépendent pas de sa propre performance en termes de
réduction de coût, ce qui aligne ses incitations privées à réduire ses coûts avec les incita-
tions sociales. Contrairement à la littérature récente sur la yardstick competition (Dalen,
1998, Sobel, 1999, Tangerås, 2002, 2003), Shleifer (1985) ne modélise pas explicitement
l’incertitude qui peut exister du côté du régulateur. Ce n’est pas pour autant qu’il s’agit
d’un modèle de régulation en information symétrique. En effet, pour mettre en oeuvre le
schéma de régulation décrit par Shleifer, le régulateur a besoin d’observer uniquement les
coûts réalisés et les dépenses des entreprises pour réduire leurs coûts. En particulier, il n’a
pas besoin d’informations sur le coût initial ou sur la fonction de coût de l’investissement
(excepté le fait qu’ils sont identiques pour toutes les entreprises) alors qu’il aurait besoin de
ces informations pour déterminer l’optimum social et y aboutir via un schéma de régulation
individuelle.
Dans un contexte de régulation par comparaison avec anti-sélection, Auriol & Laf-
font (1992) montrent comment les externalités informationnelles entre firmes peuvent être
exploitées par un régulateur pour inciter les entreprises régulées à révéler leur type. Util-
isant la structure stochastique développée par Auriol & Laffont (1992), Dalen (1998) et
Tangerås (2002) montrent que l’utilisation de la yardstick competition peut permettre au
régulateur de réduire l’asymétrie d’information dont il fait l’objet en exploitant les informa-
tions révélées pour réguler chaque firme. Exploitant la corrélation entre les performances
des firmes, il peut réduire les rentes informationnelles (socialement coûteuses) concédées
aux firmes régulées et donc instaurer une régulation plus efficace.
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Sobel (1999) vient nuancer ces résultats en établissant que la yardstick competition ne
permet pas d’obtenir un meilleur résultat que la régulation individuelle lorsque les fonds
publics ne sont pas coûteux (i.e. pas de shadow costs).15 Par ailleurs, il montre que la yard-
stick competition peut aggraver le problème de sous-investissement qui apparaît lorqu’un
régulateur ne peut pas s’engager à ne pas utiliser l’information révélée par une firme pour
la réguler dans le futur. Vu que la régulation relative permet au régulateur d’obtenir
plus facilement de l’information, ce problème de hold-up est accentué lorsque la yardstick
competition est utilisée. Néanmoins, Dalen (1998) montre que ce résultat n’est pas systé-
matique. En effet, il met en lumière un mécanisme où n’apparaît pas l’arbitrage classique
entre extraction de la rente et incitations à l’investissement (Riordan & Sappington, 1989)
et montre que la yardstick competition peut générer des investissements plus élévés que
ceux réalisés sous un régime de régulation individuelle lorsque les investissements sont spé-
cifiques à la firme qui les entreprend. Par contre, il souligne que l’incitation individuelle
à entreprendre des investissements améliorant l’efficacité de toutes les firmes régulées est
nulle sous le régime de régulation relative alors que ce n’est pas le cas lorsqu’un schéma
individuel de régulation est utilisé.
Une autre limite potentielle de la yardstick competition réside dans le fait qu’elle peut
inciter les entreprises à adopter des stratégies collusives. Dans le cadre d’un modèle d’anti-
sélection, Laffont & Martimort (2000) montrent que le régulateur doit introduire des nou-
velles contraintes pour dissuader les firmes de coopérer. Ces contraintes induisent une
distorsion supplémentaire au niveau de l’efficacité productive mais les auteurs montrent
que le third best ainsi réalisé par le régulateur peut encore dominer le résultat qu’il ob-
tiendrait sous un régime de régulation individuelle. Par ailleurs, Tangerås (2002) considère
15Dans ce cas, les rentes informationelles que les firmes obtiennent ne sont pas socialement coûteuses.
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un modèle de risque moral et montre que l’incorporation de contraintes dissuadant la col-
lusion pousse le régulateur à distordre plus l’effort requis de la part des firmes les moins
productives mais permet néanmoins de mettre en oeuvre des niveaux d’effort plus efficaces
pour les firmes les plus productives.
Structure et contenu de la thèse
Les quatre essais qui composent cette thèse prennent appui sur les travaux qui viennent
d’être évoqués. Les deux premiers chapitres prennent pleinement en compte le caractère
incertain du brevet en tant que titre de propriété intellectuelle, soit pour déterminer le
choix du régime de protection (chapitre 1), soit pour examiner les propriétés des deux
mécanismes de licence les plus usuels que sont la redevance unitaire et la redevance fixe
(chapitre 2). Le troisième chapitre, plus proche d’une préoccupation de politique de la
concurrence, étudie les propriétés du programme de clémence Amnesty Plus qui permet à
une firme dénonçant un cartel sur le marché B de bénéficier d’une réduction d’amende pour
le cartel du marché A découvert par l’autorité de la concurrence. Le quatrième chapitre, qui
relève de la théorie de la régulation économique, étudie les propriétés d’un mécanisme de
régulation relative où le prix régulé d’une entreprise dépend des coûts des autres entreprises
du même secteur.
Dans le premier chapitre, nous nous intéressons au choix du régime de protection de
la propriété intellectuelle par un innovateur. Plus précisément, nous étudions la décision
d’un innovateur de breveter ou garder le secret sur une innovation de procédé. Pour cela,
nous adoptons un modèle à plusieurs étapes dans lequel le choix entre brevet et secret
industriel est affecté par trois paramètres: la force du brevet définie comme la probabilité
qu’un tribunal confirme la validité du brevet et juge que l’imitation est une infraction, le
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coût d’imiter une innovation brevetée relativement à celui d’imiter une innovation gardée
secrète, et enfin la taille de l’innovation définie comme l’importance de la réduction de coût
permise par la nouvelle technologie.
Nous établissons que le choix du régime de protection est le résultat de deux effets:
l’effet dommages et l’effet concurrence. Le premier effet implique que toutes choses égales
par ailleurs, notamment à degré d’imitation donné, le brevet est préféré au secret. Le second
effet peut jouer en sens inverse dans la mesure où l’imitation, ayant un coût moindre sous
le régime du brevet que sous le régime du secret, peut conduire à un degré d’imitation plus
élevé sous le premier régime.
L’un des résultats les plus importants auxquels nous parvenons est que les innovations
majeures (i.e. celles qui permettent une réduction de coût substantielle) ont tendance à être
tenues secrètes alors que les innovations mineures sont toujours brevetées. Les innovations
intermédiaires, quant à elles, ne sont brevetées que si les brevets sont suffisamment forts.
Dans ce même chapitre, nous nous intéressons à une classe de licences incorporant des
royalties et une redevance fixe dans le cadre d’accords à l’amiable entre les détenteurs de
brevets et leurs concurrents lorqu’un litige concernant le brevet survient. Nous montrons
ainsi qu’une redevance fixe négative, c’est à dire un transfert du détenteur du brevet vers
le licencié, peut soutenir un niveau élevé de royalties.
Le deuxième chapitre porte sur l’effet de l’incertitude quant à la validité d’un brevet
sur les accords de licences proposés par le détenteur d’un brevet. Nous examinons deux
types de licences: celles faisant intervenir uniquement une redevance fixe et celles impli-
quant uniquement une redevance unitaire constante. Il ressort de notre analyse que si le
détenteur du brevet utilise un schéma de licence avec redevance unitaire, il peut obtenir un
surprofit par rapport au profit espéré qu’il aurait eu si l’accord de licence n’était intervenu
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qu’une fois la question de la validité tranchée. Néanmoins, ce résultat n’est plus vrai si la
licence proposée stipule uniquement un paiement fixe. Il peut ainsi arriver que le détenteur
du brevet préfère avoir recours à une licence avec redevance unitaire dans le cas d’un brevet
de validité incertaine alors qu’il aurait préféré proposer une licence avec redevance fixe si
la validité du brevet avait été certaine. L’incertitude sur la validité d’un brevet peut donc
être vue comme une explication alternative au fait que le schéma avec redevance unitaire
est utilisé par certains détenteurs de brevets. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que le pouvoir
de marché excessif dont jouit le détenteur du brevet lorsqu’il utilise un schéma de licence
avec redevance unitaire peut être diminué si les entreprises prennent ensemble la décision
d’accepter la licence ou d’attaquer la validité du brevet. Enfin nous dégageons deux recom-
mandations de politique économique: d’une part, les autorités de la concurrence devraient
être particulièrement vigilantes lorsqu’un accord de licence fait intervenir une redevance
unitaire et d’autre part, les incitations de licenciés potentiels à attaquer collectivement la
validité d’un brevet devraient être renforcées.
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous nous intéressons au programme de clémence mis en
place par les autorités américaines pour encourager des entreprises participant à un car-
tel découvert à dénoncer d’autres cartels auxquels elles participent (ou ont participé). Ce
programme, qui porte le nom d’Amnesty Plus, permet au membre d’un cartel découvert
d’obtenir une réduction de l’amende qui lui est imposée pour sa participation à ce cartel,
s’il dénonce un autre cartel auquel il participe (ou a participé). De façon plus précise, nous
nous intéressons à l’effet de ce programme sur les incitations des firmes à former un ou
plusieurs cartels. Il ressort qu’Amnesty Plus n’a d’effet pro-concurrentiel que lorsque cer-
taines conditions sont réunies. Lorsque ce n’est pas le cas, ce programme peut avoir un effet
stabilisateur et encourager la formation d’un plus grand nombre de cartels qu’en son ab-
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sence. Nous identifions les circonstances exactes sous lesquelles cet effet anti-concurrentiel
a lieu et proposons une règle simple permettant de l’éviter. Enfin, nous montrons comment
les entreprises peuvent exploiter leur contact sur plusieurs marchés pour diminuer l’effet
pro-concurrentiel ou renforcer l’effet anti-concurrentiel d’Amnesty Plus.
Le quatrième chapitre étudie l’effet du degré de contrainte sur les prix d’une politique
de régulation sur les incitations des entreprises régulées à réduire leurs coûts de production.
Nous nous intéressons à deux modes de régulation: une régulation individuelle à travers
laquelle une firme se voit fixer un prix plafond dépendant de son propre coût réalisé,
et une régulation relative où le prix plafond fixé par le régulateur est fonction du coût
réalisé d’autres firmes, elles-mêmes soumises au même schéma de régulation. Nous montrons
qu’il existe une différence fondamentale entre ces deux types de régulation quant à l’effet
d’une politique de régulation plus contraignante sur l’investissement en réduction de coût.
Lorsqu’un schéma de régulation individuelle est utilisé, une contrainte plus forte (en termes
de prix plafond) sur les firmes régulées diminue leurs incitations à réduire leurs coûts alors
que sous un schéma de régulation relative c’est le contraire qui se produit. En ce qui
concerne les prix, nous montrons qu’une régulation plus contraignante induit un prix plus
faible dans le cas de la régulation relative et que l’effet est ambigu lorsque la régulation
est individuelle. Il s’avère ainsi qu’il n’y a pas de tension entre l’amélioration de l’efficacité
productive et celle de l’efficacité allocative sous le régime de régulation relative alors que
cette tension peut apparaître sous le régime de régulation individuelle. Ceci est un avantage
de la régulation relative puiqu’elle permet d’aligner les deux objectifs de diminution des
prix et de réduction des coûts. Néanmoins, nous montrons qu’il existe deux forces qui
pourraient dissuader le régulateur d’imposer une régulation trop contraignante sous un
régime de régulation relative. La première est due au fait que, sous ce régime, la contrainte
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de participation des firmes n’est pas satisfaite si la régulation est trop stricte, ce qui n’est
pas le cas sous le régime de régulation individuelle. La seconde concerne l’effet négatif d’une
régulation plus contraignante sur l’investissement en amélioration de la qualité, effet qui
pourrait pousser un régulateur à relâcher la contrainte sur les firmes pour ne pas pénaliser
ce type d’investissement.
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Chapter 1
Choosing Intellectual Protection:
Imitation, Patent Strength and
Licensing1
1.1. Introduction
The traditional view that firms always prefer patents to other forms of protection for
their innovations has been empirically challenged for a long time. It is now well known
that secrecy, first mover advantage and exploitation of lead time may be preferred forms of
protection in many industries. Even in the same industry, forms of protection may differ
according to the nature and importance of the innovation and to the disclosure effect.
Early studies by Scherer (1965, 1967, 1983) have shown that the propensity to patent varies
significantly accross industries and that inter-industrial variations in patenting activity are
not explained by R&D expenditures. Pakes and Griliches (1980) were among the first
1This chapter is based on a joint work with David Encaoua.
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to find that the degree of randomness in the patenting activity within industries was not
explained by R&D variations. They have shown that the residual patenting behaviour
was explained by the potential imitation allowed by the disclosed information and by the
innovator’s capability to appropriate the rents generated by the innovation. Mansfield
(1986) obtained similar results based on a survey where US manufacturing firms were
asked what fractions of inventions they would not have developed in the absence of patents
between 1980 and 1983. These fractions were very low in many industries (less than
10% in electrical equipment, primary metals, instruments, motor vehicles and others) and
relatively high in industries like pharmaceuticals (60%) and chemicals (40%). Two more
recent surveys (Yale Survey by Levin et al., 1987 and Carnegie Mellon Survey by Cohen et
al. 2000) confirm these trends: it is only in industries where knowledge is strongly codified
that patents appear to be substantially preferred to other forms of protection.
Despite this accumulated empirical evidence, theoretical explanations of why and when
an innovator would prefer to keep an innovation secret rather than patent it remain rather
scarce. Before turning to the related literature, note that even if patenting is not consid-
ered as the best form of protection, innovators have a lot of reasons to apply for patents
serving purposes different from protection (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Encaoua et al. 2004).
This feature complicates the problem. Indeed, a theoretical explanation of why and when
patenting is not the best form of protection must also be consistent with the more cumber-
some issue of why, despite the existence of preferred forms of protection, patents remain
so widespread (Scotchmer, 2004).
At least three types of theoretical arguments are required to explain the protection
choice.
First, patents must be recognized as not being ironclad property rights but rather
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probabilistic rights. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) qualify the uncertain nature of patents in
a suggestive way: "A patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude a potential
imitator but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court. When a patent
holder asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice. If
the patent is found invalid, the property right will have evaporated". Thus, patent strength
refers to the probability to recover damages, with the consequence that only strong patents
give in principle to the patent holder the right to exclude an infringer or to force him to buy
a license. But as we argue below, even holders of weak patents may escape the uncertain
litigation process. They succeed through their licensing strategies to capture a significant
part of the consumers’ surplus. This is why the notion of patent quality enters so forcefully
in the agenda of antitrust authorities nowadays, especially through the criticism of the
examination system in the Patent Office (Merges, 1999, Lemley, 2001).
Second, the traditional view that knowledge is a blueprint has also been challenged.
Replicating an existing invention may be costly and time consuming because knowledge
may be more embedded in individuals and firms than in physical products or equipment.
One has to distinguish innovations according to their secrecy effectiveness, which is the
main determinant of the imitation cost (Anton et al. 2005). Many innovations involve
hidden know-how even if the allowed performance is perfectly observable. Consider for
instance a process innovation leading to a cost reduction that is reflected back in the
market price but for which the technological knowledge is neither perfectly revealed nor
easily reverse-engineered. In this case, imitating the process innovation or building around
it may be rather costly. Moreover, the imitation cost may depend on whether the invention
has been patented or not. As the patent discloses some enabling technological information,
it is clear that imitating a patented innovation should be at most as costly as if it was kept
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secret. Our paper offers a natural framework to analyze the classical trade-off between
getting a legal protection involving a compulsory disclosure of enabling information and
keeping secrecy by giving up legal protection.
Third, even if patents do not always appear as the best form of protection, innovators
may nevertheless prefer to patent their innovations because holding a patent offers the
possibility to settle a dispute against an alleged infringer through a licensing agreement
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005, Farrell and Shapiro, 2007). Alleged infringers may also prefer to
avoid a litigation process not only because litigation is costly but also because winning the
lawsuit against the patent holder involves a free-riding aspect, as other competitors benefit
from the asserted patent’s invalidity. Therefore, even when they are weak, patents may
generate substantial revenues through licensing royalties that are likely to harm consumers.
This is why patent settlements raise serious concerns for competition policy authorities
(Shapiro, 2003, Encaoua and Hollander, 2004).
The main objective of this paper is to introduce these arguments in a simple model
allowing a discussion of the following issues:
i/ What are the different forces that interact in the choice of a protection regime (patent
or secrecy)?
ii/ How are these forces affected by the patent strength, imitation cost and innovation size?
iii/ What sort of licensing agreements are likely to emerge in order to avoid patent litiga-
tion?
Two main contributions have explicitly explored the decision whether to patent an in-
novation or not.2 Hortsman et al. (1985) assume that an innovating firm possesses private
2Among other papers related to the choice of an intellectual property regime, one can mention Crampes
(1986), Gallini (1992) and Scotchmer and Greene (1990). Crampes (1986) examines the trade-off between
keeping an invention secret during an indefinite time or obtaining a legal protection over a finite duration
(the statutory patent life). Gallini (1992) introduces the idea that breadth governs the cost of inventing
around the patent. However, it is entry cost rather than imitation cost that matters. Scotchmer and
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information about profits available to competitors and that patent coverage may not ex-
clude profitable imitation. Conceived as an information transfer mechanism, a patent that
covers full information is not optimal. The optimal innovator’s choice is a mixed strategy
between patenting and keeping secrecy while the follower’s optimal choice is to stay out
of the market when the innovator patents and to imitate when the innovator does not.
The peculiarities of this model, in terms of the patent’s signaling aspect and the a priori
restrictions put on the follower’s actions, explain why there is no imitation of a patented
innovation at equilibrium. Since our paper is close to Anton and Yao (2004), we describe
more thoroughly their framework. Starting from the premise that disclosure provides com-
petitors with usable information and focusing on the innovator’s decision about how much
of an innovation should be disclosed, their model is particularly relevant for a special kind
of secrecy effectiveness. They describe a situation where the real innovation performance
is not directly observable while the disclosed know-how enables a competitor to costlessly
replicate it. Therefore, by choosing the amount to be disclosed, the innovator directly
controls the behavior of the potential imitator. Their model is a signaling game where the
innovator has private information on the innovation size and decides to reveal, partially
or fully, this information, letting the potential imitator infer the leader’s advance. The
follower chooses either to imitate or not under the risk of infringement. A refined perfect
bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game involves a separating strategy in which: i/ small
innovations are patented and fully disclosed; ii/ medium innovations are patented and par-
tially disclosed; iii/ large innovations are not patented and partially disclosed through a
public announcement. This result is illustrated by their suggestive title: "little patents
Greene (1990) focuses on the impact of patent policy on the incentives to innovate. Their model involves
a binary choice as the innovation would not be realized if it were not patented. They also assume full
disclosure of technological know-how.
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and big secrets".
In our model, we maintain the general trade-off an innovator is confronted to when
choosing its protection regime. However, rather than focusing on the signaling aspect we
assume that: i/ the process innovation size, measured by the cost reduction, is directly
observable; ii/ a patent reveals technological information that lowers the imitation cost
relative to the situation where the know-how embedded in the innovation is kept secret.3
Choosing to patent the invention may expose the innovator either to an increased imitation
level or to a lower one because the imitation level does not only depend on the imitation
cost but also on two other crucial parameters: the innovation size and patent strength.
It may happen that an innovator benefits from being imitated : this occurs whenever
the incurred loss due to imitation is overcompensated by the damages it receives from an
imitator if the court upholds the patent validity and the patent infringement. If patent
protection and secrecy lead to the same imitation level, then patenting is preferred since
damages are expected under the patent regime. This corresponds to the damage effect.
But whenever imitation levels differ according to the protection regime, a conflict arises
as long as imitation becomes higher under the patent regime. This corresponds to the
competition effect. Therefore, when the imitation extent is decided by the follower, different
interactions may occur between the competition effect and the damage effect. Our paper
aims to clarify these interactions. We propose a complete information multistage game in
which three common knowledge parameters are important: the innovation size, the patent
strength and the relative cost of imitation. We depart from the assumption limiting a
priori an imitator’s behaviour by letting it choose its own cost reduction in response to
3If the reduction of the imitation cost directly depends on the disclosed level of enabling knowledge,
using a relative imitation cost parameter is equivalent to using a disclosure level. It appears however that
working with the relative imitation cost parameter is more realistic since the imitation extent remains
controlled by the imitator, while the choice of a protection regime is made by the innovator.
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the process innovation. We also assume that the damages paid by an imitator infringing
a valid patent are equal to its profit, which corresponds to the unjust enrichment legal
doctrine. Our damages specification only presents a slight difference with the infringer’s
revenue rule assumed in Anton and Yao (2004).4 Thus, our results may be compared to
the "little patents and big secrets" results in Anton and Yao.
Our main findings are as follows. For a given innovation size, patent strength and
relative imitation cost generally act as substitutes: A decrease in one of these parameters
must be compensated by an increase in the other one in order to keep the same value of the
innovator’s profit. Inventors of small process innovations always prefer patent protection
to secrecy. This reminder of the "little patents" result in Anton and Yao (2004) rests
however on a different argument in our model. For large process innovations, our results
present some difference with the " big secrets" characterization in Anton and Yao. Our
model does not totally discard the possibility of patenting some large process innovations,
whenever imitation is too costly. This may happen when information is poorly disclosed in
the patent. In this case the innovator is indifferent between secrecy and patent protection.
For medium process innovations, our results differ more significantly from those of Anton
and Yao. It is not optimal for a firm producing such an innovation to file a patent of bad
quality, that is a patent having a low probability to be upheld by the court, unless the
disclosed information does not significantly lower the imitation cost. We show that there
exists a safe protection level that is sufficient to deter any imitation and that this level is
lower than a 100% protection. As the innovation size decreases, protecting the innovation
by means of secrecy becomes less likely. Finally, the "one size fits all" principle in the
4In a more recent paper, Anton and Yao (2005) introduce the "lost" profits of the patentee, defined
as the profits that would have occured in the absence of infringement. They show that at equilibrium,
infringement may take one of two forms: a "passive" form in which lost profits of the patentee are zero
and an "agressive" form where they are positive. One of the main results in Anton and Yao (2005) is that
infringement always occurs when damages equal lost profits. This last result does not hold in our model.
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patent design is not validated by our analysis.
These results raise many practical issues. While the model predicts that it is seldom
optimal for a firm to file a patent when the probability that it will be upheld by the court
is low, bad quality patents (relatively to novelty and non-obviousness requirements) are
widespread in the real word. How can this be explained? Moreover, why are low quality
patents not litigated more often than we observe? These issues are at the heart of what has
been called the patent paradox (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Scotchmer, 2004). We devote a
brief analysis that suggests a possible answer to explain this paradox. Whenever a patent
is not conceived only as a protection against imitation but also as a tool to reach private
settlements through licensing agreements (Shapiro, 2003), licensing agreements may act
as an alternative to patent litigation. A royalty rate independent of the patent strength
combined to a specific fixed fee may serve this purpose.
The model is presented in section 1.2. The market competition outcome under the
shadow of infringement is described in section 1.3. The imitator’s behaviour is analyzed
in section 1.4. The core of the paper, which corresponds to the protection regime choice is
examined in section 1.5. We devote section 1.6 to licensing agreements. Our conclusions
are presented in section 1.7.
1.2. The basic set-up
We examine a process innovation in a framework involving two competing firms. We
suppose that firm 1 is an innovating firm and firm 2 is a potential imitator. Each firm is
risk-neutral and seeks to maximize its expected profit. Initially, both firms produce at the
same marginal cost c > 0 . Fixed production costs are assumed to be zero. We assume
that firm 1 undertakes an R&D investment which reduces its marginal cost to the level
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d1 < c. The game we consider below starts once the innovation is realized and involves
three stages.
First, in the protection stage, the innovator has to choose between two protection
regimes. The first regime, which we denote by P, is to patent its innovation, and the
second regime, which we denote by S, consists of protecting its innovation by means of
secrecy.
Second, in the imitation stage, after the observation of the innovator’s marginal cost d1,
firm 2 chooses whether, and the extent to which, it wishes to imitate (or "build around")
the innovator’s technology. It makes an investment to reduce its marginal cost to d2 ∈
[d1, c] . Note that we do not allow the imitator to improve the innovator’s technology.5 The
difference c − d2 captures the "extent of imitation". When d2 = c, there is no imitation
at all and when d2 = d1, imitation is full. We assume that imitation at a level d2 ∈ [d1, c[
induces a fixed imitation cost I(d2) which depends on whether the innovation is patented or
kept secret. More specifically, we assume that the imitation cost under the patent regime,
which we denote by IP (d2), and the imitation cost under the secrecy regime, which we
denote by IS(d2), satisfy the following condition :
IP (d2) = fIS(d2)
where the parameter f ≥ 0 measures the relative costs of imitation under the regimes P
and S. We assume that f ≤ 1 : since patenting involves a compulsory disclosure, it is
likely that imitating a patented innovation will turn out to be less costly than imitating a
secret innovation.
5Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Chang (1995) examine the issue of technology improvement by a
second generation innovator in a cumulative innovation framework.
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Third, in the competition stage, market outcomes are determined under the shadow
of punishment. We assume that, when the innovation is patented, firm 1 sues firm 2 for
infringement if firm 2 imitates firm 1 by adopting a follow-up technology that reduces its
marginal cost to d2 < c. We also assume that firm 2 systematically contests the validity
of the patent covering the innovation.6 We denote by g the probability that the patent
survives the imitator’s legal contestation of the patent’s validity. We interpret this param-
eter as the patent’s quality : low quality patents have higher chances to be invalidated by a
court than high quality patents. Thus, a higher quality patent (in terms of novelty and in-
ventiveness) is less uncertain: the probability that a court will uphold its validity is higher.
We denote by e the probability that an imitation infringes the innovator’s patent condi-
tional on the patent being valid. This probability can be interpreted as an indicator of the
lagging patent’s breadth: the broader the patent’s breadth, the higher the probability that
a follow-up technology that reduces the marginal cost c to d2 ∈ [d1, c[ is an infringement
of the patent on the process innovation d1. Firm 2 is compelled to pay damages, supposed
to be equal to its market profit, if and only if the patent is held valid and the imitation
infringes the patent. This occurs with probability θ = eg. The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] , which
we assume to be common knowledge,7 corresponds to what it is called the patent strength
(Shapiro 2003). When the innovation is not patented, no damages are paid.
Following Anton and Yao (2004), we model our duopoly market competition as a tra-
6The typical defense in real-world patent infringement suits is to contest infringement and patent
validity.
7Assuming that the parameter θ is common knowledge is consistent with our goal of putting aside any
signaling effect. However, this assumption might seem to be quite strong: It is reasonable to think that
the innovator might have some private information as to the validity of its patent (captured through the
parameter g) and the imitator might have some private information as to the probability of infringement
e. See Bebchuk (1984) and Meurer (1989) for analysis of patent litigation under asymmetric information.
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ditional Cournot competition with linear market demand:
p(x1 + x2) = a− (x1 + x2)
where x1 is the output of firm 1, x2 is the output of firm 2 and p(x1 + x2) is the market
clearing price.
We assume that c < a < 2c. The first inequality is usual and means that the marginal cost
before innovation is below the choke price. The second inequality expresses that the market
is small which is a likely scenario for innovative markets, as it allows the possibility that
the innovative firm becomes at least twice as efficient as it currently is. In other words,
the inequality a < 2c implies that there exist innovations d1 such that d1 < 2c− a, which
can also be written as a− d1 > 2(a− c).
We choose a convex specification for the imitation technology and, to reach analytical
results, we use the following quadratic expression :
I(d2) =

f (c−d2)
2
2 if Patent
(c−d2)2
2 if Secret
1.3. Competition stage
Competition occurs under the shadow of litigation only if the innovation is patented.
Therefore, the outcome of the competition stage depends on whether the innovation is
patented or not.
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1.3.1. Patented innovation
We separately examine the cases d2 < c (i.e. the follower imitates the innovator, at
least partially) and d2 = c (i.e. the follower does not imitate the innovator), as the profit
functions differ between these two cases.
The follower imitates (d2 < c) : Under regime P , the expected gross profits of firm 1
and firm 2 are given by:
ΠP1 (x1, x2, d1, d2, θ) = (a− (x1 + x2)− d1)x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
market profits
+ θ (a− (x1 + x2)− d2)x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected damages
and
ΠP2 (x1, x2, d2, θ) = (1− θ) (a− (x1 + x2)− d2)x2
From the expected profits, one derives the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs xP1 (d1, d2, θ)
and xP2 (d1, d2, θ). They correspond either to an interior solution where both firms are
active : xP1 (d1, d2, θ) ≥ xP2 (d1, d2, θ) > 0 or to a boundary solution where only firm 1 is
active : xP1 (d1, d2, θ) > xP2 (d1, d2, θ) = 0.
Consider first an interior solution. Routine computations lead to:
xP1 =
a(1− θ) + d2(1 + θ)− 2d1
3− θ
xP2 =
a− 2d2 + d1
3− θ
A necessary and sufficient condition for an interior solution to exist is :
d2 <
a+ d1
2
(1.1)
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Note that this condition is always satisfied when d1 > 2c − a. Note also that the market
price pP (θ) is given by pP (θ) = a+d2(1−θ)+d13−θ which is increasing in θ ∈ [0, 1] as long as
condition (1) is satisfied.
Consider now a boundary solution. Such a solution arises when condition (1) is not satisfied
and is characterized by:
xP1 =
a− d1
2
and xP2 = 0
The follower does not imitate (d2 = c) : The equilibrium outputs in this case can be
derived from those of the previous case by taking θ = 0 and d2 = c. Hence:
- If d1 > 2c− a, then the equilibrium outputs are given by:
xP1 =
a+ c− 2d1
3
and xP2 =
a+ d1 − 2c
3
- If d1 ≤ 2c− a , then we have the same boundary solution as in the imitation case:
xP1 =
a− d1
2
and xP2 = 0
Summing up these cases, the expected equilibrium gross profits depend on d1, d2 and θ in
the following way :
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• If d1 ≤ 2c− a then:
ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) =

[a−d1(2−θ)+d2(1−θ)][a(1−θ)−2d1+d2(1+θ)]+θ[a−2d2+d1]2
(3−θ)2 if d2 <
a+d1
2
(a−d1)2
4 if
a+d1
2 ≤ d2 ≤ c
(1.2)
ΠP2 (d1, d2, θ) =

(1− θ) (a−2d2+d1)2
(3−θ)2 if d2 <
a+d1
2
0 if d2 ≥ a+d12
(1.3)
• If d1 > 2c− a then:
ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) =

[a−d1(2−θ)+d2(1−θ)][a(1−θ)−2d1+d2(1+θ)]+θ[a−2d2+d1]2
(3−θ)2 if d2 < c
(a+c−2d1)2
9 if d2 = c
(1.4)
ΠP2 (d1, d2, θ) =

(1− θ) (a−2d2+d1)2
(3−θ)2 if d2 < c
(a+d1−2c)2
9 if d2 = c
Therefore, under Cournot competition, firm 2 is driven out of the market if it keeps its
old technology when the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c − a) and remains active on
the market (even without imitating firm 1) when the cost reduction innovation is small
enough (d1 > 2c − a). This result depends on the small market assumption (a < 2c). In
a large market (a > 2c), firm 2 would remain in the market whatever the innovation size.
Thus, the small market assumption allows for strategic aspects that would not be captured
otherwise.
1.3.2. Non-patented innovation
The equilibrium outcomes under the secrecy regime are derived from those under the
patent regime by taking θ = 0. This simply means that no damages are paid when imitation
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occurs under secrecy. One obtains :
ΠS1 (d1, d2) =

(a−2d1+d2)2
9 if d2 <
a+d1
2
(a−d1)2
4 if d2 ≥ a+d12
(1.5)
ΠS2 (d1, d2) =

(a−2d2+d1)2
9 if d2 <
a+d1
2
0 if d2 ≥ a+d12
(1.6)
1.4. Imitation stage
Firm 2 aims to maximize its net profit when it chooses its imitation level d2 ∈ [d1, c] .
Since the follower’s gross profit and imitation cost depend on whether the innovation is
patented or not, we need to distinguish between these two regimes.
1.4.1. Patented innovation
Under this regime, the imitator’s net profit when it adopts a technology allowing to
produce at marginal cost d2 ∈ [d1, c] is given by :
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = Π
P
2 (d1, d2, θ)−
1
2
f (c− d2)2
The follower’s optimal imitation level when the innovation is patented is determined as:
dP2 (d1, f, θ) = Argmax
d2∈[d1,c]
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ)
Define A(θ) = 1−θ
(3−θ)2 . It is a decreasing function of θ ∈ [0, 1] such that A(0) =
1
9 and
A(1) = 0.
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The function d2 → H(d1, d2, f, θ) = A(θ)(a − 2d2 + d1)2 − 12f (c− d2)2, which is the
expression of GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) when d2 <
a+d1
2 and d2 < c, is necessarily either convex or
concave over its whole definition domain. The following preliminary results are easy to
show:
1- The function d2 → H(d1, d2, f, θ) is stricly convex if f < 8A(θ) and is strictly concave
if f > 8A(θ).
2- The unconstrained extremum of d2 → H(d1, d2, f, θ) is easily obtained by the the FOC:
dint2 (d1, f, θ) = c+
4A(θ)(d1 − 2c+ a)
8A(θ)− f (1.7)
In order to obtain the value of dP2 (d1, f, θ), it is necessary to know whether H(d1, d2, f, θ) is
convex or concave and to compare dint2 (d1, f, θ) to d1 and c. For instance, when d1 < 2c−a
and f > 8A(θ) (H strictly concave), equation (8) leads to dint2 (d1, f, θ) > c. Moreover,
as GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is a discontinuous function in d2 for d2 = c, it is necessary to com-
pare the value of GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) obtained in the absence of imitation to the value of
Argmax
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) obtained with imitation.
1.4.1.1. Drastic innovations (d1 < 2c− a)
With drastic innovations, partial imitation never occurs. The following proposition
(see appendix A1 for the proof) distinguishes two areas in the (θ, f) space according to
whether the optimal imitation level is maximum (i.e. dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d1) or minimum (i.e.
dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c). In the (θ, f) space, the extent of each of these two areas depends on d1.
Proposition 1 For drastic innovations (d1 < 2c − a), there exists a threshold function
ρ (d1, θ) = 2A(θ)
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2
which is decreasing in the patent strength θ and the innovation
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size c− d1 such that :
If f < ρ (d1, θ) , then the follower fully imitates: dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d1.
If f > ρ (d1, θ) , then the follower does not imitate dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c and is driven out of
the market.
The interpretation of this proposition, illustrated in figure 1, is quite straightforward.
When the process innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c−a), there exists a threshold imitation
cost ρ (d1, θ) such that if f is below this threshold it is optimal for a follower to fullly imitate
the patented innovation (dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d1), whereas if f is above the threshold, it does
not pay to imitate. Note that ρ (d1, 0) = 29
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2
< 89 for any d1 < 2c − a. Therefore,
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sufficiently large patented innovations, even when protected by a weak patent (θ not far
from 0), will not be imitated as long as the imitation cost parameter f is sufficiently high
(f > 89). This result means that for a sufficiently high lead advance of the innovator and
a sufficiently high imitation cost, imitation of the patented innovation never occurs and
the technological follower is driven out of the market. This result, which occurs under a
low intensity of competition in the product market (Cournot competition) is likely to hold
under a higher intensity of competition.8 Another important result is that the threshold
imitation cost ρ (d1, θ) decreases as the patent is stronger (higher θ) and as the innovation
is larger (lower d1). Hence the size of the region where no imitation occurs increases in the
innovation size. Furthermore, the patent strength θ and the imitation cost parameter f act
as substitutes, because both f and θ include a cost dimension for the imitator, directly via
f and indirectly via θ. As θ increases, the expected damages paid by the infringer increase
and correspond to a higher cost of infringement. Therefore an increase in one of these cost
parameters must be compensated by a decrease in the other one in order for the imitator
to keep the same expected profits.
Remark: The fact that partial imitation does not occur in this case rests on two
key properties of the Cournot duopoly equilibrium profit under a linear demand (and
possibly other demand specifications). These are convexity in the firm’s own marginal cost
and submodularity with respect to own marginal cost and rival’s marginal cost. These
properties along with the convexity of the imitation cost makes the region of the (θ, f)
space where the imitator’s net profit GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is convex expands as d1 decreases. In
this region, the only potential optimal behaviors for the imitator is to imitate fully or not
imitate at all. If d1 is sufficiently low (i.e. the innovation is sufficiently large), this region is
8It is different from the result obtained in Anton and Yao (2005) according to which imitation always
occurs under the lost profit damage rule
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sufficiently wide to encompass (high) values of f (for a fixed θ) for which non-imitation is
optimal. Since non-imitation will still be optimal for higher values of f , partial imitation
will never occur.
1.4.1.2. Small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c− a)
This case is more complicated to analyze. Partial imitation is no more discarded.
Indeed, three situations, namely full imitation, partial imitation and no imitation, may
occur according to the values of the parameters (d1, f, θ). The following proposition (proven
in appendix A2) summarizes the follower’s optimal strategy according to the values of the
parameters f , θ and d1 when d1 > 2c− a.
Proposition 2 Consider small and medium innovations (d1 > 2c − a). For each value
of d1, there exist three separating functions in the (θ, f) space defined by α (d1, θ) =
4A(θ)a−d1c−d1 , β (d1, θ) = 2A(θ)
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2 − 29 (d1−2c+ac−d1 )2 and γ(θ) = 8A(θ)1−9A(θ) that delineate
three regions:
- If (f, θ, d1) satisfy f < Min(α (d1, θ) , β (d1, θ)), then the follower fully imitates:
dP2 (f, θ, d1) = d1
- If (f, θ, d1) satisfy α (d1, θ) < f < γ(θ), then the follower partially imitates: dP2 (d1, f, θ) =
dint2 (d1, f, θ)
- If (f, θ, d1) satisfy β (d1, θ) < f < α (d1, θ) or f > Max(α (d1, θ) , γ(θ)), then the
follower does not imitate: dP2 (f, θ, d1) = c.
The functions α (d1, θ) and β (d1, θ) are decreasing in the patent strength θ and in the
innovation size c−d1 and γ(θ) is decreasing in the patent strength θ. Moreover the equations
in θ given by α (d1, θ) = β (d1, θ) and α (d1, θ) = γ(θ) have the same solution θ0(d1) ∈ [0, 1[
which means that the curves f = α (d1, θ), f = β (d1, θ) and f = γ(θ) meet at a same point
CHOOSING INTELLECTUAL PROTECTION 54
θ0(d1) in the (θ, f) space for a given d1 > 2c− a.
This proposition is illustrated in figure 2 in which we assume that 2c − a < d1 <
9c−4a
5 . It follows from α(d1, 0) =
4
9
a−d1
c−d1 that α(d1, 0) < 1 ⇔ d1 < 9c−4a5 . Therefore it
is worth distinguishing medium innovations
(
2c− a < d1 < 9c−4a5
)
from small innovations
(d1 > 2c− a) .
The imitator’s choice of d2 is affected by three variables: the cost parameter f, the patent
strength θ and the innovation size c−d1. Define θγ and θβ(d1) respectively as the solutions
to the equations: γ(θ) = 1 and β (d1, θ) = 0. For a given innovation d1 such that d1 > 2c−a,
the effect of the cost imitation parameter f on the imitation level d2 depends on the value
of the patent strength θ in [0, 1] in a specific way that we now describe.
When θ < θγ , the patent is very weak and imitation occurs whatever the cost imitation
parameter f for two reasons. First, the risk of infringing a very weak patent is not suffi-
ciently dissuasive: even if an infringement lawsuit occurs, damages will be paid with a very
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low probability θ. Second, imitation is not expensive enough to deter imitation of a small
or medium innovation (d1 > 2c− a). Therefore, imitation is either partial or full according
to the imitation cost f . It is only partial if f is above the threshold α (d1, θ) and it is full
if f is below this threshold.
When θγ ≤ θ ≤ θ0(d1), the patent is stronger and imitation becomes more expensive since
the payment of damages occurs with a higher probability θ. Therefore, imitation may be
either absent, partial or full, according to the imitation cost parameter value f . There is
no imitation at all when f is higher than γ(θ). Imitation is only partial when f is below
γ (θ) and above the previous threshold α (d1, θ) and is full when f is lower than α (d1, θ).
A third situation occurs when θ0(d1) < θ < θβ(d1). In this case, infringing is much more
expensive because the patent will be upheld by the court with a higher probability θ.
However, keeping the old technology d2 = c is also very detrimental to the follower. There-
fore, imitation is either full or absent according to whether f is below or above the lower
threshold β (d1, θ) .
Finally, a fourth situation occurs for the highest values of θ (i.e. θ > θβ(d1)). In this
case, it is no longer profitable to imitate even when imitation is costless, because the
patent protection is very strong. The imitation cost does not matter anymore and the
presumptions that the patent will be upheld by the court and that imitation will be judged
as being an infringement are so high that the patent protection plays fully its role against
imitation. Since θβ(d1) < 1, it is interesting to note that less than perfect protection is
sufficient to deter imitation. Therefore, it is justified to refer to the value θβ(d1) as the
safe protection level. A patent that protects against imitation does not need to be 100%
perfect and the safe protection level depends on the importance of the innovation itself. As
the innovation is less important (d1 increases), the safe protection level θβ(d1) increases.
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This important result suggests that smaller innovations require stronger protection, since
they are likely to be imitated. This is a serious argument against the "one size fits all"
protection principle.
The effect of d1 over dP2 (f, θ, d1) for a given (θ, d1) is interesting: as d1 decreases, leading
to an innovation involving a higher cost reduction, the partial imitation area increases
because α (d1, θ) decreases, the full imitation area decreases because both α (d1, θ) and
β (d1, θ) decrease and the no-imitation area increases because β (d1, θ) decreases.
1.4.2. Non-patented innovation
The follower’s optimal imitation strategy under regime S can be simply derived from
its optimal imitation strategy under regime P by taking f = 1 and θ = 0. The next
proposition summarizes our findings when the innovator chooses to use secrecy to protect
its innovation.
Proposition 3 Under the secrecy regime, the follower’s optimal imitation strategy d1 →
dS2 (d1) is as follows:
- If d1 ≤ 2c− a then the follower does not imitate (dS2 (d1) = c) and is driven out of the
market.
- If 2c− a < d1 < 9c−4a5 then the follower partially imitates (dS2 (d1) = 9c− 4(a+ d1) <
d1).
- If 9c−4a5 ≤ d1 ≤ c then the follower fully imitates (dS2 (d1) = d1).
Note that large innovations (d1 ≤ 2c−a ) are never imitated under regime S while they are
fully imitated under regime P when f < ρ(d1, θ). The explanation of this rather counter-
intuitive result simply derives from the previous remark that ρ(d1, 0) < 1 for any d1 ≤
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2c− a.Then under the patent regime where some enabling knowledge is disclosed, the cost
imitation parameter f may be so low (more specifically f < ρ(d1, θ)) that it may be
profitable to incur the low imitation cost fI(d1) even when damages are paid with a high
probability θ.
1.5. Protection stage
Which protection regime will the innovator choose given its anticipation of the follower’s
imitation level under each of the two regimes? To answer this question, we need to compare
its equilibrium expected profit under the patent regime
Π˜P1 (d1, f, θ) ≡ ΠP1 (d1, dP2 (d1, f, θ), θ)
to its equilibrium profit under the secrecy regime
Π˜S1 (d1) ≡ ΠS1 (d1, dS2 (d1))
Let us first determine the forces that drive the innovator’s protection regime choice. Con-
sider two (exogenous) imitation levels d2, d′2 ∈ [d1, c]. The difference ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) −
ΠS1 (d1, d
′
2) can be decomposed in the following way:
ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ)−ΠS1 (d1, d′2) =
(
ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ)−ΠS1 (d1, d2)
)
+
(
ΠS1 (d1, d2)−ΠS1 (d1, d′2)
)
The first term of this decomposition, namely the difference ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) − ΠS1 (d1, d2),
corresponds to what we call the damage effect. Given an imitation level d2, the innovator
can expect some damages if it patents its innovation, which is not the case if it chooses to
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keep it secret. Let us show that the damage effect is always (weakly) negative and (weakly)
increasing in θ. This is equivalent to show that function θ −→ ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) is (weakly)
increasing for any d2 ∈ [d1, c]. For any d2 < min
(
c, a+d12
)
, one obtains:
∂ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ)
∂θ
=
6θ(a− d2)(d2 − d1) + 6(a− 2d2 + d1) + 2(a− 2d2 + d1)2
3− θ
When d2 < min
(
c, a+d12
)
, one can check that this derivative is strictly positive. In partic-
ular, this leads to :
ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) > Π
P
1 (d1, d2, 0) = Π
S
1 (d1, d2)
When d2 ≥ a+d12 , we have shown that ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) does not depend on the parameter
θ. In particular, ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) = ΠP1 (d1, d2, 0) = ΠS1 (d1, d2). It follows that ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ)−
ΠS1 (d1, d2) ≥ 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and d2 ∈ [d1, c] .
Turn now to the second term. The difference ΠS1 (d1, d2)−ΠS1 (d1, d′2) corresponds to what we
call the competition effect. The innovator’s profits decline as it is more imitated: ΠS1 (d1, d2)
is an increasing function of d2, which implies that the sign of ΠS1 (d1, d2)−ΠS1 (d1, d′2) is the
same as the sign of d2 − d′2.
Thus, if the innovator anticipates that it will be less (or equally) imitated under the patent
regime than under the secrecy regime then both the damage effect and the competition
effect suggest the same protection regime, namely the patent regime. But if the innovator
anticipates that it will be more imitated under the patent regime than under the secrecy
regime, then the damage effect and the competition effect are opposite. The first one
increases the incentives for the innovator to choose the patent regime while the second
one increases the incentives to choose the secrecy regime. The following lemma, that
summarizes and completes what precedes, is useful for the subsequent analysis:
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Lemma 4 If the innovator is less (or equally) imitated under regime P than under regime
S then its optimal protection regime is the patent regime P. In particular, when the inno-
vator anticipates that it will be fully imitated under the secrecy regime or that it will not be
imitated at all under the patent regime, it chooses to patent its innovation.
In order to determine the innovator’s optimal protection regime, we distinguish the
three cases that appeared in the imitation stage discussion.
Case 1: d1 < 2c− a (large innovations)
In this case, we know that the innovator is not imitated at all when it chooses to keep
secrecy (dS2 (d1) = c). Its equilibrium expected profit under regime S is then given by:
Π˜S1 (d1) = Π
S
1 (d1, d1) =
(a− d1)2
4
We have also shown that under the patent regime, the innovator is fully imitated or not
imitated at all, according to whether f < ρ (d1, θ) or f > ρ (d1, θ) . Hence, its equilibrium
expected profit under regime P is given by:
Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) =

(a−d1)2
(3−θ)2 if f < ρ (d1, θ)
(a−d1)2
4 if f > ρ (d1, θ)
implying that : Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) < Π˜S1 (d1) if f < ρ (d1, θ) and Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) = Π˜S1 (d1) if
f > ρ (d1, θ) .
This leads to the following proposition illustrated in figure 3.
Proposition 5 If the innovation is large enough (d1 < 2c − a), the innovator prefers to
keep its innovation secret if f < ρ (d1, θ) and is indifferent between patent protection and
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secrecy if f > ρ (d1, θ).
Hence, keeping secrecy is always an optimal strategy to the innovator when the innova-
tion is large (d1 < 2c − a). Such a choice may hinder the diffusion of large innovations,
which may be detrimental to society since large innovations are likely to be those bringing
breakthroughs and opening big opportunities for technological improvements (cumulative
innovation). Proposition 5 suggests one way to make innovators patent their very inven-
tive innovations: this may be induced either by reducing the level of compulsory disclosure
which is equivalent, in our model, to increasing the value of the parameter f or by increasing
the value of the expected damages.
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Case 2: 2c− a < d1 < 9c−4a5 (medium innovations)
In this case, the innovator is partially imitated under regime S (dS2 (d1) = 9c−4a−4d1 < d1)
and its equilibrium expected profit under this regime is given by:
Π˜S1 (d1) = Π
S
1 (d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1) = (3c− a− 2d1)2
Three subcases must be distinguished according to the value of dP2 (d1, f, θ) which affects
Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) = Π
P
1 (d1, d
P
2 (d1, f, θ)).
Subcase 2.1: f < Min(α (d1, θ) , β (d1, θ))
We know that for such values of parameters, the innovator is fully imitated under regime
P (dP2 (d1) = d1). Its equilibrium expected profits under regime P are :
Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) = Π
P
1 (d1, d1) =
(a− d1)2
(3− θ)2
Some straightforward calculations lead to:
Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) > Π˜
S
1 (d1)⇐⇒ θ > θ˜(d1) =
9c− 4a− 5d1
3c− a− 2d1 (1.8)
Hence the innovator chooses to keep its innovation secret if θ < θ˜(d1) and to patent it
if θ > θ˜(d1). Note that θ˜(d1) is a decreasing function of d1 ∈
[
2c− a, 9c−4a5
]
such that
θ˜(9c−4a5 ) = 0 and θ˜(2c− a) = 1.
It is interesting to compare this new threshold θ˜(d1) to the previously defined safe protection
level θβ(d1). Since A(θ) is strictly decreasing, the comparison of θβ(d1) and θ˜(d1) can be
derived from the comparison of A(θβ(d1)) and A(θ˜(d1)). From β (d1, θβ(d1)) = 0 we derive:
A(θβ(d1)) =
(d1−2c+a)2
9(a−d1)2 and, using the above expression of θ˜(d1), one obtains: A(θ˜(d1)) =
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3(d1−2c+a)(3c−a−2d1)
(a−d1)2 . Therefore we just need to compare
d1−2c+a
9 and 3 (3c− a− 2d1) . For
any d1 ∈
]
2c− a, 9c−4a5
[
,we have d1−2c−a9 <
a−c
45 and 3 (3c− a− 2d1) > 3(a− c) and so we
get A(θβ(d1)) < A(θ˜(d1)) which is equivalent to θ˜(d1) < θβ(d1).
This result shows that even if a medium innovation is expected to be fully imitated under
the patent regime, a patent protection is still preferred by the innovator if the patent
holder expects to recover the infringer’s profit with a sufficiently high probability. Note
that this probability θ˜(d1) is lower than the safe protection level θβ(d1) previously defined.
Therefore, patents will be filed even if their protection level is strictly lower than the safe
protection level warranting perfect protection against imitation (see figure 4).
Subcase 2.2 : α (d1, θ) < f < γ(θ)
In this subcase, the innovator is partially imitated under regime P (dP2 (d1) = dint2 (d1, f, θ))
and under regime S (dS2 (d1) = 9c − 4(a + d1) < d1). The following lemma (proven in
appendix A3) compares these imitation levels under regime P and regime S.
Lemma 6 When the innovator is partially imitated under both protection regimes, two
cases arise:
- If f < 9A(θ) then the innovator is more imitated under regime P than under regime S.
- If f > 9A(θ) then the innovator is more imitated under regime S than under regime P.
Finally, by combining the two previous lemmas, we reach the conclusion that when f >
9A(θ), the innovator chooses to patent its innovation since the damage effect and the
competition effect go in the same direction. However, if f < 9A(θ) the damage effect and
the competition effect are opposite. The following lemma is crucial in order to compare
Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) to Π˜S1 (d1) in this case.
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Lemma 7 Along any curve f = KA(θ) in the (θ, f) space, where K is a strictly positive
parameter, the innovator’s equilibrium profit Π˜P1 (d1, θ, f) increases in the patent strength
θ as long as partial imitation occurs.
Proof. We showed in appendix A3 that the follower’s level of imitation dint2 (d1, f, θ)
depends on the parameters θ and f only through fA(θ) . This implies that d
int
2 (d1, f, θ)
remains constant as one moves on the curve f = KA(θ). Then lemma 7 appears as
a simple corollary of the result according to which the function θ −→ ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) is
increasing, for given marginal costs d1 and d2, This result appeared when we introduced
the damage effect.
Using this lemma, we derive the following result (proven in appendix A4).
Lemma 8 For medium innovations (2c − a < d1 < 9c−4a5 ), when α (d1, θ) < f < 9A(θ),
there exists a threshold λ(d1, θ) decreasing in the patent strength θ such that the innovator
keeps its innovation secret if f < λ(θ, d1) and θ < θ˜(d1) and patents it if f > λ(θ, d1) or
θ > θ˜(d1).The threshlod function λ (d1, θ) satisfies the following two conditions : λ(d1, 0) =
1 and λ(d1, θ˜(d1)) = α(d1, θ˜(d1)).
The first condition states that the innovator is indifferent between patenting and keeping
secrecy when θ = 0 and f = 1 and the second that it is indifferent between these two regimes
when θ = θ˜(d1) and f = α(d1, θ˜(d1) which is consistent with our previous findings (see
figure 4).
Subcase 2.3: β (d1, θ) < f < α (d1, θ) or f > Max(α (d1, θ) , γ(θ))
In this subcase, the innovator is not imitated at all under the patent regime (dP2 (d1) = d1).
We derive from lemma 4 that the innovator’s optimal protection regime is regime (P).
Finally, the following proposition summarizes the case 2c− a < d1 < 9c−4a5 .
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Proposition 9 For medium process innovations
(
2c− a < d1 < 9c−4a5
)
, there exist a thresh-
old function θ˜(d1) decreasing in the innovation size c−d1 and a threshold function λ (d1, θ)
decreasing in the patent strength θ such that :
- If θ < θ˜(d1) and f < λ (d1, θ) then the innovator chooses the secrecy regime
- If θ > θ˜(d1) or f > λ (d1, θ) then the innovator chooses the patent regime.
This proposition, illustrated in figure 4, can be interpreted as follows. When the patent is
strong enough (θ > θ˜(d1)) the innovator always chooses to patent its innovation whatever
the imitation cost parameter f. This means that the imitation cost allowed by disclosure
does not matter anymore when the patent strength is above θ˜(d1). In particular, it patents
its innovation even if disclosure makes the imitation costless. This result does not hold
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for weak patents (θ < θ˜(d1)). In this case, the competition effect and the damage effect
may go in opposite directions leading to different protection regimes according to whether
the disclosure effect of patenting is high enough (f < λ (d1, θ)) or not. The effect of the
innovation size on the secrecy region is clear: since θ˜(d1) decreases as the innovation size
decreases (d1 increases), the corresponding area shrinks as the innovation is smaller.
Case 3: d1 > 9c−4a5 (small innovations)
In this case, the innovator will be fully imitated if it chooses regime S (dS2 (d1) = d1).
Therefore, according to lemma 4, the innovator’s optimal protection regime is the patent
regime (P).
Proposition 10 Small innovations (d1 > 9c−4a5 ) are always patented.
This result can be explained in the following way : since small innovations are fully
imitated under secrecy, patenting is preferred for two reasons. First, it may deter imitation
leading to higher market profits. Second, even when the patent strength and the disclosure
effect are such that imitation cannot be deterred, it allows the innovator to expect some
damages compensating its market profit loss due to imitation, which is not the case under
secrecy regime.
We develop now an overall discussion of our results by comparing them to those of
Anton and Yao (2004) and embedding them in a broader perspective.
The latter proposition states that inventors of small process innovations always prefer
protection induced by patent to the protection conferred by a trade secret. This result is a
reminder of the "little patents" expression coined by Anton and Yao (2004). However, the
argument behind this common result is different in our model. Under the secrecy regime,
small process innovations are fully imitated for two reasons that reinforce one another.
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First, imitating a small innovation is not very costly and second, there is no threat of an
infringement lawsuit when the innovation is kept secret. Under patent protection, such a
threat exists and it may overrun the benefits that the infringer expects from imitating the
leader. Note that in our model, small innovations may be imitated under the patent regime
while this does not occur in Anton and Yao.
For large process innovations, our results are similar to the " big secrets" characteri-
zation obtained in Anton and Yao (2004). Large process innovations are never imitated
when they are kept secret, while the enabling knowledge disclosed by a patent may reduce
the imitation cost in a way that renders their imitation attractive. This classical tradeoff
in the economics of patents explains why "big secrets" are preferred to "big patents". Note
however that our model does not totally discard the possibility of patenting some large
process innovations. This may occur when their imitation under the patent regime is too
costly. In this case we have shown that the innovator is indifferent between secret and
patent, because in both cases, the innovation is not imitated.
Finally, it is for medium process innovations that our results significantly differ from
those of Anton and Yao. We have shown that keeping a medium process innovation secret
does not avoid imitation. It is precisely for medium process innovations that partial inno-
vation occurs under the secrecy regime. However, under the patent regime, imitation may
be either absent, partial and total. We have also shown that the innovator may patent or
keep secrecy while in Anton and Yao, medium process innovations are always patented and
partially disclosed.
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1.6. Licensing agreements as alternatives to litigation
In this section, we allow for licensing agreements between the innovator and the follower.
Since our purpose is not to study all the possible agreements that may emerge, we restrict
our attention to the simple case of process innovations leading to a small cost reduction,
i.e. d1 > 9c−4a5 . We know from the previous section that those innovations are always
patented. We analyze licensing agreements between the innovator and an imitator that
avoid litigation to be completed until the court’s decision.
We study two-part tariff licenses (r, F ) where r is a royalty rate and F a fixed fee. Let
us first examine the equilibrium outcomes when the innovator and the follower agree on a
license (r, F ). Gross profits can be written as
ΠL1 (x1, x2, d1, r, F ) = (a− x1 − x2 − d1)x1 + rx2 + F
ΠL1 (x1, x2, d1, r, F ) = (a− x1 − x2 − (d1 + r))x2 − F
An equilibrium of the competition stage under the license regime (L) is given by
xL1 =
a− d1 + r
3
xL2 =
a− d1 − 2r
3
and leads to the following equilibrium price:
pL =
a+ 2d1 + r
3
We assume hereafter that 0 ≤ r ≤ a−d12 . This assumption does not entail any loss of
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generality since any royalty rate such that r > a−d12 leads to the same boundary solution
as r = a−d12 :
xL1 =
a− d1
2
xL2 = 0
Equilibrium gross profits are given by:
Π˜L1 (d1, r, F ) =
(
a− d1 + r
3
)2
+ r
a− d1 − 2r
3
+ F (1.9)
Π˜L2 (d1, r, F ) =
(
a− d1 − 2r
3
)2
− F (1.10)
1.6.1. A benchmark: the non-collusive agreement
First, we address the following question: does there exist a license (r, F ) such that
the profits under the license regime replicate the profits under the patent regime (without
licensing), i.e:
Π˜L1 (d1, r, F ) = Π˜
P
1 (d1, θ)
and
Π˜L2 (d1, r, F ) = Π˜
P
2 (d1, θ)
Since we do not set any restriction on the fixed fee F (in particular, we allow F to be
negative), it is clear that such a question amounts to the existence of a royalty rate r such
that the industry profits Π˜L(d1, r) = Π˜L1 (d1, r, F ) + Π˜L2 (d1, r, F ) under the license regime
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replicate the industry profits under the patent regime without licensing, i.e:
Π˜L(d1, r) = Π˜P1 (d1, θ) + Π˜
P
2 (d1, θ) (1.11)
which can be rewritten as:
1
9
[−r2 + (a− d1)r + 2(a− d1)2] = 2− θ
(3− θ)2 (a− d1)
2 (1.12)
Solving this equation, we find a unique solution :
r˜(θ) =
θ
3− θ (a− d1) (1.13)
The equilibrium price is then given by:
p˜L (θ) =
a+ d1(2− θ)
3− θ
The royalty rate r˜(θ) and equilibrium price p˜L (θ) are increasing in θ. We can now derive
the fixed fee F˜ (θ) from the equation Π˜L2 (d1, r˜(θ), F˜ (θ)) = Π˜P2 (d1, θ):
F˜ (θ) =
θ(θ − 1)
(3− θ)2 (a− d1)
2
Thus, we obtain the following properties of the function F˜ :
- F˜ (0) = F˜ (1) = 0.
- F˜ (θ) < 0 for any θ ∈ ]0, 1[ .
- F˜ (θ) is strictly decreasing over
[
0, 35
]
and strictly increasing over
[
3
5 , 1
]
.
Note that the license (r˜(θ), F˜ (θ)) not only replicates the expected profits of the innovator
CHOOSING INTELLECTUAL PROTECTION 70
and the follower under regime P (without licensing) but also induces the same equilibrium
outputs and then the same equilibrium price. It is indeed easy to check that :
x˜L1 (θ) =
a− d1 + r˜(θ)
3
=
(1− θ) (a− d1)
3− θ = x
P
1 (θ)
and
x˜L2 (θ) =
a− d1 − 2r˜(θ)
3
=
a− d1
3− θ = x
P
2 (θ)
which obviously lead to
p˜L (θ) = pP (θ)
where pP (θ) is the equilibrium price under the patent regime without licensing.
Thus, the fact that competition stage outcomes are identical under both regimes (patent
under the shadow of infringement and license defined by (r˜(θ), F˜ (θ))), allows us to consider
the license regime defined by (r˜(θ), F˜ (θ)) as a benchmark to which we could compare the
outcomes of the licensing agreements that are likely to emerge.
Consider Shapiro’s criterion that a settlement, e.g. a licensing agreement, should not
be allowed unless it does not make consumers worse off relative to the situation where
litigation occurs. The non collusive agreement we fully characterized above meets this
requirement since it does not result in a higher price. However, there exists a fundamuntal
difference between Shapiro (2003) and our setting: competition occurs and prices are set
in Shapiro’s model after the issues of validity and infringement are resolved while in our
setting, it happens before (competition occurs under the shadow of infringement). Due to
this difference, it is possible to design a settlement that improves firm’s profits without
decreasing consumers’ expected surplus in Shapiro (2003) while this is not possible in our
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setting.9
1.6.2. The most collusive agreement
One of the agreements which are more likely to emerge is a two-part tariff license thet
maximizes the firms’ joint profits. The part of the industry profits allocated to each firm
is then determined by the fixed fee F .
Consider such a licensing agreement, denoted by
(
rˆ(θ), Fˆ (θ)
)
. Since rˆ(θ) is defined by
rˆ(θ) = Argmax ΠL(d1, r)
0≤r≤a−d1
2
, the royalty rˆ(θ) does not depend on the patent strength θ.More-
over, it is easy to see that ΠL(d1, r) is an increasing function of r over interval
[
0, a−d12
]
.
This yields:
rˆ(θ) = rˆ =
a− d1
2
= r˜(1), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]
leading to the price:
pˆ(θ) = pˆ =
a+ d1
2
= p˜L (1) ≥ p˜L (θ) , ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]
This result means that the patent strength is no longer reflected by the price paid by
consumers. In particular, low quality patents which generate lower prices when litigated,
generate the same price as would high quality patents. This obviously harm the consumers.
Note that xL2 =
a−d1−2r
3 = 0 when r = rˆ. Hence, when the follower accepts the license(
rˆ, Fˆ (θ)
)
it implicitly accepts to stay out of the market and the industry profits are then
captured by the patentee. Nevertheless, the innovator transfers a part of these monopoly
profits to the licensee through the negative fixed fee Fˆ (θ). In other words, the license
9In our model, the only agreement that is acceptable by both parties and does not harm consumers is
the non collusive agreement determined above.
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(
rˆ, Fˆ (θ)
)
is equivalent to an agreement whereby the innovator pays its competitor to stay
out of the market. Hence this illustrates in our framework the issue, raised by Shapiro
(2003), that licensing agreements used to settle patent litigation could actually be used as
a way to reach anticompetitive outcomes.
The patentee’s and the licensee’s profits when they agree on the license
(
rˆ, Fˆ (θ)
)
are
given by:
ΠL1 (d1, θ) =
(a− d1)2
4
+ Fˆ (θ)
ΠL2 (d1, θ) = −Fˆ (θ)
This type of agreement is accepted by both the innovator and the follower as long as the
fixed fee Fˆ (θ) is in the interval
[
ΠP1 (d1, θ)− (a−d1)
2
4 ,−ΠP2 (d1, θ)
]
, that is:10
Fˆ (θ) ∈
[
−A(θ) (5− θ) (a− d1)2 ,−A(θ) (a− d1)2
]
(1.14)
The possibility that such two-part tariffs involving negative fees emerge in licensing agree-
ments is a big concern for competition authorities. We know that in the pharmaceutical
industry, agreements of this kind have been actually used by some patent holders in their
negociations with generic challengers under the Hatch-Waxman Act. They obviously harm
consumers and this is why patent settlements, which take the form of licensing agreements,
must be under the scrutiny of competition authorities (Shapiro, 2003).
10The license (rˆ, F0(θ)) where F0(θ) = −A(θ) (5− θ) (a− d1)2 is the optimal license, from the innovator’s
perspective, among all the licenses that maximize industry profits. It is likely to emerge if the innovator
has a "take it or leave it" bargaining power. Indeed, it is clear that with such a bargaining power the
innovator will pay its competitor the minimum amount that makes it accept to stay out the market.
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1.7. Conclusion
Departing from the usual convention that patents are perfect forms of protection opens a
lot of research avenues. One of the most important issues is to know under what conditions
patent protection is preferred to secrecy. Our model provides a theoretical answer to this
question for a process innovation. For each class of cost reduction (small, medium and
large) we have obtained specific results. First, we have determined the imitation level in
each regime. Second, in the space of the two key parameters (patent strength and relative
imitation cost) we have derived the partition that delineates areas where one protection
regime dominates the other. How can one use these results for a policy purpose? This is
an interesting and complex issue for which we suggest preliminary insights. Consider the
relative imitation cost. In a world where patent design is independent of the invention,
particularly concerning the same compulsory disclosure for all patents, it seems very hard
to determine a priori what would be the value of the imitation cost parameter. One can
simply reach a rather vague idea of the secrecy effectiveness of the invention, that leads to
an idiosyncratic characterization covering a large spectrum of possibilities, running from
the "naked idea" case to the "perfectly hidden idea" case. This type of assessment would
depend on some priors on whether the invention could be more or less easily discovered by
reverse-engineering. But in a world where a patent is not designed around the "one size
fits all" principle, some flexibility could be introduced by allowing each innovator to choose
a patent inside a menu of characteristics. For instance an innovator may have to choose
between a patent with strong property rights and high disclosure requirements and a patent
with weak property rights and low disclosure requirements. If an incentive mechanism
built around this principle could be achieved, it would be an appropriate answer to the
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rather disappointing result that "little patents and big secrets" are the preferred forms of
protection. Small innovations could be easily imitated because their rights are weak. Large
innovations could be patented because their rights are strong. In both cases, diffusion of
innovation would be enhanced. The construction of such an incentive mechanism is left for
future research.
Our model analyzes also the licensing agreements between a patent holder and a com-
petitor. Such agreements avoid the litigation to go until completion. One of the possible
consequences of a patent settlement as an alternative to a trial raises some concerns. The
royalty rate paid by the licensee does not depend on the patent strength as a natural
benchmark would command. Licensing very bad quality patents may occur with as high
royalty rate as if the patent were full-proof. Moreover, the patentee pays a fixed fee to the
licensee to compensate its loss in the market. While the two parties maximize their joint
profits, it is clear that such a settlement harms consumers and creates a big concern for
society. Shapiro (2003) and Farrell and Shapiro (2005) reach the same conclusion by using
quite different models.
Finally, while some economists (Ayres and Klemperer, 1999) find that probabilistic
rights open welfare improving opportunities (entry occurs under the shadow of punishment)
it is also important to stress some of their negative consequences. Adopting trade secrecy
for large inventions may reduce the diffusion of innovation. Moreover, patent settlements
of the sort examined in this paper are detrimental to society. This is one reason why patent
quality is probably one of the most challenging issues to which we are now confronted.
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1.9. Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Since ΠP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = 0 for any d2 ∈
[
a+d1
2 , c
]
, it follows from the fact that imitation is
costly that the follower’s best imitation level over this interval is d2 = c :
Argmax
d2∈
[
a+d1
2
,c
]GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = c (1.15)
which implies that the follower’s optimal imitation level is necessarily equal to either c or
Argmax
d2∈
[
d1,
a+d1
2
] GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ).
In order to determine the maximum value of GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) over the interval
[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
,
we must distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : f < 8A(θ)
The function d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is convex over
[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
since GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) =
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H(d1, d2, f, θ) over this interval. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that dint2 (d1, f, θ) <
a+d1
2 . Then, there are two possibilities according to whether d
int
2 (d1, f, θ) > d1 or dint2 (d1, f, θ) ≤
d1.
- If dint2 (d1, f, θ) > d1 then d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is decreasing over the interval
[
d1, d
int
2 (d1, f, θ)
]
and is increasing over the interval
[
dint2 (d1, f, θ),
a+d1
2
]
, which entails that d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ)
reaches its maximum value over the interval
[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
at either d2 = d1 or d2 = a+d12 .
- If dint2 (d1, f, θ) < d1 then d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is increasing over the interval
[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
which implies that it reaches its maximum value at d2 = c.
The crucial point is that in both cases, dP2 (d1, f, θ) ∈
{
d1,
a+d1
2 , c
}
. Since we know that
the follower prefers not to imitate rather than imitate at a level d2 = a+d12 , it is sufficient
to compare GP2 (d1, d1, f, θ) to GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) = 0 in order to determine dP2 (d1, f, θ). Hence,
two subcases arise:
- If f < 2A(θ)
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2
then GP2 (d1, d1, f, θ) > 0 which results in dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d1 (full
imitation)
- If 2A(θ)
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2
< f < 8A(θ) then GP2 (d1, d1, f, θ) < 0 which results in dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c
(no imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(θ)
In this case, dint2 (d1, f, θ) > c >
a+d1
2 and d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is concave over the
interval
[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
. Then, the function d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is increasing over the interval[
d1,
a+d1
2
]
, which results in Argmax
d2∈
[
d1,
a+d1
2
] GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = a+d12 . Since GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = 0
for any d2 ≥ a+d12 , we conclude that dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c (no imitation).
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
The imitator must compare the maximal net profit it can get when it imitates, i.e. sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) =
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sup
d2∈[d1,c[
H(d1, d2, f, θ) , to the net profit it derives from keeping its old technology, ie.
GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) =
(d1−2c−a)2
9 .Two cases must be distinguished:
Case 1 : f < 8A(θ)
In this case, dint2 (d1, f, θ) > c and d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is convex over the interval [d1, c[,
which entails that d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is decreasing over the interval [d1, c[ , and results
in sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = G
P
2 (d1, d1, f, θ) which has to be compared to GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) .
This leads us to distinguish two subcases.
Define β (d1, θ) = 2A(θ)
(
a−d1
c−d1
)2 − 29 (d1−2c+ac−d1 )2 .
- If f < β (d1, θ) thenGP2 (d1, d1, f, θ) > GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) which results in dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d1(full
imitation).
- If f > β (d1, θ) then GP2 (d1, d1, f, θ) < GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) which results in dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c (no
imitation).
Case 2 : f > 8A(θ)
In this case, dint2 (d1, f, θ) < c and d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is concave over the interval [d1, c[.
Two subcases must be distinguished :
- If dint2 (d1, f, θ) < d1 then d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) is decreasing over the interval [d1, c[ ,
which implies that sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = G
P
2 (d1, d1, f, θ).
- If dint2 (d1, f, θ) > d1 then d2 → GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) reaches its maximum over [d1, c[ at
d2 = dint2 (d1, f, θ): sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = G
P
2 (d1, d
int
2 (d1, f, θ), f, θ).
Consider the condition dint2 (d1, f, θ) < d1. It is straightforward to show that this inequality
can be rewritten as :
f < α (d1, θ) =
4(a− d1)
c− d1 A(θ)
Then, the two previous subcases can be written as:
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- If 8A(θ) < f < 4(a−d1)c−d1 A(θ) then sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = G
P
2 (d1, d1, f, θ) which has to
be compared to GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) (this has been previously done).
- If f > 4(a−d1)c−d1 A(θ) then sup
d2∈[d1,c[
GP2 (d1, d2, f, θ) = G
P
2 (d1, d
int
2 (d1, f, θ), f, θ) which has to
be compared to GP2 (d1, c, f, θ). Comparing these two terms is equivalent to comparing f
to the threshold γ(θ) = 8
(3−θ)2
1−θ −9
. More specifically:
• If 4(a−d1)c−d1 A(θ) < f < γ(θ) then GP2 (d1, dint2 , f, θ) > GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) which leads to
dP2 (d1, f, θ) = d
int
2 (d1, f, θ) (partial imitation).
• If f > γ(θ) then GP2 (d1, dint2 , f, θ) < GP2 (d1, c, f, θ) which leads to dP2 (d1, f, θ) = c
(no imitation).
Let us now show that the equations α (d1, θ) = β (d1, θ) and α (d1, θ) = γ(θ) have the same
solution θ0(d1) over the interval [0, 1[ ,which means that the curves f = α (d1, θ) , f =
β (d1, θ) and f = γ(θ) meet at the same point.
Some straightforward computations show that the equation α (d1, θ) = β (d1, θ) is equiva-
lent to the equation:
A(θ) =
1
9
d1 − 2c+ a
a− d1
Therefore, the equations α (d1, θ) = β (d1, θ) and α (d1, θ) = γ(θ) have the same solution
in θ over the interval [0, 1[ if (and only if) 19
d1−2c+a
a−d1 is a solution in X to the equation
4(a−d1)
c−d1 X =
8
X−9 . It is easy to check that this is satisfied.
A3. Proof of lemma 6
It is easy to see that dint2 (d1, f, θ) depends on the parameters (f, θ) only through the
parameter f (3−θ)
2
1−θ .With a slight modification of notations, we can write d
int
2 (d1, f, θ) =
dint2 (d1,
f
A(θ)). It is also clear that the imitation level d
int
2 is increasing in
f
A(θ) . Hence,
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lemma 6 simply derives from dS2 (d1) = dint2 (d1,
f
A(θ) = 9).
A4. Proof of lemma 8.
Consider first the case θ < θ˜ (d1) . Let us show that equation ΠP1 (d1, dint2 (d1, f, θ), θ) =
ΠS1 (d1, 9c − 4a − 4d1) which expresses that the innovator is indifferent between patent-
ing and keeping secrecy (in this subcase) has a unique solution in f over the interval
[α(d1, θ), 9A(θ)]. Since the function f −→ dint2 (d1, f, θ) is strictly increasing over the inter-
val [α(d1, θ), 9A(θ)], this is equivalent to state that equation ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) = ΠS1 (d1, 9c−4a−
4d1) has a unique solution in d2 over the interval
[
dint2 (d1, α(d1, θ), θ), d
int
2 (d1, 9A(θ), θ)
]
.
The latter interval can simply be written as [d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1] .Note that the function
Fθ : d2 −→ ΠP1 (d1, d2, θ) − ΠS1 (d1, 9c − 4a − 4d1) is a convex parabolic function then it is
either i/ increasing over [d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1] or ii/ U-shaped over [d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1] . Since
θ < θ˜ (d1), we have Fθ(d1) < 0 (see subcase 2.1). We also know from lemma 4 that
F (9c − 4a − 4d1) ≥ 0. It follows that in both cases i/ and ii/ equation Fθ(d2) = 0 has
a unique solution over [d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1] . Hence, the equation ΠP1 (d1, dint2 (d1, f, θ), θ) =
ΠS1 (d1, 9c − 4a − 4d1) has a unique solution in f that we denote by λ(d1, θ). Note that
dint2 (d1, 1, 0) = d
S
2 (d1) = 9c− 4a− 4d1 which leads to λ(d1, 1) = 0. Note also that :
ΠP1 (d1, d
int
2 (d1, f, θ), θ) > Π
S
1 (d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1) if and only if f > λ (d1, θ) (1.16)
Furthermore, we know that dint2 (d1, α(d1, θ˜ (d1)), θ˜ (d1)) = d1 and ΠP1 (d1, d1, θ) = ΠS1 (d1, 9c−
4a−4d1) (see subcase 2.1) so ΠP1 (d1, dint2 (d1, α(d1, θ˜ (d1)), θ˜ (d1)), θ˜ (d1)) = ΠS1 (d1, 9c−4a−
4d1) which leads to λ(d1, θ˜(d1)) = α(d1, θ˜(d1)).
Consider now the case θ > θ˜ (d1) . Let θ0 > θ˜ (d1) and f0 ∈ ]α(d1, θ), 9A(θ)[ . The point
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(θ0, f0) belongs to the curve f = f0A(θ0)A (θ) . It is easy to see (graphically or analytically)
that the curve f = f0A(θ0)A (θ) necessarily meets either the curve defined by θ = θ˜(d1)
and f ≤ α(d1, θ) or the curve defined by f = λ(d1, θ) and θ ≤ θ˜ (d1) at a point (θ1, f1)
such that θ1 < θ0. Since in any point of the latter two curves the innovator’s profit under
regime P is equal to its profit under regime S, and θ1 < θ0, we derive from lemma 7
that the innovator’s profit under regime P is greater than its profit under regime S when
(θ, f) = (θ0, f0) . Hence, the innovator chooses to patent its innovation.
Let us now show that λ(d1, θ) is strictly decreasing in θ. Consider θ1 and θ2 such that
θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ˜(d1). The points (θ1, d1) and
(
θ2,
λ(d1,θ1)
A(θ1)
A (θ2)
)
belong to the curve defined by
f = λ(d1,θ1)A(θ1) A (θ). We derive from lemma 7 that Π
P
1 (d1, d
int
2 (d1,
λ(d1,θ1)
A(θ1)
A (θ2) , θ2), θ2) <
ΠP1 (d1, d
int
2 (d1, λ (d1, θ1) , θ1), θ1) = Π
S
1 (d1, 9c− 4a− 4d1) which leads, according to (1.17),
to λ(d1,θ1)A(θ1) A (θ2) > λ(d1, θ2). Furthermore we know that A (θ) is positive and decreasing,
so A(θ2)A(θ1) < 1. This allows us to state that λ(d1, θ1) > λ(d1, θ2).
Chapter 2
Licensing Uncertain Patents:
Per-Unit Royalty vs Fixed Fee1
2.1. Introduction
Licensing intellectual property is a key element in the innovation process and its diffu-
sion. A license is a contract whereby the owner of intellectual property authorizes another
party to use it, in exchange for payment.2 The properties and virtues of licensing (Kamien,
1992, Scotchmer, 2004) have mainly been analyzed in a framework in which intellectual
property rights guarantee perfect protection and give their owners a right to exclude as
strong as physical property rights do. This framework does not correspond to what we ob-
serve in practice. In the real world patents do not give the right to exclude but rather a more
limited right to "try to exclude" by asserting the patent in court (Ayres and Klemperer,
1999, Shapiro, 2003, Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). The exclusive right of a patentholder
1This chapter is based on a joint work with David Encaoua.
2According to some surveys (Taylor and Silberstone,1973, Rostoker,1984, and Anand and Khanna,
2000), the per-unit royalty rate and the fixed fee mechanism are the most frequent licensing schemes.
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can be enforced only if the court upholds the patent validity. For this reason, patents are
considered as probabilistic rights rather than ironclad rights. This paper is devoted to the
analysis of licensing patents that are uncertain, i.e. patents that have a positive probability
to be invalidated by a court if they are challenged.3
Many reasons explain the inherent uncertainty attached to a patent. First, the standard
patentability requirements, namely the subject matter, utility, novelty and non-obviousness
(or inventive step in Europe) are difficult to assess by patent office examiners. Legal uncer-
tainty over the patentability standards is especially pervasive in the new patenting subject
matters for which the prior art is rather scarce, like software or business methods. More-
over, the claims granted by the patent office are supposed to delineate the patent scope,
but their ex post validation depends on the judicial doctrine adopted by the court, and
it may be difficult for a patentholder and a potential infringer to know exactly what the
patent protects. Second, the resources devoted to the patentability standards review by
the patent office are in general insufficient to allow an adequate review of each patent ap-
plication.4 Many innovations are granted patent protection even though they do not meet
patentability standards. This results in many "weak patents", i.e. patents that have a high
probability to be invalidated by a court if they are challenged. Finally, it has been argued
that incentives inside the patent offices make it easier and more desirable for examiners to
grant patents rather than reject them (Farrell and Merges, 2004, IDEI report, 2006).
The patent quality problem raises many concerns particularly in the US.5 We may ask,
3This uncertainty does not necessarily imply asymmetric information or different beliefs about patent
validity among involved parties. Uncertainty may occur even if the parties share the same beliefs on the
patent validity. For a different view, see Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Meurer (1989),
Hylton (2002).
4The average time spent by an examiner on each patent is about 15-20 hours in the USPTO (Jaffe &
Lerner, 2004) and around 30 hours in the EPO. The gap between the massive growth of patent applications
and the insufficient resources at the patent office creates a "vicious circle" (Caillaud and Duchêne, 2005).
Incentives to file "bad applications" increase the patent office overload, and a larger overload leads to
further deterioration of the examination process.
5Europe is also concerned by the patent quality problem even though the post-grant opposition at the
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first: are bad quality patents harmful or not? Lemley (2001) claims that it is reasonably
efficient to maintain a low standard of patent examination, in accordance with the "rational
ignorance principle". Specifically, he argues that the cost of a thorough examination for
each application would be prohibitive while inducing only a small benefit. Firstly, the
majority of patents turn out to have insignificant market value implying that the social
cost of granting them is small even if they are invalid. Secondly, if a weak but profitable
patent is granted, some market players will probably bring the case before a court to settle
the validity issue, if the patent is licensed at too high a price.
These arguments have attracted much criticism. First, there are many reasons to think
that individual incentives to challenge a weak patent are rather low. A patentee generally
cares more about winning than a potential infringer does, since by winning against a
single challenger, a patentee establishes the validity of the patent against many other
potential infringers. By contrast, when infringers are competitors, a successful challenge
obtained by one of them benefits all (Farrell and Merges, 2004, Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).6
Consequently, according to the free-riding argument, the individual incentives to challenge
a patent validity are weak. Moreover, according to the so-called pass-through argument,
licensees are induced to accept a high per-unit royalty rate when they can decide to pass-on
the royalty to their customers.7 Finally, an unsuccessful attacker may be in jeopardy or
even evicted from the market once deprived from the new technology, or required to pay a
higher price than the licensees who have accepted the licensing contract.
EPO alleviates it (see Graham et al. 2003). The European situation in terms of patent quality is analyzed
in Guellec and von Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) and the IDEI report (2006).
6Following the Blonder-Tongue decision (1971), it became clear that "the attacker is not able to exclude
others from appropriating the benefit of its successful patent attack", Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ.
of Illinois Found, 402, U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
7When multiple infringers compete in a product market, royalties are often passed-through, at least
in part, to consumers. The pass-through will be stronger the more competitive the product market, the
more symmetric the royalties, the more elastic the industry supply curve, and the less elastic the industry
demand curve" (Farrell and Merges, 2004).
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All these arguments suggest that individual incentives to challenge a patent may be
rather low. The probabilistic nature of patent protection and the low individual incentives
to challenge a patent may thus strengthen the market power of the licensor. The owner of
a probabilistic right and a potential user will come to a licensing agreement as a private
settlement to avoid the uncertainty of a court resolution. An agreement benefits the holder
of a weak patent while litigation and possible invalidation by a court would deprive the
licensor from any licensing revenue. However the licensing contract will be accepted by
the licensee only if its expected profit is at least as large as when the patent validity is
challenged. Therefore licensing an uncertain patent under the shadow of patent litigation
raises an interesting trade-off. We show in this paper that different factors explain the issue
of this trade-off: i) the nature of the licensing scheme (per-unit royalty vs. up-front fee); ii)
the patent strength measured by the probability that it will be upheld; iii) the importance
of the innovation; iv) the type of commitment when dealing with an unsuccessful challenger;
v) the possibility to engage in collective negotiations of the licensing contract; vi) some
market structure variables such as the size of the industry and the intensity of market
competition.8
The literature on licensing and the properties of the different licensing mechanisms
has extensively examined the case of perfect patent protection. Based largely on previ-
ous works by Arrow (1962), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Kamien and Tauman (1984,
1986), Kamien et al. (1992), the survey by Kamien (1992) summarizes the major results,
especially by comparing the patentholder’s profits under different licensing schemes. The
patentee’s profits are highest when licensing is made through an auction, in which the
patentee announces the number of licenses on offer and the latter accrue to the highest
8Since a non-licensee suffers a negative externality when a competitor becomes a licensee, more intense
competition in the product market increases the licensor’s market power.
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bidders. The per-unit royalty scheme and the up-front fee mechanism have been set against
each other. While the earlier literature claimed that a per unit royalty always generates
lower profits than a fixed fee, regardless of the industry size and the magnitude of the in-
novation (Kamien and Tauman,1984 and 1986), a more recent work has shown that when
the number of firms in the industry is sufficiently high, the innovator’s payoff is higher
with royalty licensing than with a fixed fee or an auction (Sen, 2005). Moreover, some
licensing methods induce full diffusion, while others lead to only partial diffusion of the
innovation: the number of licensees depends on the licensing method and the magnitude
of the cost reduction. In a more recent contribution, Sen and Tauman (2007) generalize
these findings by allowing the optimal combination of an auction and a per-unit royalty in
situations where the innovator may be either an outsider or an insider in the industry.9
Let us now consider that a patent is a probabilistic right. Rough intuition suggests
that licensing an uncertain patent in the shadow of patent litigation leads to a license price
which is proportional to the patent strength. This intuition is not always correct for the
following reason: when imperfect competition occurs in the industry, the free riding argu-
ment mentioned above lowers the individual incentives to challenge the patent’s validity
and this benefits the patentholder. Farrell and Shapiro (2007) establishes two important
properties for a minor cost reducing innovation: (i) For weak patents, the royalty rate is
as high as if the patent were certain: it is equal to the magnitude of the cost reduction
allowed by the innovation; (ii) Whatever the patent strength, the royalty rate obtained in
9Another burgeoning literature explores the consequences of informational asymmetries on licensing.
Aoki and Hu (1996) examines how the choice between strategic licensing and litigating is affected by the
levels of the litigation costs and their allocation between the plaintiff and the defendant. Brocas (2006)
identifies two informational asymmetries: the moral hazard due to the inobservability of the innovator’s
R&D effort, and the adverse selection due to the private value of holding a license. Macho-Stadler et al.
(1996) introduces know-how transfer and shows that the patentholder prefers contracts based on per-unit
royalties rather than fixed fee payments. Other contributions, emphasizing either risk aversion (Bousquet et
al., 1998), strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002), strategic complementarity (Muto, 1993, Poddar and Sinha,
2004), or the size of the oligopoly market (Sen, 2006) reach the same conclusion stating the superiority of
the royalty licensing scheme.
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the shadow of patent litigation exceeds the expected value of the royalty resulting from the
patent challenge. These strong properties have been obtained by considering a two-part
licensing contract mechanism combining a per-unit royalty and a fixed fee, allowing for
instance a high royalty rate to be compensated by a negative transfer (i.e. an up-front fee
paid by the licensor to the licensee).10 Two restrictive assumptions have been used in Far-
rell and Shapiro to obtain these results: first, they restrict their analysis to small process
innovations, i.e. innovations leading to a small cost reduction; second, they assume that
the best patentholder’s licensing strategy is to sell a license to all firms in the industry,
rather than to restrict the license supply to some firms, leaving it to others to possibly
initiate a litigation process.
In this paper we assess the robustness of these results by separately investigating two of
the most common licensing mechanisms, namely the per-unit royalty rate and the up-front
fee. We analyze the properties of these mechanisms which let the licensor choose the number
of licensees whatever the innovation size. For both types of licensing schemes, we develop
a three-stage game in which the patentholder, acting as a Stackelberg leader, determines
either a royalty rate or a fixed fee at the first stage. At the second stage, each firm
independently decides whether to accept the licensing contract. If it does not, it challenges
the patent validity. If the patent is found valid, the unsuccessful challenger is bound to use
the old technology. If the patent is found invalid, all the firms in the oligopolistic industry
have free access to the technology. In the last stage, licensees and non-licensees compete in
the product market. Different variants of this basic model are examined in this paper, by
introducing the possibility of a collective challenge or by allowing renegotiation between
the patentholder and an unsuccessful challenger.
10Farrell and Shapiro also investigate a two-part tariff in which the fixed fee is constrained to be non-
negative. However, in this case, their main result holds only under additional restrictions.
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Our paper departs from Farrell and Shapiro (2007) in several ways. First, unlike Farrell
and Shapiro who focus on a single licensing scheme combining a per-unit royalty and a fixed
fee, we separately investigate these two schemes; second, while they only consider the case
where the cost reduction is small, we investigate the consequences of any cost reduction;
third, we relax the crucial assumption of their paper stating that the patentholder licenses
every firm in the industry, by endogeneizing the number of licensees. We show below
that this endogeneization has important consequences, particularly when comparing the
properties of the per-unit royalty rate and the up-front fee licensing schemes. We also
challenge the assumption that an unsuccessful challenger is offered a license at a price that
captures its entire surplus.
We contribute to the literature on licensing uncertain patents on five points. First, we
show that while it is generally possible for the patentholder to reap some "extra profit"
by selling an uncertain patent under the per-unit royalty regime, the opportunity to do
so under the up-front fee regime disappears. This is due to the fact that the patentee’s
profit under a fixed fee regime is always equal to the expected profit in case of litigation.11
Second, we show in the case of a linear demand under Cournot competition that the
patentee’s profits may be higher with a per-unit royalty than with a fixed fee. This result
- which confirms Sen (2005) - rests on a completely different argument based on patent
uncertainty. Third, for the per-unit royalty regime, we obtain sufficient conditions under
which the royalty rate resulting from a collective challenge is lower than the expected
royalty from an individual challenge. Fourth, we show that there exist situations in which
11Under a fixed-fee licensing regime, the patentholder can avoid patent litigation only by offering a fee at
most equal to a proportion of the fee that he would choose if the patent were perfect, this proportion being
exactly equal to the patent strength. Under a per-unit royalty regime, the patentholder prefers to avoid
patent litigation if and only if the royalty is higher than some threshold. Sufficient conditions under which
this threshold is larger than the expected value of the royalty rate in case of litigation are established.
Other sufficient conditions ensure that the threshold may be lower than this benchmark. These properties
are a novel contribution on licensing uncertain patents.
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the per-unit royalty for a weak patent is below the expected royalty in case of litigation.
The latter result is obtained under general assumptions on the profit functions and is
confirmed when post-trial renegotiation is introduced. Finally, we show that the results
obtained with perfect patents also hold when patents are uncertain but strong: in this
case, litigation never occurs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 examines the per-unit royalty scheme.
It starts with the derivation of the maximal value of the per-unit royalty that deters any
litigation. This value is compared to two benchmarks: i/ the expected value of the royalty
in case of litigation; ii/ the royalty that would prevail under collective challenges of the
patent validity. The patentholder’s optimal royalty rate and its licensing revenues are then
determined. The conditions under which litigation is avoided at the subgame perfect
equilibrium are established. Section 2.3 analyzes the fixed fee licensing scheme. It derives
the demand for licenses and the licensing revenues as a function of the up-front fee. These
revenues are then compared to the expected revenues in case of litigation. In Section 2.4,
the two licensing mechanisms are compared from the licensor’s perspective. Section 2.5
concludes by summarizing the results, putting them in an economic policy perspective, and
suggesting new research directions.
2.2. Royalty licensing schemes
We consider an industry consisting of n identical risk-neutral firms producing at a
marginal cost c (fixed production costs are assumed to be zero). A firm P outside the
industry holds a patent covering a technology that would allow each firm to reduce its
marginal cost from c to c− .
In this section, we examine licensing schemes involving a pure royalty rate. More
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specifically, we seek to determine the subgame perfect equilibria of the following three-
stage game:
First stage: The patentholder P proposes a licensing contract whereby a licensee can
use the patented technology against the payment of a per-unit royalty rate r.
Second stage: The n firms in the industry simultaneously and independently decide
whether to purchase a license at the royalty rate r. If a firm does not accept the license
offer, it can challenge the patent validity before a court.12 The outcome of such a trial is
uncertain: with probability θ the patent is upheld by the court and with probability 1− θ
it is invalidated. The parameter θ measures the patent strength. If the patent is upheld,
then a firm that does not purchase the license uses the old technology,13 thus producing at
marginal cost c whereas those who accepted the license offer use the new technology and
pay the royalty rate r to the patentholder, having thus an effective marginal cost equal to
c− + r. If the patent is invalidated, all the firms, including those who accepted the offer
can use for free the new technology and their common marginal cost is c− . 14
Third stage: The n firms produce under the cost structure inherited from stage 2. The
kind of competition that occurs is not specified. It is only assumed that there exists a
12In the US, a firm can seek a declaratory judgement against the validity of a patent if it has a "reasonable
apprehension" of being sued for infringement by the patentholder. A firm that is planning to use a patented
technology, or is currently using it, without a license can reasonably fear to be sued for infringement.
13This assumption may seem quite strong but recall that IP laws do not compel patentholders to license
others, particularly those who challenge the validity of a patent or sue the patentholder for infringement
of their own patents. To illustrate, when Intergraph (a company producing graphic work stations) sued
Intel (micro-processors) for infringement of its Central Processing Unit patent, Intel countered by removing
Intergraph from its list of customers and threatening to discontinue the sale of Intel microprocessors to
Intergraph (See Encaoua and Hollander, 2002). We relax later this assumption by introducing renegotiation
between the unsuccessful challenger and the patentholder.
14Note that in our model the plaintiff is the potential licensee and the defendant is the patentholder while
in Farrell and Shapiro (2007) the roles are inversed. Both situations occur in the real world. Nonetheless,
note that, in a setting without litigation costs, as in our model and Farrell and Shapiro’s, who the plain-
tiff/defendant is does not matter. What matters in both models is that a trial in which patent validity will
be examined by the court, will occur whenever at least one firm does not accept the licensing contract. In
Farrell and Shapiro, a patentholder always finds it optimal to sue a firm that uses its technology without
a license and the alleged infringer challenges the patent validity as a defense strategy. In our model a firm
that refuses the licensing contract always finds it optimal to challenge the patent validity.
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unique Nash equilibrium in the competition game between the members of the oligopoly
for any cost structure of the firms.
We sum-up the outcome of the third stage by denoting pi(x, y) the equilibrium profit
function of a firm producing with marginal cost x while its (n − 1) competitors produce
with marginal cost y.15 The case where pi(x, y) = 0 is not excluded.
We assume the following general properties that are satisfied by a large class of profit
functions (See Amir and Wooders, 2000 and Boone, 2001).
A1. A firm’s equilibrium profit pi(x, y) is continuous in both it arguments over [0,+∞[×
[0,+∞[ and twice differentiable in both its arguments over the subset of [0,+∞[× [0,+∞[
in which pi(x, y) > 0. Moreover pi(c, c) > 0.
A2. A firm’s equilibrium profit is decreasing in its own cost : If pi(x, y) > 0 then pi1(x, y) <
0, and if pi(x, y) = 0 then pi(x′, y) = 0 for any x′ > x.
A3. A firm’s equilibrium profit is increasing in its competitors’ costs : If pi(x, y) > 0 then
pi2(x, y) > 0, and if pi(x, y) = 0 then pi(x, y′) = 0 for any y′ < y.
A4. In a symmetric oligopoly, an identical drop in all firms’ costs raises each firm’s
equilibrium profit: If pi (x, x) > 0 then pi1 (x, x) + pi2 (x, x) < 0, and if pi (x, x) = 0 then
pi (y, y) = 0 for any y > x.
Given A2 and A3, A4 means that own cost effects dominate rival’s cost effects. This
assumption, while being fullfilled in a wide range of competitive settings including Cournot
oligopoly and differentiated Bertrand oligopoly with linear demand, may not be satisfied
15We restrict the notation to the situations where at least (n− 1) firms produce with the same marginal
cost because this will be the case in all the equilibria under royalty licensing as we will see in the subsequent
analysis.
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under Cournot competition when the demand is "very convex" (see Kimmel 1992, Février
and Linnemer 2004).
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game using backward induction.
2.2.1. Accepting or not the patentholder’s offer: second stage
Let us determine the set of royalty rates r such that all firms accepting the licensing
contract is a Nash equilibrium of the second stage. This occurs if and only if no firm has
an incentive to deviate by refusing to buy a license at this rate and challenging the patent
validity.16 The expected profit from such a unilateral deviation is θpi(c, c −  + r) + (1 −
θ)pi(c− , c− ) because:
- If the challenger does not succeed in invalidating the patent, which happens with proba-
bility θ, it produces at the cost c while its competitors produce at the effective cost c−+r,
- If the patent is invalidated, which happens with probabiliy 1− θ, all firms produce at the
cost c− .
Thus, all firms accepting a per-unit royalty r is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
pi(c− + r, c− + r) ≥ θpi(c, c− + r) + (1− θ)pi(c− , c− ) (2.1)
Note that the royalty rate r affects both sides of this inequality. Due to assumption A4,
the left-hand side, that is, a firm’s profit when all firms accept the license is decreasing in r.
Due to assumption A3, the right-hand side, that is, the expected profit of a challenger when
all other firms accept the license offer, is (weakly) increasing in r. Thus, a lower royalty rate
makes the license option more attractive to a potential licensee for two reasons: it increases
16Since there are no litigation costs, a firm that refuses the licensing contract always finds it optimal to
challenge the patent validity. For an analysis of the effects of litigation costs on licensing under the shadow
of litigation, see Aoki & Hu (1999).
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the payoff from the license option and it decreases the payoff from the outside option namely
the challenge option. Note that the latter indirect effect arises only if pi(c, c −  + r) > 0.
However it may happen that the extent of the cost asymmetry between the licensees and
an unsucessful challenger result in zero profit for the latter, that is, pi(c, c− + r) = 0. We
distinguish between two cases according to whether such royalty rate values exist.
Case 1: pi(c, c− ) = 0.
This case may occur for a sufficiently large innovation (high value of ) or a sufficiently
intense competition (e.g. large number n of firms). Using assumptions A1 and A3 and
the intermediate value theorem, one easily shows that there exists a threshold rˆ ∈ [0, ]
such that pi(c, c −  + r) = 0 if r ≤ rˆ and pi(c, c −  + r) > 0 if r > rˆ. In other words, an
unsuccessful challenger will not be viable if the royalty rate is below some threshold rˆ, and
will be viable if the royalty rate is above the threshold rˆ.
Consider first a contract involving a royalty rate r ≤ rˆ. In this case, condition (2.1) can be
rewritten as:
pi(c− + r, c− + r) ≥ (1− θ)pi(c− , c− ) (2.2)
Let θˆ ∈ [0, 1] be the unique solution in θ to the equation pi(c−+ rˆ, c−+ rˆ) = (1−θ)pi(c−
, c − ). The following lemma introduces a threshold that is useful for characterizing the
licensing contracts accepted by all firms:
Lemma 1 Assume that pi(c, c− ) = 0. The equation pi(c− + r, c− + r) = (1− θ)pi(c−
, c − ) has a unique solution in r over [0, rˆ] for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. This solution, denoted
r2(θ), satifies the following properties: i/ r2(θ) is differentiable and increasing in θ over
LICENSING UNCERTAIN PATENTS 95
[
0, θˆ
]
17, ii/ r2(0) = 0 and r2(θˆ) = rˆ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now a contract involving a royalty rate r > rˆ. It will be accepted by all firms if
and only if inequality (2.1) is satisfied.
Lemma 2 Assume that pi(c, c − ) = 0. The equation pi(c −  + r, c −  + r) = θpi(c, c −
 + r) + (1 − θ)pi(c − , c − ) has a unique solution in r over [rˆ, ] for any θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
.
This solution, denoted r1 (θ), satisfies the following properties: i/ r1(θ) is differentiable and
increasing in θ over
[
θˆ, 1
]
, ii/ r1(θˆ) = rˆ and r1 (1) = .
Proof. See Appendix
We can now characterize the set of royalty rates that are accepted by all firms when
pi(c, c− ) = 0.
Proposition 3 If pi(c, c − ) = 0 then all firms accepting the royalty rate r is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if r ≤ r (θ) where:
r (θ) =

r2(θ) if θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
r1 (θ) if θ ∈
]
θˆ, 1
]
Proof. See Appendix.
When the innovation is large or/and the intensity of competition is high, proposition 3
shows that the firms’ incentives to accept a given royalty rate crucially depend on whether
the patent is relatively weak (i.e. θ ≤ θˆ) or relatively strong (i.e. θ > θˆ). When the
patent is strong, the positive effect of a higher royalty rate on the outside option profit
17Throughout this paper, a function f will be said to be differentiable over a closed interval [a, b] if it is
differentiable at any point of the open interval ]a, b[ , right-differentiable at a and left-differentiable at b.
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(i.e. a challenger’s profit) plays a role in constraining the royalty rates acceptable by all
firms. Indeed, pi (c, c− + r1 (θ)) > 0 because r1 (θ) > rˆ for all θ > θˆ. However, when the
patent is weak, this indirect effect does not play a role since pi (c, c− + r2 (θ)) = 0, due
to r2 (θ) ≤ rˆ for all θ < θˆ. In this sense, a firm has an additional incentive not to accept a
licensing contract when the patent is strong enough.18
Remark 1 : From lemma (1) and (2), it is clear that the maximal royalty rate r (θ)
acceptable by all firms is increasing and continuous over [0, 1] .Moreover, it is differentiable
over
[
0, θˆ
]
and
[
θˆ, 1
]
but its left-sided derivative is different from its right-sided derivative
at point θ = θˆ. One can show that the former is greater than the latter which is in line
with our previous observation that an extra force (stemming from the indirect effect we
pointed out) constrains the royalty rates acceptable by all firms when θ > θˆ.
The following property of r2(θ) will be useful for the comparison of the maximal royalty
rate r (θ) accepted by all firms to some benchmarks we define later.
Lemma 4 r2(θ) is convex over
[
0, θˆ
]
if (and only if) pi (x, x) is convex in x over [c− , c− + rˆ] .
Proof. See Appendix
Note that the convexity of a firm’s profit pi (x, x) in a symmetric industry holds for a
wide range of competitive environments, including Cournot oligopoly with linear or iso-
elastic demand and differentiated Bertrand oligopoly with linear demand.19
18One can get to the same interpretation using a more formal argument: defining the threshold r2 (θ)
not only for θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
but for all θ ∈ [0, 1[ as the unique solution to the equality derived from to inequality
(2), we can show that r1 (θ) < r2 (θ) for all θ ∈
]
θˆ, 1
[
.
19It can be shown that, if pi (x, x) is concave in x over [c− , c] then r2(θ) is concave over
[
0, θˆ
]
. However,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a simple demand function leading to the concavity of the equilibrium
profit function pi (x, x) under neither Cournot nor differentiated Bertrand competition.
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Case 2: pi(c, c− ) > 0
In this case, whatever the royalty rate r ≥ 0 proposed by the patentholder, the profit of
an unsuccessful challenger remains positive even when all other firms purchase a license:
pi(c, c−+r) ≥ pi(c, c−) > 0. Therefore, in this case, we use the same notation r1 (θ) for the
unique solution in r to the equation pi(c−+r, c−+r) = θpi(c, c−+r)+(1−θ)pi(c−, c−)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1] .20 The existence, uniqueness and properties of r1 (θ) can be established as
under case 1. These are stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 Assume that pi(c, c−) > 0. The equation pi(c−+r, c−+r) = θpi(c, c−+r)+
(1− θ)pi(c− , c− ) has a unique solution in r over [0, ] for any θ ∈ [0, 1] . This solution,
denoted r1 (θ), satisfies the following properties: i/ r1(θ) is differentiable and increasing in
θ over [0, 1], ii/ r1(0) = 0 and r1 (1) = .
Proof. See Appendix
The next proposition characterizes the set of royalty rates acceptable by all firms.
Proposition 6 If pi(c, c − ) > 0 then, for any θ ∈ [0, 1] , all firms accepting the royalty
rate r is a Nash equilibrium if and only if r ≤ r (θ) = r1 (θ).
Proof. See Appendix
Considering again the indirect effet that captures the positive externality of a higher
royalty rate on a challenger’s expected profit, we can state that this effect is always at
work in constraining the royalty rates acceptable by all firms when the innovation is small
or/and the competition intensity is low.
20The threshold r1 (θ) that could be denoted r1 (θ, ) to explicitly display its dependence upon , has been
previously defined for the values of  such that pi (c, c− ) = 0, and for patent strength values θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
(see lemma 2). Here, this threshold is defined for the values of  that satisfy pi (c, c− ) > 0 and for all
patent strength values θ ∈ [0, 1] .
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We now illustrate those results in the case of Cournot oligopoly with linear demand.
Example 1: Cournot oligopoly with linear demand
Under Cournot competition with linear demand Q = a− p , it is straightforward to show
that: pi(c, c− ) = 0⇐⇒  ≥ a−cn−1 .
Therefore, if  < a−cn−1 , a licensing contract with a royalty rate r is accepted by all firms
if and only if r ≤ r1(θ) where r1(θ) is the unique positive solution in r to equation (2.1)
which, in the case of Cournot competition with linear demand, is equivalent to the following
equation: (a− c+ − r)2 = θ[a− c− (n− 1)(− r)]2 + (1− θ)(a− c+ )2.
Assume now that  ≥ a−cn−1 . Let us determine the value rˆ such that the inequality pi(c, c−
 + r) > 0 is equivalent to r > rˆ. A simple calculation leads to rˆ =  − a−cn−1 . Therefore,
a licensing contract based on a royalty rate r ≤ rˆ is accepted by all firms if and only
if r ≤ r2(θ) where r2(θ) is the unique solution in r ∈ [0, ] to the following equation:
[a− c+ − r]2 = (1− θ)[a− c+ ]2.
The positive solution to this equation is given by r2(θ) = [1 −
√
1− θ](a − c + ). This
expression can be used to determine the patent strength threshold θˆ = 1− [ n(a−c)(n−1)(a−c+) ]2
such that r2(θˆ) = rˆ.
Thus, if  ≤ a−cn−1 , the maximal royalty rate the patentholder can make all firms accept is
r(θ) = r1(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], while if  ≥ a−cn−1 , the maximal royalty rate the patentholder
can make all firms accept is given by:
r(θ) =

r2(θ) = [1−
√
1− θ](a− c+ ) if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θˆ
r1(θ) if θˆ ≤ θ ≤ 1
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2.2.1.1. Royalty rate benchmarks
Now that we have characterized the maximal royalty r(θ) acceptable by all firms, it is
interesting to compare it to two benchmarks: i/ the expected value of the maximal royalty
rate in case of litigation, which we denote by re(θ); ii/ the royalty rate deterring a collective
challenge, which we denote by rc(θ).
First benchmark: the expected value of the maximal royalty rate in case of
litigation
This benchmark can be easily computed: with probability θ the patent is upheld by
the court, hence becoming an ironclad right that can be licensed at a maximal per-unit
royalty r(1) = , and with probability 1− θ the patent is invalidated and the firms can use
it for free, leaving the patentholder with a royalty r(0) = 0. Therefore, the expected value
of the maximal royalty rate in case of litigation is equal to re(θ) = θr(1)+(1−θ)r(0) = θ.
The expected value of the maximal royalty in case of litigation is thus proportional to the
patent strength θ. This benchmark is interpreted in Farrell and Shapiro (2007) as the ex
ante value of the per-unit royalty rate that an applicant of a process innovation reducing
the cost by  can expect when the patent has a probability θ to be granted by the patent
office.
Second benchmark: the royalty rate deterring a collective challenge
Suppose that at stage 2 the firms cooperatively agree on whether to buy the license
or refuse it and challenge all together the patent validity.21 In this case, the firms will
21Firms are allowed to challenge collectively the validity of a patent, at least in the US. An example is
the PanIP Group Defense Fund which is a coalition of fifteen e-retailers that has been created to invalidate
a patent covering some key aspects of electronic commerce, hold by Pangea Intellectual Properties (US
patent number 5.576.951).
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cooperatively accept a licensing contract involving a royalty rate r if and only if:
pi (c− + r, c− + r) ≥ θpi (c, c) + (1− θ)pi (c− , c− )
The function w defined by w(r) = pi (c− + r, c− + r)−θpi (c, c)− (1− θ)pi (c− , c− )
is continuous, strictly decreasing (by A4) and satisfies the conditions w (0) ≥ 0 and w () ≤
0. Hence there exists a unique solution rc(θ) ∈ [0, ] to the equation w (r) = 0, and the
inequality w (r) ≥ 0 is equivalent to r ≤ rc(θ). This means that all firms cooperatively
accept to buy a license at a royalty rate r if and only if r ≤ rc(θ). Some properties of the
benchmark rc(θ) are presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 The function rc(θ) satisfies the following properties:
i/ rc(θ) is increasing over [0, 1] and rc(0) = 0, rc(1) = ,
ii/ rc(θ) is convex over [0, 1] if (and only if) the function x → pi(x, x) is convex over
[c− , c] and in this case rc(θ) ≤ re(θ) = θ.22
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus the royalty rate deterring a collective challenge rc(θ) is lower than the expected
royalty rate in case of litigation re(θ) if the (reasonable) assumption that pi(x, x) is convex
holds.
2.2.1.2. Comparison of r(θ) to re(θ) = θ
Analyzing the shape of the function θ → r(θ) allows us to compare the per-unit royalty
rate r(θ) that deters individual challenge to the benchmark re(θ) = θ which represents
22It can be shown that rc (θ) is concave over [0, 1] if and only if the function x→ pi(x, x) is concave over
[c− , c]. In this case rc(θ) ≥ re(θ) = θ. However, as previously mentioned, the concavity of pi(x, x) is
unlikely in usual settings.
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the expected maximal royalty rate in case of individual litigation.
Recall first that when the innovation  is such that pi (c, c− ) = 0, we have r (θ) = r2(θ)
over the interval
[
0, θˆ
]
.
We would like to compare r2(θ) to the benchmark re(θ) = θ for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. If we
tackle the case of sufficiently weak patents we can derive a comparison of r2(θ) to re(θ) for
θ small enough from the comparison of r′2(0) to . Indeed, if r′2(0) ≥  (resp. r′2(0) < ) then
for θ sufficiently small, but different from 0, we will have r2(θ) > θ (resp. r2(θ) < θ).23
Since r2(0) = 0, we have:
r′2(0) =
−pi(c− , c− )
(pi1 + pi2)(c− , c− )
Therefore,
r′2(0) ≥ ⇐⇒
−pi(c− , c− )
(pi1 + pi2)(c− , c− ) ≥ 1
Denoting λ() = pi(c− , c− ), we obtain:
r′2(0) ≥ ⇐⇒
λ()
λ′ ()
≥ 1⇐⇒ η () ≤ 1 (2.3)
where η () = λ
′()
λ() =
nλ′()
nλ() is the elasticity of the industry profits with respect to a cost
reduction .
Hence we can state that for sufficiently weak patents, the comparison of r2(θ) and re(θ) = θ
can be derived from the value of the elasticty η () relative to 1.
Moreover, if the additional assumption that pi (x, x) is convex in x holds then we know from
lemma (4) that r2(θ) is convex. This makes it possible to derive the global comparison of
r2(θ) to re(θ) = θ over the whole interval
[
0, θˆ
]
, as the next proposition shows.
23Since r2 (θ) is strictly convex, even the equality r′2 (0) =  yields r2 (θ) > θ for θ small enough (but
different from 0).
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Proposition 8 Consider an innovation such that pi(c, c− ) = 0. Assume that pi (x, x) is
convex in x over [c− , c] . The comparison of r2(θ) with re (θ) = θ depends on η () in
the following way:
1- if η () ≤ 1 then r2(θ) > θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
.
2- if η () > 1 then two subcases arise:
2-a- if rˆ < θˆ then r2(θ) < θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
.
2-b- If rˆ ≥ θˆ then there exists θ˘ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
such that r2(θ) < θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θ˘
[
and
r2(θ) ≥ θ for any
[
θ˘, θˆ
]
.
Proof. See Appendix
The elasticity of the industry profits with respect to a cost reduction plays a crucial role in
the comparison of the maximal royalty rate acceptable r2(θ) by all firms and re(θ) = θ.
The intuition behind the result stated in Proposition (8) is that a low elasticity entails a
low (negative) effect of an increase in the royalty rate on the firms’ profit when they all
purchase a license. Under such conditions, the patentholder may be able to impose a high
royalty rate. In particular, the level of the royalty rate may be greater than the benchmark
level re (θ) as case 1 shows. However, if the elasticity of the industry profits is high, the
patentholder may not be able to charge a high royalty without triggering a challenge : such
royalty would result in a relatively weak profit for the licensees hence making the challenge
option more attractive.
The following examples illustrate the two cases presented in proposition (8).
Example 1 (continued): Cournot oligopoly with linear demand
Under this specification, η () = 2a−c+ which leads to η () ≤ 1⇔  ≤ a− c. Moreover, the
condition pi(c, c− ) = 0 is equivalent to  ≥ a−cn−1 . Therefore:
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- If  ∈
[
a−c
n−1 , a− c
]
then η () ≤ 1 which yields r2(θ) > θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
.
- If  ≥ a−c then η () > 1. This allows to state that we are under case 2 of proposition
8. Moreover if n = 2 it holds that rˆ < θˆ for any  > a− c, which implies that r2(θ) < θ
for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
(that is, subcase 2-a applies) . However, if n > 2 then both subcases 2-a
and 2-b are possible according to the value of  ≥ a− c. We can show that for the values
of  sufficiently close to a− c, subcase 2-b applies while for greater values of , subcase 2-a
applies.
Example 2: Differentiated Bertrand duopoly with linear demand
Consider a market with two firms producing differentiated goods. Assume that the inverse
demand function for product i = 1, 2 is given by pi = a − (qi + γqj) where j 6= i and γ ∈
[0, 1[ . Tedious calculations show that, under this specification, the condition pi (c, c− ) = 0
is satisfied if and only if  ≥ ¯ (γ) = (2+γ)(1−γ)2γ (a− c) . The threshold ¯ (γ) is decreasing
in γ which is intuitive as γ may be interpreted as an inverse measure of differentiation.
Furthermore, the equilibrium profit when both firms produce at marginal cost c −  is
pi (c− , c− ) = 1−γ
(2−γ)2(1+γ) (a− c+ )
2 which yields η () = 2a−c+ and thus η () > 1⇐⇒
 > a − c. Since ¯ (γ) −→
γ↓0
+∞ and ¯ (γ) −→
γ↑1
0 and ¯ (γ) is continuous and (strictly)
decreasing, there exists γ¯ ∈ ]0, 1[ such that ¯ (γ¯) = (a− c) and ¯ (γ) < a− c if and only if
γ < γ¯. Thus, we get the following results:
- If the differentiation between the two products is weak, i.e. γ ≥ γ¯, then η () ≤ 1 if
¯ (γ) <  ≤ a − c and η () > 1 if  > a − c. Thus, the former case falls under case 1 of
proposition (8): r2(θ) > θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
, while the latter falls under case 2: r2(θ) < θ
at least for θ sufficiently small.
- If the differentiation between the two products is high, i.e. γ < γ¯, then η () > 1 for
any  ≥ a− c. Here, it is always true that r2(θ) < θ at least for θ sufficiently small.
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We can also derive the position of r1(θ) relative to re (θ) = θ for θ sufficiently
close to 1 (i.e. sufficiently strong patents) from the comparison of r′1(1) to . Note that
r′1(1) =
pi(c,c)−pi(c−,c−)
pi1(c,c)
. Therefore if the slope pi(c,c)−pi(c−,c−) is strictly greater (resp.
smaller) than the negative partial derivative pi1(c, c) then r1(θ) < θ (resp. r1(θ) > θ) for
sufficiently strong patents.
Figure 1 displays three possible shapes of r(θ) and illustrates how it may compare to
the expected royalty re(θ) = θ in case of litigation.
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2.2.1.3. Comparison of r(θ) to rc(θ)
Proposition 9 The maximal royalty rate (non-cooperatively) accepted by all firms is higher
than the maximal royalty rate deterring a collective challenge: r(θ) ≥ rc(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix
An individual challenge by a firm has the following positive externality on the other
firms : if the patent is invalidated, all firms, not only the challenger, benefit from the cost
reduction for free. This public good nature of an individual challenge gives rise to a free-
riding problem that is ruled out when firms act cooperatively. This is why r(θ) ≥ rc(θ).
Furthermore, the difference r(θ) − rc(θ) can be seen as a measure of the (positive) effect
of the free-riding between firms on the patentholder’s ability to extract higher royalties.
2.2.1.4. The second stage equilibria
Before turning to the patentholder’s optimal licensing contract, we state the equilibria
of the second stage in the following proposition
Proposition 10 For a patentholder’s offer involving a royalty rate r, the equilibria of the
second stage depend on the royalty rate r as follows:
i/ if r ≤ r(θ) then the unique equilibrium is given by all firms accepting the license
offer,
ii/ if r(θ) < r ≤  then the equilibria are the situations where (n−1) firms buy a license
and one does not,
iii/ if r >  the unique equilibrium is given by all firms refusing the license offer.
Proof. See Appendix.
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This proposition states that two potentially profitable possibilities are offered to a
holder of an uncertain patent with strength θ when selling licenses through a per-unit
royalty rate: either the royalty r is chosen below the maximal value r(θ) that deters any
challenge, and in this case n licenses are sold, or the chosen royalty rate r is above this
value (r(θ) < r ≤ ), and in this case one and only one firm challenges the patent validity
(n−1 licenses are sold). Furthermore, if the royalty rate is above the cost reduction allowed
by the innovation, then intuitively, no firm will purchase a license.
2.2.2. The patentholder’s optimal license offer: first stage
We turn now to the patentholder’s optimal decision at the first stage of the game.
Denote q(c −  + r, k) the individual output of a licensee when the per-unit rate r is
accepted by k firms, and the n− k remaining firms produce at marginal cost c.
The patentholder’s expected licensing revenues P (r) are given by
P (r) =

nrq(c− + r, n) if r ≤ r(θ)
θ(n− 1)rq(c− + r, n− 1) if r(θ) < r ≤ 
0 if r > 
Recall that whenever r ∈]r(θ), ], one firm refuses the license offer and challenges the patent
validity while the other (n− 1) firms buy a license (see proposition 10). Therefore, in this
case, the patentholder’s licensing revenues depend on the issue of litigation (the patent is
upheld with probability θ).
We suppose that the following assumptions hold:
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A5. A licensee’s output is (weakly) decreasing in the number of licensees: q(c− + r, n−
1) ≥ q(c− + r, n) for all r ∈ [0, ] .
A6. The aggregate output is (weakly) increasing in the number of licensees: Q(c−+r, n) ≥
Q(c− + r, n− 1) for all r ∈ [0, ] .
A7. The function r → rq (c− + r, k) is concave over [0, ] for k ∈ {n− 1, n} .
Assumption A7 ensures that the patentholder’s licensing revenues are concave both in the
range of the royalty values where litigation is deterred, that is, [0, r(θ)] , and in the region
of the royalty values where it is not, that is ]r (θ) , ] . This assumption is quite reasonable
since a higher royalty rate is likely to have a negative effect on the (equilibrium) demand
adressed to each licensee which would make the licensing revenues subject to two opposite
effects, possibly resulting in a concave shape for the licensing revenues.
Note that assumptions A5, A6 and A7 are satisfied under Cournot competition with a
linear demand.
Denote r˜k () = arg max
0≤r≤
rq (c− + r, k) for k ∈ {n− 1, n} .
Determining the maximum of P (r) over [0, r(θ)] and [r(θ), ] amounts to comparing  and
r˜k () for k = n− 1, n. This leads to different outcomes according to the location of ε with
respect to r˜n−1 () and r˜n ().
The following lemma is useful for the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 11 If  ≤ r˜n−1 () then  ≤ r˜n () .
Proof. See Appendix
A straightforward consequence of the lemma is that if  > r˜n () then  > r˜n−1 () as well.
Therefore, only three cases have to be investigated: i/  ≤ r˜n−1 (); ii/ r˜n−1 () <  ≤ r˜n ();
iii/  > r˜n () .
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The following propositions determine the patentholder’s optimal choice r∗(θ) in each of
these cases and identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium in-
volves no litigation (i.e no challenge of the patent validity).
Proposition 12 If  ≤ r˜n−1 () , the function s(θ) defined as the unique solution in r to
the equation nrq(c− + r, n) = θ(n− 1)q(c, n− 1) is convex over [0, 1], satisfies s(0) = 0,
s(1) < , and the per-unit royalty that maximizes the licensing revenues is given by:
r∗ (θ) =

r (θ) if r (θ) ≥ s (θ)
 if r (θ) < s (θ)
In this case, litigation is deterred at equilibrium if and only if r (θ) ≥ s (θ)
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition characterizes the optimal royalty rate for the patentholder when the mag-
nitude  of the cost reduction is such that  ≤ r˜n−1 (). First, the function s(θ) defines
the royalty rate level for which the patentholder is indifferent between selling n licenses
at the price r(θ) and selling (n− 1) licenses at the higher price  (in which case litigation
occurs and the expected licensing revenues are θ(n − 1)q(c, n − 1)24). Note that when
 ≤ r˜n−1 () , if the license is sold to only (n−1) firms, the optimal royalty rate is  because
the licensing revenue is an increasing concave function of r over [0, ]. Second, the compar-
ison between the maximal rate r(θ) acceptable by all firms and the royalty rate s(θ) leads
to the following decision: if r (θ) ≥ s (θ) it is optimal to set r∗(θ) = r(θ) and this choice
deters litigation; if r (θ) < s (θ) it is optimal to set a higher price r∗(θ) =  and to let one
24Note that q (c, n− 1) = q (c, n) . The LHS quantity refers to a situation where n − 1 firms in the
industry produce at a marginal cost c−  and pay a per-unit royalty  while one firm produces at marginal
cost c. The RHS quantity refers to a situation where all firms produce at a marginal cost c−  and pay a
per-unit royalty . in both situations all firms in the industry produce at the same effective marginal cost,
that is c which results in the equality stated above.
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firm challenge the patent validity. Note that if r(θ) is convex and the curves r(θ) and s (θ)
meet at only one point over ]0, 1[ , then the curve r(θ) necessarily intersects the curve s(θ)
from below since r(0) = s(0) = 0 and s(1) < r(1) = . This implies that for low values of
θ, we have r (θ) < s (θ) and the optimal per-unit royalty rate is then independent of θ and
is the same as if the patent were certain. A similar result appears in Farrell and Shapiro
(2007) but the justification is different here. While Farrell and Shapiro consider only the
case where the cost reduction magnitude  is small enough and assume that all firms buy a
license at equilibrium, we obtain this result by allowing the number of licensees to depend
on the per-unit royalty. It is precisely when the royalty at which all firms accept to buy a
license is too low (i.e. r(θ) < s(θ)) that the holder of a weak patent prefers to sell it at the
higher price , triggering thus a patent litigation.
We turn now to the second case where r˜n−1 () <  ≤ r˜n () .
Proposition 13 If r˜n−1 () <  ≤ r˜n () , then defining v (θ) as the unique solution in r to
the equation nrq(c− + r, n) = (n− 1)θr˜n−1 () q(c− + r˜n−1 () , n− 1), and θ˜n−1 as the
solution to the equation r(θ) = r˜n−1 () , the function v(θ) is convex over [0, 1], v(0) = 0,
v(1) < , and we have:
r∗ (θ) =

r˜n−1 () if θ < θ˜n−1 and r (θ) < v (θ)
r (θ) otherwise
In this case, litigation is deterred at equilibrium if and only if at least one of the two
following conditions hold: θ ≥ θ˜n−1 or r (θ) ≥ v (θ)
Proof. See Appendix.
To interpret this proposition, one must first note that if the patentholder finds it optimal
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to trigger a litigation by selling at a royalty r > r(θ), the optimal royalty rate is given
by r˜n−1 () since r˜n−1 () < . The expected licensing revenues are therefore equal to
(n−1)θr˜n−1 () q(c−+ r˜n−1 () , n−1). The function v(θ) defines the royalty rate level for
which the patentholder is indifferent between selling n licenses at r(θ) and selling (n− 1)
licenses at the price r˜n−1 () . Second, it is optimal to sell only (n− 1) licenses at the per-
unit royalty r˜n−1 () as long as v(θ) > r(θ) and θ < θ˜n−1 where θ˜n−1 is the solution to the
equation r(θ) = r˜n−1 () . This means that the holder of a weak patent (θ < θ˜n−1) prefers
to trigger a patent litigation by selling licenses at a per-unit royalty rate r˜n−1 () when the
royalty that all the firms accept is too low (r(θ) < v(θ)). Again, this extends the result
obtained by Farrell and Shapiro (2007) in the sense that the optimal per-unit royalty rate
r∗ (θ) for a weak patent (θ < θ˜n−1) is independent of the patent strength θ (provided that
r (θ) < v (θ)). However, there is a major difference with Farrell and Shapiro (2007) and our
finding in the case  ≤ r˜n−1 (): the royalty r∗ (θ) for such weak patents is not equal to the
optimal royalty rate if the patent were certain. Indeed, it is equal to r˜n−1 () <  = r∗ (1) .
We turn now to the case  > r˜n () .
Proposition 14 If  > r˜n () then, defining θ˜n as the unique solution to the equation
r(θ) = r˜n () , we have
r∗ (θ) =

r˜n−1 () if θ ≤ min
(
θ˜n−1, θ˜n
)
and r (θ) < v (θ)
r˜n () if θ ≥ θ˜n−1
r (θ) otherwise
In this case, litigation is deterred at equilibrium if and only if at least one of the two
following conditions hold: θ > min(θ˜n−1, θ˜n) or r (θ) ≥ v (θ) .
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Proof. See Appendix.
The interpretation is the same as in the two previous propositions except that for
 > r˜n () (implying that  > r˜n−1()), when it is optimal for the patentholder to trigger
a litigation by selling at a royalty r > r(θ), the optimal royalty rate is given either by
r˜n−1 () or r˜n (). Again the optimal per-unit rate of a weak patent may not depend on
the patent’s strength but it is not equal to the royalty rate as if the patent were certain.
Indeed, whenever θ ≤ min
(
θ˜n−1, θ˜n
)
and r (θ) < v (θ) , it holds that r∗ (θ) = r˜n−1 ()
whereas r∗ (1) = r˜n () .
The following proposition gives a sufficient condition for litigation deterrence.
Corollary 15 If r (θ) > θ then the patentholder finds it optimal to deter litigation and
P (r∗ (θ)) > θP (r∗ (1)).
Proof. See Appendix.
This corollary gives a justification for the use of the expected value of the royalty in case
of litigation re(θ) = θ as a benchmark. If the maximal royalty rate r(θ) acceptable by all
firms is above this value, then the patentholder will always prefer to deter litigation. More
importantly, deterring a potential challenge in this case will not prevent the patentholder
from making a relatively high profit. Specifically, it gets a profit higher than θP (r∗ (1))
which represents the patentholder’s expected profit if the patent validity issue were resolved
before the license deal takes place. It can also be interpreted as the patentholder’s expected
profit if it were granted a full-proof patent by the patent office with probability θ (see Farrell
and Shapiro 2007). Hence, the per-unit royalty scheme may allow the patentholder to reap
some extra profit relative to the natural benchmark θP (r∗ (1)).
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Example 1 (continued): Cournot oligopoly with linear demand
Under this specification, we show that r˜n () = a−c+2 and r˜n−1 () =
a−c+n
2n . Hence, in this
case, it holds that r˜n () > r˜n−1 () for any  > 0. Furthermore,  ≥ r˜n−1 () holds if and
only if  ≥ a−cn , and  ≥ r˜n () holds if and only if  ≥ a− c. The latter condition happens
to be the condition defining a drastic cost-reducing innovation under Cournot competition
(with linear demand). Hence, the condition  ≥ r˜n () has a simple interpretation in this
special case.
Consider now an innovation  ∈
[
a−c
n−1 , a− c
]
. Such innovation may fall either under the
case  ≥ r˜n () or under r˜n−1 () ≤  < r˜n () . However, we know from a previous part of
this example that for  ∈
[
a−c
n−1 , a− c
]
, it holds that r (θ) = r2(θ) > θ for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
.
Therefore, corollary (15) and its proof allow us to state directly that litigation will not
occur at equilibrium and the optimal royalty will be r∗ (θ) = min (r2 (θ) , r˜n ()) for any
θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. Since  ≤ a− c then  ≤ r˜n () which results in r (θ) ≤ r˜n () (because r (θ) ≤ )
and yields: r∗ (θ) = r2 (θ) for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. The remaining part of corollary (15) ensures
that such a royalty will result in a profit higher than the benchmark profit θP (r∗ (1)).
2.2.3. Introduction of renegotiation
So far we have assumed that in case of litigation, an unsuccessful challenger produces
with marginal cost c because the patentholder refuses to sell him a license. Whether such
a commitment to refuse a license to an unsucessful challenger is credible or not must be
discussed. From the challenger’s perspective this commitment is equivalent to an offer of
a new licensing contract involving a royalty rate r¯ = . However, from the patentholder’s
perspective, this equivalence does not hold. Moreover a situation where an unsuccessful
challenger is offered a new licensing contract involving a royalty rate r¯ <  may be preferred
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by the patentholder to a situation where it is offered a contract based on r¯ = . Such an
issue is important since a potential challenger will take the decision whether to accept
the license or contest the patent validity, anticipating what would happen if the patent is
validated.
Formally if we allow for renegotiation when (n− 1) firms accept a licensing contract based
on a royalty rate r and the remaining firm challenges the patent unsuccessfully, then the
patentholder will offer to the challenger a contract involving a royalty rate r¯ ∈ [0, ] that
maximizes its licensing revenues
P (r, r¯) = (n− 1) rqL (c− + r, c− + r¯) + r¯qNL (c− + r, c− + r¯)
where qL (c− + r, c− + r¯) denotes the equilibrium quantity produced by each of the
(n− 1) firms that accepted initially the license offer r and qNL (c− + r, c− + r¯) is the
equilibrium quantity produced by the unsuccessful challenger who produces at marginal
cost c−+ r¯. If r¯(r) is the royalty rate that maximizes P (r, r¯) with respect to r¯, a licensing
contract involving a royalty rate r will be accepted by all the firms if and only if:
pi(c− + r, c− + r) ≥ θpi(c− + r¯ (r) , c− + r) + (1− θ)pi(c− , c− ) (2.4)
Since r¯ (r) ≤  we have pi(c −  + r¯ (r) , c −  + r) ≥ pi(c, c −  + r) which entails that
constraint (2.4) is (weakly) more stringent than (2.1). More specifically, a royalty rate r
could be accepted if the patentholder commits to refuse a license to a challenger or license
him at r¯ = , but not accepted if he cannot commit. This implies that the maximal royalty
rate the patentholder can make the n firms pay is (weakly) smaller when renegotiation of
a licensing contract (after patent validation) is introduced.
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We investigate in more detail this issue in the following example.
Example 1 (continued): Cournot oligopoly with linear demand
Denote firm n the challenging firm and r¯ the per-unit royalty rate at which a license
is offered if the challenge fails. Cournot competition between (n − 1) firms (indexed by
i = 1, 2, ..., n−1) whose marginal cost is c−+r and firm n whose marginal cost is c−+ r¯
leads to the following equilibrium outputs:
qi(r, r¯) =

a−c+−2r+r¯
n+1 if i = 1, .., n− 1
a−c+−nr¯+(n−1)r
n+1 if i = n
For a given r, the value of the royalty rate r¯ that maximizes the patentholder’s licensing
revenue is the solution to the following program:
max
r∈[0,]
P (r, r¯) = (n− 1)ra− c+ − 2r + r¯
n+ 1
+ r¯
a− c+ − nr¯ + (n− 1)r
n+ 1
Suppose that the innovation is non-drastic, i.e.  < a− c. The unique unconstrained maxi-
mum of the concave function r¯ −→ P (r, r¯) is given by the FOC ∂P (r,r¯)∂r¯ = a−c++2(n−1)r−2nr¯n+1 =
0. The maximum of the function P (r, r¯) over the interval r¯ ∈ [0, ] is reached at
r¯(r) = min
(
,
(n− 1)
n
r +
a− c+ 
2n
)
= min
(
, r +
1
n
(
a− c+ 
2
− r
))
Since  < a−c, we have a−c+2 > . Therefore, r ∈ [0, ] =⇒ a−c+2 −r ≥ 0 and consequently
r¯(r) ≥ r. Hence a firm which refuses a licensing contract and unsuccessfully challenges the
patent validity will get a new licensing offer with a higher royalty rate than the royalty
paid by licensees that have accepted the initial licensing contract.25
25 It is obvious that the patentholder’s position is stronger after the patent has been upheld by the court
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Moreover, the condition r¯(r) <  is fulfilled if and only if r < ( 2n−12(n−1))− a−c2(n−1) ≡ ϕ, which
is positive whenever  > a−c2n−1 . For such a royalty rate r, we have pi(c −  + r¯(r), c −  +
r) = [a−c+−nr¯(r)+(n−1)rn+1 ]
2, and the condition expressing that all firms accept the licensing
contract r is:
pi(c− + r, c− + r) ≥ θpi(c− + r¯(r), c− + r) + (1− θ)pi(c− , c− )
Replacing r¯(r) by its value, one obtains:
(a− c+ − r)2
(n+ 1)2
≥ θ
[
a− c+ 
2(n+ 1)
]2
+ (1− θ)
[
a− c+ 
(n+ 1)
]2
=
4− 3θ
4
[
a− c+ 
(n+ 1)
]2
This inequality is satisfied if and only if:
r ≤ (a− c+ )
(
1−
√
4− 3θ
2
)
Hence a royalty rate r < ϕ is accepted by all firms if and only if the previous inequality
holds. Denoting θ¯ the unique solution in θ to the equation (a − c + )
(
1−
√
4−3θ
2
)
= ϕ,
we can then state that for θ ≤ θ¯, the maximal royalty rate accepted by all firms when
post-trial license offer is possible is given by:
rp (θ) = (a− c+ )
(
1−
√
4− 3θ
2
)
Straightforward computations lead to dr
p
dθ (0) =
3
8(a − c + ). It is easy to show that
drp
dθ (0) <  for any  ∈
]
3
5 (a− c) , a− c
[
. Consequently for such intermediate innovations,
rp (θ) < θ for sufficiently small values of θ. Note that for such innovations, the condition
than before.
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 > a−c2n−1 is satisfied since
3
5 (a− c) > a−c2n−1 for any n ≥ 2.
These results lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 16 Assume renegotiation is possible. In a Cournot model with homogeneous
product and a linear demand Q = a − p, the maximal per-unit royalty rate that induces
a perfect subgame equilibrium in which all firms choose to buy a license of a patented
technology that reduces the marginal cost by  ∈ ]35 (a− c) , a− c[ is given by rp (θ) =
(a − c + )
(
1−
√
4−3θ
2
)
for a patent strength θ smaller than a threshold θ ∈]0, 1[. The
royalty rp(θ) is sustained by a renegotiated royalty r¯(rp(θ)) < , and is smaller than the
benchmark re (θ) = θ if the patent is sufficiently weak.
Under the conditions stated in this proposition, the maximal royalty rate rp(θ) (accepted
by all firms) if renegotiation is possible is below the benchmark re (θ) = θ whereas the
maximal royalty rate r (θ) if renegotiation is not possible is above the benchmark re (θ) = θ
under the same conditions (see the application of Proposition 8 to Cournot competition).
More generally, this proposition illustrates the role of post-trial renegotiation in licensing
an uncertain patent. An individual challenge becomes more attractive when it is possible
to renegotiate ex post a new royalty after the issue of the trial. Consequently, the patentee
looses some of its market power in determining ex ante the per-unit royalty rate that deters
litigation. For this reason, refusing a license to an unsuccessful challenger should not be
allowed.
2.3. Fixed fee licensing schemes
In this section, we examine licensing contracts involving a fixed fee only. We consider
the same three-stage game as in the per-unit royalty licensing scheme, simply replacing the
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royalty rate by a fixed fee in the licensing contract offered by the patentholder.
Denote piL(k) (respectively piNL(k)) the equilibrium profit of a firm producing at a constant
marginal cost c−  (respectively c) in an industry of n firms, out of which k firms produce
at marginal cost c−  and the remaining n− k firms produce at marginal cost c.
We set the following assumption which states that a licensee’s profit (gross of the license fee)
when all firms buy the license is higher than a non-licensee’s profit whatever the number
of licensees.
A8: piNL(k) < piL(n) for all k < n.
Note that this assumption holds for instance under Cournot competition with linear de-
mand. A stronger assumption would be to set the following two conditions : i/ a non-
licensee’s profit piNL (k) is decreasing in the number of licensees k, which would the coun-
terpart of assumption A3 in this setting, ii/ a firm’s profit if all firm buy a license is greater
than a firm’s profit if no firms purchases a license, i.e. piNL (0) < piL (n) , which would be
the counterpart of assumption A4. It is straightforward that assumption A8 can be derived
from i/ and ii/.
We start with a preliminary result describing what happens at equilibrium when not all
firms accept the up-front fee.
Lemma 17 Consider a Nash equilibrium of stage 2. If not all firms accept the licensing
contract in this equilibrium then there is at least one firm (among those who do not accept
the contract) that challenges the patent validity.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to derive the demand function for licenses, we set the following assumption:
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A9: For all k between 0 and n− 1,
piL(k)− piL(k + 1) ≥ piNL(k − 1)− piNL(k)
This assumption, which holds for instance under Cournot competition with linear demand,
states that a licensee’s incremental profit is at least equal to a non-licensee’s incremental
profit when the number of licensees is reduced by one unit. Another way to put this
assumption is to state that a firm’s willingness to pay for a license, i.e. piL (k)−piNL (k − 1) ,
is decreasing in the number of licensees k.
2.3.1. Demand function for licenses: second stage
The following proposition gives the demand for licenses at the Nash equilibrium of stage
2 as a function of the up-front fee F chosen by the patentholder P in stage 1:
Proposition 18 Denote Fn(θ) = θ
(
piL(n)− piNL(n− 1)) and Fk = piL(k) − piNL(k − 1)
for all k ≤ n− 1.
- If F < Fn(θ) then the unique Nash equilibrium of stage 2 is the situation where all
firms accept the licensing contract.
- If Fn(θ) < F < Fn−1 then the Nash equilibria of stage 2 are the situations where n−1
firms accept the licensing contract and one firm does not.
- For any k between 0 and n − 2, if Fk+1 < F < Fk then the Nash equilibria of stage
2 are the situations where k firms accept the licensing contract and the remaining n − k
firms do not.
- If F > F1 then the unique Nash equilibrium of stage 2 is the situation where all firms
reject the licensing contract.
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Proof. See Appendix.
To avoid the multiple equilibria problem that arises when F is equal to one of the threshold
values Fk we assume that a firm which is indifferent between accepting the license offer
made the patentholder and refusing it chooses to accept it. Hence, we can define the number
k(F, θ) of firms that accept at equilibrium the license offer F made by the patentholder:
k(F, θ) =

n if F ≤ Fn (θ)
n− 1 if Fn (θ) < F ≤ Fn−1
... . ...
k if Fk+1 < F ≤ Fk
... . ...
0 if F > F1
Note that k(F, θ) depends on θ only through the threshold Fn (θ) . More specifically, if we
denote Fn(1) = Fn we have Fn(θ) = θFn and F > Fn (θ) implies k(F, θ) = k(F ).
2.3.2. Choice of the fixed fee: first stage
The patentholder will choose F so as to maximize its licensing revenues anticipating the
number of firms that will accept the license offer. If the up-front fee F is such that all firms
accept the offer then the patentholder’s licensing revenues are equal to nF. If the up-front
fee is such that there is at least one firm that does not accept the offer then litigation
occurs and the patentholder gets licensing revenues equal to k(F )F only when the patent
validity is upheld by the court. This happens with probability θ which entails that the
expected licensing revenues of the patentholder when F induces a number of licensees k
smaller than n are equal to θk(F )F. The expected licensing revenues of the patentholder
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as a function of the up-front fee F can be summarized as follows:
P (F, θ) =

nF if F ≤ Fn (θ)
θ (n− 1)F if Fn (θ) < F ≤ Fn−1
... . ...
θkF if Fk+1 ≤ F ≤ Fk
... . ...
0 if F > F1
Since the demand function for licenses is stepwise, the maximization of P (F, θ) with respect
to F will lead to one (or several) of the thresholds Fn (θ) and F = Fk, k ≤ n− 1. In other
words, the maximization program max
F≥0
P (F, θ) is equivalent to the maximization program:
max
F∈{F1,...,Fk,...,Fn−1,Fn(θ)}
P (F, θ)
Since Fn (θ) = θFn, the expected licensing revenues P (F, θ) for a value of F belonging to
the set {F1, ..., Fk, ..., Fn−1,Fn (θ)} is given by:
P (F, θ) =

n(θFn) if F = θFn
θ (n− 1)Fn−1 if F = Fn−1
... . ...
θkFk if F = Fk
... . ...
θF1 if F = F1
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This shows that for any θ 6= 0, maximizing P (F, θ) over the set {F1, ..., Fk, ..., Fn−1, Fn (θ)}
is equivalent to maximizing P (F, 1) over the set {F1, ..., Fk, ..., Fn−1, Fn} in the following
sense: if the maximum of P (F, 1) is reached at Fk then the maximum of P (F, θ) is reached
at Fk if k < n and at Fn (θ) = θFn if k = n. Hence, we have the following result:
Proposition 19 If the maximum of P (F, 1) is reached at F ∗ = Fn then the patentholder
offers a licensing contract with a fixed fee F ∗ (θ) = Fn(θ) = θFn that induces a number
of licensees equal to the total number of firms. If the maximum of P (F, 1) is reached at
F ∗ = Fk with k < n then the patentholder offers a licensing contract with an up-front fee
F ∗ = Fk that induces a number of licensees equal to k.
This proposition entails the following two results:
Corollary 20 The equilibrium number of licensees k∗ does not depend on the patent strength
θ.
Proof. The previous proposition shows that the choice of the fixed fee by the patentholder
does not depend on θ. Since the number of licensees is determined by the value of the up-
front fee fixed by the patentholder it follows that the equilibrium number of licensees does
not depend on the patent strength θ.
Corollary 21 The equilibrium expected licensing revenues of the patentholder under an
up-front fee regime, denoted P ∗F (θ) = P (F
∗ (θ) , θ), are proportional to the patent strength,
i.e.:
P ∗F (θ) = θP
∗
F (1)
Proof. If the patentholder offers a licensing contract at an up-front fee F = Fn(θ) = θFn
then its equilibrium licensing revenues are P ∗F (θ) = n (θFn) = θ (nFn) = θP
∗
F (1). If the
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patentholder offers a licensing contract at an up-front fee F = Fk where k < n, then its
equilibrium licensing revenues are P ∗F (θ) = θ (kFk) = θP
∗
F (1).
The results of this section lead to the conclusion that licensing an uncertain patent by
means of a fixed fee is not affected by the uncertainty, in the sense that the number of
licensees does not depend on the patent strength and the patentholder’s licensing revenues
are exactly proportional to the patent strength. These results are very different from those
obtained with a per-unit royalty rate (previous section) or with a two-part tariff as in Farrell
and Shapiro (2007). In particular under the up-front fee regime, the patentholder cannot
reap any extra profit relative to the benchmark θP ∗F (1).This leads to a first conclusion:
licensing weak patents is very sensitive to the chosen licensing scheme.
We turn now to comparing the licensing revenues collected through the two schemes.
2.4. Royalty rate vs. fixed fee
In this section we show that, at least under some circumstances, the patentholder prefers
to use a royalty rate rather than a fixed fee in the licensing contracts it proposes. Denote
P ∗r (θ) = P (r∗ (θ)) the optimal patentholder’s profit when the per-unit royalty licensing
scheme is used.
Proposition 22 If the patentholder gets higher licensing revenues when using the royalty
rate scheme than with the fixed fee scheme when the patent’ svalidity is certain, i.e. θ = 1,
it will also prefer to use a royalty rate rather than a fixed fee when the patent validity is
uncertain, i.e. θ < 1, whenever r (θ) > θ.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that P ∗r (θ) > θP ∗r (1) whenever r (θ) > θ,
whereas it always holds that P ∗F (θ) = θP
∗
F (1). Therefore, if P
∗
r (1) > P
∗
F (1) then P
∗
r (θ) >
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θP ∗r (1) ≥ θP ∗F (1) = P ∗F (θ) which means that the patentholder’s licensing revenues are
higher when the royalty rate mechanism is used.
This proposition gives only a sufficient condition for royalty rate contracts to be preferred
over up-front fee contracts when the innovation is covered by an uncertain patent. If
royalties are preferred to fixed fees when θ = 1, the former will be also preferred to the
latter for θ < 1 whenever r (θ) > θ. However, this condition is far from necessary as the
following example shows: The royalty rate mechanism may be preferred for some values of
θ < 1 even when the fixed fee mechanism is preferred when θ = 1.
Example 1 (continued): Cournot competition with a linear demand
We know from Kamien and Tauman (1986) that in a full-proof patent setting, i.e. θ = 1,
the patentholder’s licensing revenues are higher with an up-front fee than with a royalty
rate.26 We show hereafter that this ranking need not hold when the patent is uncertain:
the patentholder may prefer to use the royalty rate mechanism rather than the fixed fee
mechanism.
We consider innovations of intermediate magnitude, i.e. a−cn−1 <  < a − c protected by
relatively weak patents, i.e. θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
[
with θˆ = 1 − [ n(a−c)(n−1)(a−c+) ]2. We focus on this
case because under those conditions the royalty rate the patentholder will set has a simple
analytical form r∗(θ) = r2(θ) = [1 −
√
1− θ](a − c + ). This allows us to compute the
quantity produced at equilibrium by each firm: q (c− + r(θ), n) =
√
1−θ(a−c+)
n+1 . The
equilibrium licensing revenues derived from the royalty r(θ) = r2(θ) are thus given by:
P ∗r (θ) = nr(θ)q (c− + r(θ), n) =
n
(√
1− θ − 1 + θ) (a− c+ )2
n+ 1
26Sen (2005) shows that this result holds only when the number of firms in the downstream industry is
not too high.
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Kamien and Tauman (1986, proposition 2) gives the patentholder’s profit expression when
θ = 1. Using this expression and corollary (21), we derive the value of the patentholder
revenues for any  ∈
]
a−c
n−1 , a− c
[
:
P ∗F (θ) =

2θn
(n+1)2
2
[
a−c
2 +
n+2
4
]2 if a−cn−1 <  ≤ 2(a−c)n
θn(n+2)
(n+1)2
 (a− c) if 2(a−c)n ≤  < a− c
Let us compare P ∗r (θ) and P ∗F (θ). First note that P
∗
F (θ) is linear in θ while P
∗
r (θ) is
concave in θ. Second, these functions take the same value for θ = 0.We can then state that
a sufficient condition for P ∗r (θ) to be greater than P ∗F (θ) for all θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
is that P ∗r (θˆ) ≥
P ∗F (θˆ). The left-hand member of this inequality is given by P
∗
r (θˆ) = nr(θˆ)q
(
c− + r(θˆ)
)
=
nrˆq (c− + rˆ) = n2(n−1)(n+1)
(
− a−cn−1
)
(a− c) while the right-hand member depends on
whether  is such that a−cn−1 ≤  ≤ 2(a−c)n or 2(a−c)n ≤  ≤ a− c.
Let us examine the subcase 2(a−c)n ≤  ≤ a − c. When this condition is satisfied, we have
P ∗F (θˆ) =
n(n+2)
(n+1)2
 (a− c)
(
1− [ n(a−c)(n−1)(a−c+) ]2
)
. Comparing P ∗r (θˆ) to P ∗F (θˆ) amounts then
to comparing nn−1
(
− a−cn−1
)
to n+2n+1
(
1− [ n(a−c)(n−1)(a−c+) ]2
)
. A sufficient (and necessary)
condition to have P ∗r (θˆ) ≥ P ∗F (θˆ) is
(
n
n−1 − n+2n+1
)
− nn−1 a−cn−1 ≥ −n+2n+1[ n(a−c)(n−1)(a−c+) ]2. The
left-hand side of this inequality is clearly increasing in  while it is straighforward to show
that the right-hand side is decreasing in . Therefore , to show that the previous inequality
holds for any  ∈
[
2(a−c)
n , a− c
]
, it is sufficient to show that it holds for  = 2(a−c)n .
Taking the inequality for  = 2(a−c)n and simplifying by (a− c), we get nn−1
(
2
n − 1n−1
)
>
2(n+2)
n(n+1)
(
1− n
(n−1)(1+ 2n)
)2
which can be shown after some algebraic manipulations to be
equivalent to nn−1 >
2
n+1 , which is obviously true. Hence, the condition P
∗
r (θˆ) ≥ P ∗F (θˆ)
holds for an innovation such that 2(a−c)n ≤  ≤ a−c.We can then state the following result:
LICENSING UNCERTAIN PATENTS 125
Proposition 23 If the firms compete à la Cournot in a market where the demand is linear,
then for an innovation  of intermediate magnitude, i.e. such that 2(a−c)n ≤  ≤ a − c,
covered by a relatively weak patent, i.e. such that θ ≤ θˆ, the patentholder gets higher
licensing revenues using a royalty rate rather than a fixed fee, whereas if the patent were
perfect the reverse would be true.
This proposition shows that the uncertainty over patent validity provides an alternative
explanation as to why a patentholder may prefer the per-unit royalty scheme over the fixed
fee scheme.
2.5. Conclusion
The consequences of licensing uncertain patents have been examined in this paper by
addressing the following question: to what extent licensing a patent that has a positive
probability to be invalidated if it is challenged favors the patentholder when confronted to
potential users in an oligopolistic industry? Our results show that the answer to Farrell
and Shapiro’s question "How strong are weak patents?" is very sensitive to the choice of
the licensing scheme. Two licensing schemes have been examined: the per-unit royalty rate
and the up-front fee. The most salient result is that these two mechanisms lead to opposite
consequences. While licensing uncertain patents by means of a royalty rate allows in general
the patentholder to reap some extra profit relative to the expected profit after the court
resolution of the patent validity, a fixed fee regime discards completely this possibility.
Under a fixed fee the patentholder obtains exactly its expected revenue. These results
mainly arise from letting the number of licensees depend on the price of the license chosen
by the patentholder, either a per-unit royalty rate or an up-front fee. Another important
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result is that under the per-unit royalty licensing regime it may happen that the holder of
a weak patent prefers to sell a license at the same royalty rate as if the patent were certain,
taking thus the risk of triggering a litigation on patent validity. However, whether such an
outcome is possible depends crucially on the innovation size and even when it does occur,
the justification is completely different from Farrell and Shapiro (2007). It is precisely when
the royalty rate acceptable by all the firms in the downward industry is too low that the
holder of a weak patent may prefer to sell at the royalty rate that maximizes its licensing
revenues as if the patent were certain. Moreover we have shown that even if fixed fees are
preferred when the patent is very strong, royalties may be more profitable if the patent is
uncertain, particularly if it is weak. Some classical properties of licensing certain patents
may thus be reversed in the uncertain patent framework. We have also explored different
policy levers affecting the patentholder’s market power when using a per-unit royalty rate.
We showed that its market power may be reduced in two ways: First, by preventing the
patentholder’s refusal to sell a license to an unsuccessful challenger. Second, by favoring
collective challenges of patents’ validity, particularly when competition intensity in the
market is so high that individual incentives to challenge a patent are weak.
One important question concerns the patent quality problem. Since the patent system
involves a two-tier process combining patent office examination and challenge by a court
of the validity of the granted patent, there are two possible approaches to this problem.
The first approach is to find some ways to encourage third parties to bring to a court
pieces of evidence in order to challenge the validity of presumably weak patents (post-
grant opposition in Europe or post-grant reexamination in the United States). Giving
more incentives to potential licensees to challenge a patent validity is necessary because
the free riding aspect weakens individual incentives. In this perspective, two policy levers
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are suggested: the renegotiation of the licensing contract with an unsuccessful challenger
and the cooperative approach among potential licensees to collectively accept or refuse a
licensing contract. Incentives to renegotiate could be encouraged by not allowing a patentee
to refuse a license to an unsuccessful chalenger. Encouraging a joint decision for accepting
or refusing a licensing contract may also reduce the patentholder’s market power.
The second approach to the patent quality problem is to improve the screening process
inside the patent office itself through the strengthening of the patentability standards,
turning back the Lemley’s "rational ignorant patent office principle" (Lemley, 2001). This
second approach could be interesting, particularly when the patent strength is no more
common knowledge but a private information parameter. The patent office could thus
propose to any applicant a menu involving the choice of either paying an extra fee to
obtain a thorough examination process at the patent office signalling thus a high patent
quality or paying a lower fee to simply obtain a "standard" examination process that may
signal the weakness of the patent. Designing an efficient mechanism to implement such a
procedure is left for future investigation.
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2.7. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Denote h(θ, r) = pi(c −  + r, c −  + r) − (1 − θ)pi(c − , c − ) and consider, for a given
θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
, the equation h(θ, r) = 0. Note that h(θ, 0) = θpi(c− , c− ) ≥ 0 and h(θ, rˆ) =(
θ − θˆ
)
pi(c − , c − ) ≤ 0 for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. Since h(θ, .) is continuous and strictly
decreasing over [0, rˆ] (due to A1 and A4), we can use the intermediate value theorem to
state that the equation h(θ, r) = 0 has a unique solution in r, which we denote r2(θ),
over [0, rˆ]. Moreover, assumption A1 implies that h(., .) is continuously differentiable over
[0, rˆ]×
[
0, θˆ
]
, which allows to state (using the implicit function theorem for instance) that
r2(θ) is differentiable over
[
0, θˆ
]
and
r′2(θ) =
−pi(c− , c− )
(pi1 + pi2)(c− + r2(θ), c− + r2(θ))
This implies that r′2(θ) > 0 since pi1 + pi2 < 0 over [c− , c− + rˆ] × [c− , c− + rˆ]
(by A4). Therefore r2(θ) increases in the patent strength θ over
[
0, θˆ
]
. Furthermore, it is
obvious that r2(0) = 0 and we derive from the definition of θˆ that r2(θˆ) = rˆ.
Proof of Lemma 2
Denote g(θ, r) = pi(c−+r, c−+r)−θpi(c, c−+r)−(1−θ)pi(c−, c−) and consider, for
a given θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
, the equation g(θ, r) = 0. Note that g(θ, rˆ) =
(
θ − θˆ
)
pi(c− , c− ) ≥ 0
for any θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
and g(θ, ) = (1− θ) [pi(c, c)− pi(c− , c− )] ≤ 0 for any θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
(by
A4). Moreover, the function g(θ, .) is continuous and strictly increasing over [rˆ, ]. Then,
using the intermediate value theorem, we state that the equation g(θ, r) = 0 has a unique
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solution in r for any θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
, which we denote by r1 (θ). Furthermore, assumption A1
ensures that h(., .) is continuously differentiable over [rˆ, ] ×
[
θˆ, 1
]
, which allows to state
that r1(θ) is differentiable over
[
θˆ, 1
]
and:
r′1(θ) =
pi(c, c− + r1(θ))− pi(c− , c− )
(pi1 + pi2)(c− + r1(θ), c− + r1(θ))− θpi2(c, c− + r1(θ)) (2.5)
The denominator is negative due to A3 and A4. The numerator is negative as well because
pi(c, c−+r1(θ)) ≤ pi(c−+r1(θ), c−+r1(θ)) < pi(c−, c−). The first inequality follows
from r1(θ) ≤  and the second one from A4. Thus, r′1(θ) > 0, that is r1(θ) is increasing in
the patent strength θ over
[
θˆ, 1
]
. Furthermore, it is obvious that r1() = 1 and we derive
from the definition of θˆ that r1(θˆ) = rˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
.
Consider a royalty rate r ≤ rˆ. This royalty rate is accepted by all firms if and only if
condition (2.2) holds, that is, h(θ, r) ≥ 0 where h has been defined in the proof of lemma
1. Since h(θ, r) is decreasing in r, the royalty rate r will be accepted by all firms if and
only if r ≤ r2 (θ) where r2 (θ) is defined in lemma 1.
Consider now r > rˆ. A necessary and sufficient condition for this royalty to be accepted by
all firms is that condition (2.1) holds, that is, g(θ, r) ≥ 0 where g has been defined in the
proof of lemma 2. Since g(θ, r) and h(θ, r) are decreasing in r and r1 (θ) ≤ rˆ for θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
then for any r > rˆ, it holds that g(θ, r) ≤ g(θ, rˆ) ≤ g(θ, rˆ) = h (θ, rˆ) ≤ h (θ, r1 (θ)) = 0
which shows that r will not be accepted.
Hence, for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
, a royalty rate r will be accepted by all firms if and only if
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r ≤ min (rˆ, r2 (θ)) = r2 (θ) .
Case 2 : θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
Consider now a royalty rate r ≤ rˆ. This royalty rate is accepted by all firms if and only if
h(θ, r) ≥ 0. Since g(θ, r) and h(θ, r) are decreasing in r, it holds that h(θ, r) ≥ h(θ, rˆ) =
g(θ, rˆ) ≥ g(θ, r2 (θ)) = 0, which shows that r will be accepted by all firms.
Consider now a royalty rate r > rˆ. This royalty rate is accepted by all firms if and only if
g(θ, r) ≥ 0. Since the function g (θ, r) is decreasing in r, the royalty rate r will be accepted
by all firms if and only if r ≤ r1 (θ) where r1 (θ) is defined in lemma 1.
Hence, for any θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
, a royalty rate r will be accepted by all firms if and only if
r ≤ max (rˆ, r1 (θ)) = r1 (θ) .
Proof of Lemma 4
We know from the proof of lemma 1 that for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
:
r′2(θ) =
−pi(c− , c− )
(pi1 + pi2)(c− + r2(θ), c− + r2(θ))
Since the numerator is negative, the derivative r′2(θ) is increasing (or equivalently r2(θ) is
convex) if and only if (pi1 + pi2)(c −  + r2(θ), c −  + r2(θ)) is increasing in θ. Since r2(θ)
is increasing over
[
0, θˆ
]
, the latter condition is equivalent to x → (pi1 + pi2) (x, x) being
increasing over [c− , c− + rˆ] . Since x→ (pi1 + pi2) (x, x) is the derivative of x→ pi (x, x),
we can state that r2(θ) is convex over
[
0, θˆ
]
if and only if pi (x, x) is convex in x over
[c− , c− + rˆ] .
Proof of Lemma 5
The existence and unicity can be proven as in lemma 2. A difference with lemma 2 is
that we do not need to restrict to θ ∈
[
θˆ, 1
]
to get the differentiability property. Indeed
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as r → pi (c, c− + r) remains positive for any r ≥ 0, it is differentiable over [0, ] . This
ensures the differentiability of g(θ, r) (defined in the proof of lemma 2) over [0, ] and
allows to state that r1(θ) is differentiable over [0, 1] and r′1(θ) has the expression given by
(2.5), which ensures the increasingness of r1(θ). The equalities r1(0) = 0 and r1() = 1 are
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let θ ∈ [0, 1] . A royalty r ≥ 0 is accepted by all firms if and only if g(θ, r) ≥ 0. Since this
is a decreasing function in r and g(θ, r1(θ)) = 0, then a royalty rate r ≥ 0 is accepted by
all firms if and only if r ≤ r1(θ).
Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating the equation pi (c− + rc(θ), c− + rc(θ)) = θpi (c, c)+(1− θ)pi (c− , c− )
with respect to θ, we get dr
c(θ)
dθ =
pi(c,c)−pi(c−,c−)
(pi1+pi2)(c−+rc(θ),c−+rc(θ)) . Both the numerator and the
denominator are negative which implies that rc(θ) is increasing.
Since pi (c, c)− pi (c− , c− ) < 0 (due to A4), the derivative drc(θ)dθ is increasing in θ over
[0, 1] (i.e. rc(θ) is convex) if and only if (pi1 + pi2) (c− + rc(θ), c− + rc(θ)) is increasing
in θ over [0, 1] . Since rc(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing from rc(0) = 0 to rc(1) = ,
the latter condition is equivalent to (pi1 + pi2) (x, x) is increasing in x over [c− , c] , which
means that x→ pi(x, x) is convex over [c− , c]. In this case, rc(θ) ≥ θrc(1)+(1− θ) rc(0) =
θ.
Proof of Proposition 8
Let us tackle first the case η () ≤ 1.We know from the equivalence relation (2.3) that this
leads to r′2(0) ≥ . Since r′2(θ) is (strictly) increasing in θ, the latter inequality leads to
r′2(θ) >  for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
. Taking the integral of both sides of the inequality and using
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the equality r2(0) = 0 leads to r2(θ) > θ for any θ ∈
]
0, θˆ
]
.
Let us turn now to the case η () > 1. In this case, r′2(0) < , which entails that r2(θ) < θ
for θ small enough.
Assume first that rˆ > θˆ. Since r2(θ) is continuous over
[
0, θˆ
]
, and r2(θ) < θ for θ small
enough while r2(θˆ) = rˆ > θˆ then we can state that the equation r2(θ) = θ has at least
one solution over
[
0, θˆ
]
. Denote θ˘ the smallest solution and let us show that there are no
other solution to the equation. Since r2(θ) is convex and intersects r2(θ) = θ from below,
the derivative at the intersection point is greater than the slope of the straight line θ, that
is, r′2(θ˘) > . Since r′2(θ) is (strictly) increasing in θ, r2(θ) will remain above θ for θ > θ˘
(we can show it by integrating both sides of r′2(θ˘) >  and using the equality r2(θ˘) = θ˘).
Assume now that rˆ ≤ θˆ. This means that r2(θˆ) < θˆ.We argue that under this assumption
r2(θ) will remain above θ for any θ ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. The reason is that in case this does not hold,
the curve of r2(θ) would intersect the straight line θ at least twice. This is impossible
because, as we have shown, after an intersection with this straight line, the curve of r2(θ)
remains above the line.
Proof of Proposition 9
We have: pi (c, c) ≥ pi (c, c− + rc(θ)) . Since pi (c− + rc(θ), c− + rc(θ)) = θpi (c, c) +
(1− θ)pi (c− , c− ) we obtain that pi (c− + rc(θ), c− + rc(θ)) ≥ θpi (c, c− + rc(θ))+
(1− θ)pi (c− , c− ) . The latter inequality implies that a royalty rate r = rc(θ) will be non
cooperatively accepted by all firms if proposed by the patentholder. Therefore rc(θ) ≤ r(θ).
Proof of Proposition 10
We first show that if r <  it is impossible to have an equilibrium in which the number k of
firms accepting the offer is strictly less than n−1. If this were true then one of the n−k ≥ 2
firms that have not accepted the licensing contract could get a higher expected profit by
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deviating unilaterally and accepting the contract. Indeed, if it deviates then litigation will
still occur because there will remain at least one firm refusing the license offer. This would
result in the deviating firm having a marginal cost c− + r instead of c in case the patent
is upheld, while still having a marginal cost equal to c− if the patent is invalidated by the
court. Hence, the number of firms accepting the license offer r <  at equilibrium is at least
equal to n − 1. This remains true for r =  under the assumption that a firm accepts the
offer when indifferent between accepting or refusing it. Furthermore, if r ≤ r(θ), condition
(2.1) shows that an equilibrium cannot involve k = n− 1 licensees. Thus, i/ is proven.
If r > r(θ), an outcome in which one firm refuses the license offer while the others accept it
is a Nash equilibrium: condition (2.1) shows that the firm refusing the offer gets a higher
profit than if it had accepted it, and it has been shown that the remaining firms do not
benefit from refusing the license since the patent will be challenged anyway. This proves
ii/.
Part iii/ of the proposition is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 11
Let k ∈ {n− 1, n} . Since the function rq (c− ε+ r, k − 1) is concave in r and reaches its
maximum at r˜k () then it is increasing over [0, r˜k ()] . Consequently, the following holds:
 ≤ r˜k ()⇐⇒ ∂
∂r
(rq (c− ε+ r, k)) |r= ≥ 0⇐⇒ q (c, k) +  ∂
∂r
(q (c− ε+ r, k)) |r= ≥ 0
Let us compare ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n)) |r= and ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n− 1)) |r=. It is clear that
q(c, n) = q(c, n−1): both expressions refer to the individual output of a firm in a symmetric
oligopoly consisting of n firms producing at marginal cost c. Thus, using assumption A5,
we get: q(c−ε+r,n−1)−q(c,n−1)r− ≤ q(c−ε+r,n)−q(c,n)r− for all r < . Taking the limit of both
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sides as r → , we obtain ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n)) |r= ≥ ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n− 1)) |r=. Hence,
q (c, n) +  ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n)) |r= ≥ q (c, n− 1) +  ∂∂r (q (c− ε+ r, n− 1)) |r=. Therefore,
the following chain of implications holds:
 ≤ r˜n−1 () =⇒ q (c, n− 1) +  ∂
∂r
(q (c− ε+ r, n− 1)) |r= ≥ 0
=⇒ q (c, n) +  ∂
∂r
(q (c− ε+ r, n)) |r= ≥ 0 =⇒  ≤ r˜n ()
Proof of Proposition 12
Assume that  ≤ r˜n−1 () . By lemma 11, the inequality  ≤ r˜n () holds as well. In this
case the maximum of P ∗(r) over [0, r(θ)] is reached at r(θ), and its maximum over ]r(θ), ]
is reached at . Therefore, we must compare nr(θ)q(c− + r(θ), n) to (n− 1)θq(c, n− 1).
Consider a royalty rate r ∈ [0, ] . The inequality nrq(r, n) ≥ (n − 1)θq(, n) is fulfilled if
and only if rq(c−+r,n)q(c,n) ≥ n−1n θ. Since the function r −→ rq(c−+r,n)q(c,n) is strictly increasing and
continuous in r and takes the value 0 for r = 0 and 1 for r = , there exists a unique solution
to the equation rq(c−+r,n)q(c,n) =
n−1
n θ, which is denoted by s (θ) . The condition
rq(c−+r,n)
q(c,n) ≥
n−1
n θ can then be written as r ≥ s (θ) . Hence the inequality nr(θ)q(c −  + r(θ), n) ≥
n − 1)θq(c, n) amounts to r (θ) ≥ s (θ) . The convexity of s (θ) can be derived from the
concavity of w : r −→ rq(c−+r, n) and its increasingness over [0, ] : differentiating twice
the equation w(s(θ))w() = θ
n−1
n , we get w
′′ (s (θ)) (s′ (θ))2 + w′ (s (θ)) s′′ (θ) = 0 which leads
to s′′ (θ) = −w′′(s(θ))(s′(θ))2w′(s(θ)) > 0. The property s(0) = 0 is immediate and the property
s(1) <  derives from n−1n < 1.
Proof of Proposition 13
Assume that r˜n−1 () <  ≤ r˜n () . In this case, the maximum of P (r) over [0, r(θ)] is
reached at r (θ) . Define θ˜n−1 as the unique solution in θ to the equation r (θ) = r˜n−1 () (it
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is straightforward to check that such a solution exists in [0, 1] and is unique). Two subcases
must be distinguished:
- Subcase 1: θ ≤ θ˜n−1 : The maximum of P (r) over ]r(θ), ε] is then reached at r˜n−1 () . De-
termining the royalty rate that maximizes P (r) over [0, ] amounts then to the comparison
of nr(θ)q(c−+r(θ), n) and (n−1)θr˜n−1 () q(c−+ r˜n−1 () , n−1). The former is greater
than the latter if and only if r (θ) is greater than v (θ) defined as the unique solution in r
to the equation nrq(c− + r, n) = (n−1)θr˜n−1 () q(c− + r˜n−1 () , n−1). The existence,
uniquess, increasingness and convexity with respect to θ of such a solution can be estab-
lished in a similar way to that of s (θ) . The function v (θ) satisfies as well the properties
v (0) = 0 and v (1) < . The first inequality is straightforward to show and the second one
derives from nεq(c, n) > nr˜n−1 () q(c −  + r˜n−1 () , n) (which holds because r˜n−1 () <
 ≤ r˜n ()) and nr˜n−1 () q(c− + r˜n−1 () , n) > (n− 1) r˜n−1 () q(c− + r˜n−1 () , n− 1).
Indeed these two inequalities result in nεq(c, n) > (n− 1) r˜n−1 () q(c−+r˜n−1 () , n−1) =
nv (1) q(c− + v (1) , n) and consequently lead to  > v (1) .
- Subcase 2: θ > θ˜n−1 : The upper bound of P (r) over ]r(θ), ε] is then reached at r(θ)+.
From the expression of P (r), it is clear that P (r (θ)) > P (r (θ)+). Hence, the maximum of
P (r) over [0, ] is reached at r(θ).Consequently litigation is always deterred in this subcase.
Proof of Proposition 14
Assume that  > r˜n () . By lemma (6) the inequality  > r˜n−1 () holds as well. Analogously
to θ˜n−1, define θ˜n as the unique solution in θ to the equation r (θ) = r˜n (). Three subcases
are distinguished:
- Subcase 1: θ ≤ min
(
θ˜n−1, θ˜n
)
: The maximum of P (r) over [0, r(θ)] is then reached at
r (θ) and its maximum over ]r(θ), ε] is reached at r˜n−1 () . Hence the analysis conducted
in subcase 1 in the proof of proposition 13 applies here.
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- Subcase 2 : θ˜n−1 < θ < θ˜n : The maximum of P (r) over [0, r(θ)] is then reached at r (θ)
and its maximum over ]r(θ), ε] is reached at r(θ)+. Therefore the maximum of P (r) over
[0, ] is reached at r(θ) (see subcase 2 in the proof of proposition 13) which implies that
litigation is deterred. Note that this subcase is not relevant if the inequality θ˜n−1 < θ˜n
does not hold.
- Subcase 3: θ ≥ θ˜n : The maximum of P (r) over [0, r(θ)] is then reached at r˜n () . This
is sufficient to state that the maximum of P (r) over [0, ] is reached at r˜n () .This follows
from the fact that the function r −→ nrq(c− + r, n) reaches its unconstrained maximum
at r˜n () and nrq(c −  + r, n) > θ(n − 1)rq(c −  + r, n − 1) for any r ∈ [0, ] . The latter
inequality results from assumption A6: nq(c−+r, n) = Q(c−+r, n) ≥ Q(c−+r, n−1) ≥
(n− 1)q(c− + r, n− 1).
Proof of Corollary 15
Assume that r (θ) > θ. Since s(θ) is a convex function such that s (0) = 0 and s (1) < 
then s(θ) ≤ θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently a sufficient condition for the inequality
r (θ) ≥ s (θ) to hold is that r (θ) ≥ θ. The same conclusion applies for the convex function
v(θ). Given this, the first part of the corollary follows immediately from the three previous
propositions.
Using the three previous propositions, it is straighforward to check that under the con-
ditions r (θ) ≥ s (θ) and r (θ) ≥ v (θ) (which hold when r (θ) > θ), the optimal royalty
rate set by the patentholder simplifies as follows: r∗ (θ) = min (r (θ) , r˜n ()) . Using the in-
equality r (θ) > θ, we get r∗ (θ) > min (θ, r˜n ()) > min (θ, θr˜n ()) = θmin (, r˜n ()) =
θr∗ (1) . Hence for all θ ∈ [0, 1] , θr∗ (1) < r∗ (θ) = min (r (θ) , r˜n ()) . Since the func-
tion P (r) = nrq(c −  + r, n) is concave in r over [0, r (θ)] then P (θr∗ (1)) > θP (r∗ (1))
and since it reaches its maximum at r˜n (), it is increasing over [0, r∗ (θ)] which en-
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tails that P (r∗ (θ)) > P (θr∗ (1)) . From the two previous inequalities, we obtain that
P (r∗ (θ)) > θP (r∗ (1)).
Proof of Lemma 17
Let us show that a situation where only k < n firms accept the contract and none of
the remaining n − k firms challenges the patent validity cannot be a Nash equilibrium of
stage 2. If one of these firms challenges the patent validity it gets an expected profit of
θpiNL(k) + (1− θ)piL(n), whereas it gets a profit equal to piNL(k) if no firm challenges the
patent validity. From A8 it follows that θpiNL(k) + (1 − θ)piL(n) > piNL(k) which means
that a downstream firm that does not accept the licensing contract is always better off
challenging the patent validity.
Proof of Proposition 18
The situation where the n firms accept the licensing contract F is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if:
piL(n)− F ≥ θpiNL(n− 1) + (1− θ)piL(n)
which can be rewritten as:
F ≤ θ (piL(n)− piNL(n− 1)) (2.6)
that is
F ≤ Fn(θ)
A situation where n−1 firms accept the licensing contract and one firm does not is a Nash
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equilibrium (of stage 2) if and only if:
θpiNL(n− 1) + (1− θ)piL(n) ≥ piL(n)− F (2.7)
and
θ[piL(n− 1)− F ] + (1− θ)piL(n) ≥ θpiNL(n− 2) + (1− θ)piL(n) (2.8)
Condition (2.7) means that the one firm that does not accept the licensing contract and
challenges the patent validity does not find it optimal to unilaterally deviate by accepting
the licensing contract. Condition (2.8) means that none of the n−1 firms which accept the
licensing contract find it optimal to unilaterally deviate by refusing the contract. When
the number of firms accepting the contract is strictly less than n, litigation will occur
(lemma 17) which entails that the firms accepting the contract pay the fixed fee F only if
the patent validity is upheld, which happens with probability θ. With the complementary
probability 1 − θ, the patent is invalidated and all the firms get the same profit namely
piL(n). It is straightforward to show that conditions (2.7) and (2.8) are equivalent to the
following double inequality:
θ[piL(n)− piNL(n− 1)] ≤ F ≤ piL(n− 1)− piNL(n− 2)
that is
Fn(θ) ≤ F ≤ Fn−1
Note that the inequality θ[piL(n)−piNL(n−1)] < piL(n−1)−piNL(n−2) follows immediately
from A9 for θ = 1 and is a fortiori satisfied for θ < 1.
A situation where k ≤ n− 2 firms accept the licensing contract and the remaining do not
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is a Nash equilibrium of the stage 2 subgame if and only if:
θ
(
piL(k)− F )+ (1− θ)piL(n) ≥ θpiNL(k − 1) + (1− θ)piL(n) (2.9)
and
θpiNL(k) + (1− θ)piL(n) ≥ θ (piL(k + 1)− F )+ (1− θ)piL(n) (2.10)
Condition (2.9) means that none of the k firms accepting the licensing contract finds it
optimal to unilaterally deviate by refusing the contract and condition (2.10) means that
none of the n−k firms refusing the licensing contract finds it optimal to unilaterally deviate
by accepting the contract. It is easy to see that conditions (2.9) and (2.10) can be combined
into the following double inequality that does not depend on θ:
piL(k + 1)− piNL(k) ≤ F ≤ piL(k)− piNL(k − 1)
that is:
Fk+1 ≤ F ≤ Fk
Note that the inequality piL(k+ 1)−piNL(k) ≤ piL(k)−piNL(k−1) follows from A9. Thus,
the role of assumption A9 is to guarantee that the set of values of F belonging to the
interval [Fk+1, Fk] is not empty.
A situation where no firm accepts the licensing contract is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if:
θpiNL(0) + (1− θ)piL(n) ≥ θ (piL(1)− F )+ (1− θ)piL(n)
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which can be rewritten as:
piNL(0) ≥ piL(1)− F
or equivalently as:
F ≥ piL(1)− piNL(0) = F1
Chapter 3
Leniency Programs for Multimarket
Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus
on Cartel Formation1
3.1. Introduction
Experience garnered over many years has taught antitrust authorities in the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) that companies which have been colluding
in one specific product or geographic market are more likely to have engaged in cartel
activities in other adjacent markets.
Due to the high diversity of businesses in multinational firms, cartel activities bear all
the marks of contagion between and especially within companies. The probably most well-
known example for such a cross-linked collusive pattern is the conspiracy in the markets
for various vitamins. The striking feature of this complex of infringements was the central
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Catherine Roux.
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role played by Hoffmann-la Roche (HLR) and BASF, the two main vitamin producers,
over the course of ten years in virtually every cartel affecting the whole extent of bulk
vitamin production.2 HLR, BASF and Rhône-Poulenc instigated the first main group
of cartels which consisted of price fixing agreements in the markets for vitamins A and
E. The initial success of these arrangements inspired their replication in other vitamin
markets. Smaller producers such as Merck, Takeda and Daiichi joined the pioneers and
simultaneously colluded in a number of vitamin products. Accordingly, the European
Commission (EC) stated that “the simultaneous existence of the collusive arrangements in
the various vitamins was not a spontaneous or haphazard development, but was conceived
and directed by the same persons at the most senior levels of the companies concerned”.3
Rhône-Poulenc’s disclosure of evidence on collusion in the markets for vitamins A and E led
to the opening of an investigation. However, only BASF’s comprehensive collaboration with
the US Department of Justice (DoJ) under the Amnesty Plus Program accelerated inquiries
and finally led to the successful prosecution of all participants. When Rhône-Poulenc plead
guilty to its vitamin conspiracies under the US Amnesty Program and applied for leniency
under the 1996 EC Leniency Notice, it did not provide any information on its participation
in the vitamin D3 infringement and even pursued cartel activities in other product markets
such as methionine and methylglucamine.4
In the US, convictions of global cartels in the 1990s suggest that at least a dozen
firms were repeat offenders in related product industries (Connor, 2003). The DoJ has
been investigating around 50 alleged international cartels in 2004, and half of them have
been detected during inquiries on other markets (Hammond, 2004). With the objective
2Concerned were the markets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, folic acid, C, D3, H, beta carotene
and carotinoids.
3EC IP/01/1625 November 2001.
4EC IP/01/1625 November 2001, EC IP/02/976 July 2002, EC IP/02/1746 November 2002.
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of fully exploiting the multimarket contact between colluding firms, the DoJ implemented
the Amnesty Plus Program in 1999 as part of its Corporate Leniency Policy. According
to Hammond, “The Division’s Amnesty Plus program creates an attractive inducement for
encouraging companies who are already under investigation to report the full extent of
their antitrust crimes [. . .]” (Hammond, 2004, p.16).
Leniency programs reduce fines for cartel members that bring evidence to the antitrust
authority. Amnesty refers to the complete exemption from fines. Amnesty Plus aims at
attracting amnesty applications by encouraging subjects of ongoing investigations to con-
sider whether they qualify for amnesty in other than the currently inspected markets where
they engage in cartel activities. In particular, Amnesty Plus offers a firm, which currently
plea-bargains an agreement for participation in one cartel, where it cannot obtain guaran-
teed amnesty, complete immunity in a second cartel affecting another market. Provided
that the firm agrees to fully cooperate in the investigation of the conspiracy of which the
DoJ was previously not aware, it is automatically granted amnesty for this second offense.
Moreover, the company benefits from a substantial additional discount5, i.e. the Plus, in
the calculation of its fine in any plea agreement for the initial matter under investigation.6
Under the current EC Leniency Notice, Amnesty Plus does not exist. Although, in 2001,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended the
inclusion of Amnesty Plus as part of the 2002 reforms of the EU Leniency Program, the
EC did not seize the opportunity to follow the US example by introducing a similar policy.
5The size of the additional discount mainly depends on three factors: The strength of the evidence
provided by the cooperating company, the potential significance of the revealed case measured in terms
of volume of commerce involved, geographic scope and the number of co-conspirators, and the likelihood
that the DoJ would have detected the cartel absent self-reporting (Hammond, 2006)
6As a counterpart of Amnesty Plus, the DoJ contemporaneously implemented the Penalty Plus Program.
Penalty Plus increases the fines for companies that neglect to take advantage of Amnesty Plus but are
nevertheless caught for a second time. The main reason why we do not include Penalty Plus in our
analysis is that, whereas we want to focus on the difference between the US and the EU leniency policy,
the clause of “aggravating circumstances” in the “2006 EC Guidelines on the method of setting fines” is
very similar to the US Penalty Plus.
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The present paper studies whether and how the Amnesty Plus policy affects firms’
incentives to form a cartel. It seems intuitive that, following a conviction of one cartel,
Amnesty Plus encourages firms to report another cartel by granting the first firm which
applies for this program a substantial discount in the fine already imposed. However,
we argue that, Amnesty Plus may have important consequences for cartel formation in
particular because it increases the firms’ incentives to report a cartel after a first detection
through fine reductions.
We study two markets in which two identical firms play an infinitely repeated game of
collusion. In each period, the firms can choose to form a cartel before interacting on the
product market. Collusion generates incriminating evidence which the antitrust authority
can discover with some probability. In addition, each firm can also bring this evidence to
the authority. When a cartel is detected, either through an investigation or a firm’s self-
reporting, each cartel member, except the first reporting firm, has to pay a fine. Amnesty
Plus becomes relevant when the firms have to decide whether to report a cartel in one
market after they have already been convicted in the other market.
Our main result is that Amnesty Plus may affect cartel formation in two different ways:
On the one hand, Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive effect by dissuading the firms
to create one of their cartels when they would have formed both of them in the absence of
Amnesty Plus. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus may also have an anticompetitive effect
as it may encourage the firms to form both cartels when they would have formed only one
of them under an antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus.
We also examine whether the firms can exploit their multimarket contact by linking
punishment strategies across markets. Without Amnesty Plus, the firms can always treat
the markets in isolation and thus, they use multimarket trigger strategies only if this
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facilitates collusion. Amnesty Plus however inherently links the markets. Moreover, it is
the antitrust authority which decides on the implementation of Amnesty Plus, and the
firms can only try to weaken its effectiveness by adapting their strategies. In particular,
we find that if the markets do not differ substantially in terms of profitability, the use of
multimarket strategies, while it does not directly affect the firms’ ability to collude, lowers
the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus and increases its anticompetitive effect.
Surprisingly, although legal studies which mainly argue in favor of an Amnesty Plus pol-
icy in Europe are burgeoning, the existing literature contains virtually no formal economic
analysis which attemps to clarify possible motives for the EC’s non-adoption of Amnesty
Plus, let alone to study the potential impact of such a policy on cartel formation. We take
the first step towards filling this gap in the economic theory on leniency programs.
Recent academic research such as Harrington (2008), Chen and Rey (2007), Aubert et
al.(2006), Spagnolo (2004) and Motta and Polo (2003) has elaborated on the differences in
conception of leniency programs and their impact on the effectiveness of antitrust enforce-
ment.7 This line of research mainly highlights the basic trade-offs between destabilizing
collusion and deterring cartel formation and explores whether and, if so, under which con-
ditions, leniency programs do not deter but rather encourage the formation of a cartel.
The results are embedded in a normative analysis of how the antitrust authority should
design such programs to minimize their undesirable effect. Our analysis is close in purpose
to this literature in that we examine how Amnesty Plus as a feature of leniency programs
affects cartel stability. However, unlike in previous work, where the firms collude in one
market only, we allow them to simultaneously participate in two collusive agreements.
Some studies suggest that leniency programs which not only reduce fines but offer a
7For an extensive overview of the economic literature on leniency programs see Spagnolo (2006).
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positive reward to whistleblowing firms can deter collusion in a more effective way. In
particular, Aubert et al.(2006) find the minimal reward necessary to induce a firm to
report collusion and point out that this reward may be quite large. Spagnolo (2004) shows
that an optimally designed leniency program rewards the first reporting company with an
amount equal to the sum of the fines paid by its former partners. On this issue, economic
theory however conflicts with legal practice. Although granting positive rewards may
strengthen the deterrence power of leniency programs, remunerating antitrust offenders
not only raises moral concerns but may also increase the risk of negative effects in that it
may further lower the expected penalty level. Hence, antitrust authorities mostly refrain
from rewarding informants.8 However, it may be argued that Amnesty Plus is equivalent
to granting more than 100% leniency because it not only waives the entire penalty in the
second cartel but also gives a fine discount for the initial infringement (Wils, 2007). From
this perspective, the justification for an Amnesty Plus policy does not seem obvious.
Another strand of literature studies the role of multimarket contact between firms in
sustaining collusion when monitoring is perfect. In their seminal paper, Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) build on the idea, first raised by Edwards (1955) and further developed
in a finite oligopoly games context by Harrington (1987), that multimarket contact across
firms may foster anticompetitive outcomes. As a benchmark, they establish an irrelevance
result: with identical firms and markets and constant returns to scale technology, multimar-
ket contact does not affect the opportunities for cooperation. However, they also identify
various plausible circumstances in which strategically linking markets facilitates collusion
by slackening the incentive constraints that limit the firms’ ability to sustain collusive be-
8Note however that for other forms of multiagent crime, like government fraud, the US False Claim Act
substantially rewards the cooperation of individual informants. Moreover, Korea has introduced a reward
scheme for reporting parties in antitrust cases.
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havior in settings of repeated interactions. Spagnolo (1999) refutes this irrelevance result
and shows that, if the firms’ static objective functions are strictly concave, multimarket
contact always makes collusion viable in a set of markets even if, in its absence, it could
not be sustained in any of these markets.
Relatively few papers examine the effect on collusive behavior of the interaction be-
tween multimarket contact and imperfect information. Thomas and Willig (2006) find that
exploiting multimarket contact by strategically linking markets may be unprofitable. This
surprising result occurs because strategic linkage may promote contagion which allows ad-
verse shocks to spread from one market to another. Matsushima (2001) shows that efficient
collusion can be achieved in the limit through the linkage of a sufficiently large number of
identical markets.
We look at the interaction between Amnesty Plus and multimarket contact and its
effect on the firms’ ability to collude when information is perfect. Our analysis allows to
distinguish the anticompetitive effect of strategic linkage from the one of Amnesty Plus.
Whereas multimarket strategies are chosen by the firms and used only if they are pro-
collusive, Amnesty Plus is implemented by the antitrust authority. Hence, it links markets
both when it facilitates but also when it hinders collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model.
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 analyze cartel formation when firms use standard trigger strategies
both under a European antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus and under a US antitrust
policy with Amnesty Plus. In section 3.5, we graphically present our main findings. In
sections 3.6 and 3.7, we allow firms to use multimarket punishment. Section 8 briefly
concludes. All proofs can be found in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we discuss how the
relaxation of two important assumptions affects our results.
LENIENCY PROGRAMS FOR MULTIMARKET FIRMS 151
3.2. The model
3.2.1. Set-up
We consider two markets k = 1, 2 in which two identical firms play an infinitely repeated
game where, in each period, they can choose to form a cartel before interacting on the
product market. Communication is necessary for collusion and generates hard evidence
which makes it possible to establish the antitrust offense. Markets 1 and 2 may differ in
profitability. In particular, market 1 is at least as profitable as market 2. Firms discount
future payoffs by a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. We compare the firms’ cartel
formation decisions under the EC Leniency Program and the US Amnesty Program whose
sole difference here is that the latter allows for Amnesty Plus.9 Amnesty Plus signifies that
a firm which has been caught colluding in one market can get a discount in the fine already
imposed by reporting the remaining cartel in the other market.
The collusive joint profit is 2pik > 0, and thus, each firm makes a cartel profit equal to
pik. Denote by λ = pi2pi1 ∈ ]0, 1] the profit ratio of the two cartels. If firms compete, they
make zero profits. In case one firm unilaterally deviates from the cartel while the other
continues to collude, the deviating firm earns the whole short-term cartel profit 2pik alone,
whereas the other firm gets nothing. Firms use (grim) trigger strategies. The punishment
firms agreed upon starts the period following the deviation and lasts forever after.
At the time firms decide whether to enter an illegal agreement, they observe the strict-
ness of the enforcement policy that is summarized by a conviction probability q ∈]0, 1] with
which the Antitrust Authority (AA) opens an investigation in one market leading to the
9More specifically, we examine the effect of Amnesty Plus on the best collusive subgame-perfect equi-
librium that can be sustained through trigger strategies.
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conviction of the colluding firms with certainty.10 Detection across markets is independent.
Each convicted firm pays a market specific fine Fk which is reduced under Amnesty Plus
to Fk−Rk in return for the disclosure of the second cartel. Rk ∈ ]0, Fk] represents the fine
reduction granted to the first informant. The higher Rk the more generous the Amnesty
Plus policy. The firm which is eligible for Amnesty Plus is the first company which reports
the second infringement and thus, it also receives amnesty in that market. If both firms
simultaneously apply for Amnesty Plus, each is first with probability 12 .
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the evidence of collusion lasts for only one
period. Thus, even after a firm has deviated from a collusive agreement it is held liable
for its cartel behavior and can be fined until the end of the period in which the deviation
occurred.11 Each cartel member has the possibility to bring the incriminating evidence
to the AA. The first informant is eligible for total immunity from fines under a standard
Amnesty Program. In our model, the only strategic implication of this standard Amnesty
Program is that, since a defecting firm must still fear conviction, a unilateral deviation is
always immediately followed by the reporting of the cartel.
In practice, fines are set according to judicial principles but are often related, directly or
indirectly, to the nature and importance of the anticompetitive behavior, and thus, to the
profits from collusion. We assume that the AA sets the fine as a function of the per period
collusive profits12, Fk = F (pik) where F (·) is an increasing function. Let then θk = Fkpik
10To keep the model simple, we identify investigation and conviction with a single probability. However,
we could introduce uncertainty with respect to the AA’s ability to prove guilty a detected cartel by
substituting qs for q where s is the probability with which the investigation succeeds. See Chen and Rey
(2007) for an analysis of optimal leniency rates before any and once an investigation is opened which
distinguishes the probability of launching the investigation from the probability with which it succeeds.
11The limitation period of the liability for antitrust offenses is generally a positive number of years.
Article 25 of the EC Council Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission can sue for Administrative
Action until five years from the date of the infringement. Moreover, “[. . .]in the case of continuing or
repeated infringements, time shall begin to run on the day on which the infringement ceases”.
12Since the evidence that incriminates a cartel lasts only for one period, the assumption that the AA
takes the collusive profit per period and not cumulated over the whole duration of the cartel as a basis for
the determination of the fine seems plausible.
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denote the fine-profit ratio for market k = 1, 2 and suppose that θ2 ≥ θ1. This reflects the
idea that the fine rises proportionally or less than proportionally with the cartel profit, i.e.
that θk = Fkpik is weakly decreasing in pik.
13 Fine records tend to support this assumption.14
Following a cartel conviction, we assume that the AA closely monitors the previously
collusive industry and thus, firms compete and never return back to collusion in the same
market.
3.2.2. Timing
The time structure of the game is as follows:
• t = 0:
Stage 0 : Both firms decide in each market whether to enter a collusive agreement.
If at least one firm decides not to collude in market k, competition takes place in
this market. If this happens in both markets, the game ends for that period. If both
firms choose to collude in market k, their communication leaves some hard evidence.
Stage 1 : Each firm decides whether to deviate or not from the collusive agreement(s).
Its rival does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
Stage 2 : Each firm decides whether to report the evidence to the AA. The AA detects
the cartel with probability 1 if at least one firm self-reports. The first informant gets
complete immunity from fines in this market, whereas the other firm has to pay the
13E.g., let F (·) be an increasing concave function or let Fk be an affine transformation of pik: F (pik) =
a+ bpik with a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. In Appendix B1, we discuss how the relaxation of the assumption θ2 ≥ θ1
affects our analysis.
14E.g. Vitamin cartel: In the US, a fine equal to 127% of the collusive overcharge was imposed in the
market of vitamin B2 whereas it ranged between 63% and 88% of the collusive overcharge in the more
profitable vitamin C market. In the EU, the fines ranged between 63% and 88% for vitamin B2 and
between 30% and 60% for vitamin C (Connor, 2005).
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full fine. If each cartel formed in stage 0 is reported in this stage, the game ends for
this period; otherwise:
Stage 3 : Each cartel formed in stage 0 and not reported in stage 2 is detected with
probability q. If the AA does not detect the cartel(s) formed in stage 0, the game
ends for that period. If the AA however detects the cartel(s) formed in stage 0, the
colluding firms pay the corresponding fines, and the game ends for that period. If
the firms have formed both cartels in stage 0, and the AA has detected only one of
them, then:
Stage 4 : Each firm chooses whether to report the remaining cartel.
• t ≥ 1: If both cartels have been formed but none of them has been convicted (detected
or reported) in the previous period, the same time structure applies to this period.
If either no cartel has been formed or the cartel(s) formed has (have) been convicted,
the firms compete in both markets.15 If either one cartel has been formed and not
convicted or both cartels have been formed but only one cartel has been convicted,
then:
Stage 0 : Each firm decides whether to enter a collusive agreement in the market
where the cartel has gone undetected in the previous periods. If at least one firm
chooses not to collude, competition takes place in this market, and the game ends
for this period.
Stage 1 : Each firm decides whether to deviate from the collusive agreement. Its rival
does not observe this decision until the end of stage 2.
15We assume here that the firms can only form a cartel if this cartel has already been formed in the
previous period. In Appendix B2, we relax this assumption and discuss the strategy where the firms form
cartel 1 until it is detected and then form cartel 2.
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Stage 2 : Each firm decides whether to report the evidence to the AA.
Stage 3 : The AA detects the cartel in market k with probability q. If the cartel is
not detected the game ends for this period. If it is detected, the colluding firms pay
the corresponding fines.
3.2.3. Individual stability of a cartel
We first examine under what conditions an individual cartel is sustainable if the firms
interact in only one market k. The firms can try to sustain repeated collusion by using
trigger strategies in which they would return to competition the period following the devia-
tion in case one of them deviates from the collusive outcome. In the presence of a standard
amnesty policy where the first self-reporting firm pays no fine, deviating and reporting
weakly dominates deviating and not reporting. A unilateral deviation is therefore always
followed by an amnesty application. Hence, in the period of the deviation, the informant
earns the whole cartel profit and pays no fine whereas thereafter, he gets zero profits from
competition. Collusion is sustainable if the present discounted value Vk of the cartel is at
least as big as the gain each firm gets from a unilateral deviation in this market, that is
Vk ≥ 2pik
Vk is the continuation value of the cartel in market k and is such that:
Vk = q(pik − Fk) + (1− q)(pik + δVk)
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Solving for Vk yields
Vk =
pik − qFk
1− δ(1− q)
The above condition defines an individual stability threshold such that cartel k is
individually stable if and only if
δ ≥ pik + qFk
2pik(1− q) =
1 + qθk
2(1− q) ≡ δ˜(q, θk)
A firm has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the collusive equilibrium if δ ≥ δ˜(q, θk).
Both firms anticipate that collusion will be sustainable and thus, they form the cartel.
However, if δ < δ˜(q, θk), the firms anticipate that, immediately after the formation of the
cartel, they would both deviate and self-report. Hence, they do not form the cartel in
the first place. The individual stability threshold is increasing and continuous in all its
arguments. Intuitively, the higher the probability of conviction and the higher the fine-
profit ratio, the more firms have to value future flows of collusive profits, and thus, the
higher the δ needed to individually sustain the cartel. Note that δ˜(q, θk) ≤ 1 if and only if
θk ≤ 1q −2. Otherwise, the cartel k is individually unstable for any value δ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
the assumption θ2 ≥ θ1 implies that δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ˜(q, θ2), i.e. a cartel in market 2 is equally
or more difficult to sustain than a cartel in the more profitable market 1.
3.3. EC Leniency Program with standard trigger strategies
Suppose now that the firms encounter each other in the two markets 1 and 2, and
that they use standard trigger strategies to sustain collusion. Each firm plays the collusive
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equilibrium in market k = 1, 2 as long as the partner colludes in this market. If a firm
unilaterally deviates from the collusive agreement, the other firm competes from the next
period on and forever after in this market. Note that a deviation in one market triggers
punishment only in this specific market. Intuitively, since punishment strategies as well as
detection probabilities across markets are independent, firms treat each market in isolation,
and their actions in market 1 do not influence their decisions in market 2. The condition
under which a cartel is formed is therefore the same as the condition under which the cartel
is individually stable. We provide a formal proof of this intuitive argument and state the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the EU antitrust policy, a cartel is formed if and only if it is indi-
vidually stable. More precisely,
i/ If δ < δ˜(q, θ1), no cartel is formed.
ii/ If δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ < δ˜(q, θ2), cartel 1 is formed whereas cartel 2 is not.
iii/ If δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ, both cartels are formed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In what follows, we assume that θ2 ≤ 1q − 2. Without this assumption, the region in
case iii/ where the firms form both cartels would be empty.
3.4. US Amnesty Program with standard trigger strategies
We now introduce an Amnesty Plus policy which allows a firm, already caught in one
cartel, to benefit from a fine reduction if it is the first to report the other cartel. It has been
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heavily advertised that the main benefit of Amnesty Plus is its effect on cartel desistance:
Amnesty Plus increases the firms’ incentives to report a cartel after the detection of another
cartel. However, we argue that, above all, Amnesty Plus may have important consequences
for cartel deterrence in particular because it encourages reporting after a first detection
through fine reductions. To see these effects, we proceed by backward induction. Suppose
that the firms have formed both cartels, and the AA has detected one of them, say cartel
−k. The remaining cartel k survives this detection only if none of the firms unveils the
collusive evidence to the AA at the end of this period. The firms do not report cartel k if
and only if two conditions jointly hold. First, the fine reduction a firm gets in return for
the disclosure of cartel k must not exceed the discounted value of this cartel. That is
δVk ≥ R−k
This condition defines a robustness threshold such that cartel k is robust to the detection
of cartel −k if and only if
δ ≥
R−k
pik
1− qθk + (1− q)R−kpik
≡ δ̂
(
q, θk,
R−k
pik
)
Note that the robustness threshold is increasing and continuous in all its arguments. In
particular, it increases with the fine reduction R−k. The more generous the Amnesty Plus
policy, the higher the robustness threshold, and the more the firms find the reporting of
cartel k attractive. Hence, Amnesty Plus encourages firms to report a cartel once another
cartel has been detected. Second, the firms will have to again form cartel k at the beginning
of the next period. This will happen if and only if the individual stability condition holds.
Hence, cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only if it is robust and individually
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stable, that is
Vk ≥ max
(
2pik,
R−k
δ
)
If this inequality does not hold, the firms report cartel k. In particular, if cartel k is
individually unstable, the firms anticipate that they cannot form this cartel next period.
Reporting cartel k is then a dominant strategy for each firm. If a firm anticipates that its
partner does not report cartel k, it gets a strictly positive fine reduction from reporting
instead of zero from not reporting. Moreover, if a firm anticipates that its co-conspirator
reports, it also prefers reporting since it gets Amnesty Plus with probability 12 and avoids
paying a fine with certainty. If cartel k is individually stable but not robust, the Nash
equilibrium in dominant strategies is to report this cartel. Again, if a firm anticipates that
its partner reports cartel k, it also prefers to report. However, even if a firm anticipates
that its partner does not report and thus that they may form the cartel again next period,
it prefers to report because the fine reduction is higher than the present discounted value
the firm would get from sustaining this cartel.
Let us compare the individual stability to the robustness threshold in market k. We
find that
δ˜(q, θk) ≥ δ̂
(
q, θk,
R−k
pik
)
⇐⇒ R−k ≤ pik + qFk1− q (3.1)
Intuitively, if the fine reduction R−k is rather small, Amnesty Plus cannot induce the
reporting of the cartel, and it is the individual stability and not the robustness condition
which is stringent. Hence, cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only if
δ ≥ δ˜(q, θk). However, if the fine reduction is large enough, the firms want to benefit
LENIENCY PROGRAMS FOR MULTIMARKET FIRMS 160
from Amnesty Plus and therefore they report the cartel. In this case, it is the robustness
condition which is stringent, and cartel k survives the detection of cartel −k if and only if
δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θk,
R−k
pik
)
.
Since we can now determine the outcome in the last stage of the game after a possible
detection in one of the markets, we examine the firms’ decisions in the cartel formation
stage. The firms create both cartels only if they do not find the optimal unilateral deviation
profitable. Hence, the joint formation of the cartels is a Nash Equilibrium if the expected
present discounted value each firm gets when forming both cartels is weakly higher than
the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation, that is
V12 ≥ payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation
This inequality defines a joint stability condition such that the firms form both cartels
if and only if this condition is satisfied. Note that the right hand side (RHS) of the
above condition does not depend on the fine reduction under Amnesty Plus since, after
a unilateral deviation, at most one cartel is left, and the Amnesty Plus option is not
available. The left hand side (LHS), however, is (weakly) increasing piecewise in R1 and
R2 and thus, the joint stability condition becomes less stringent piecewise when the fine
discounts increase. It is important to understand, that the effects of Amnesty Plus on
cartel desistance and on cartel deterrence may go in opposite directions. On the one hand,
Amnesty Plus strengthens the firms’ incentives to report a cartel once the other cartel has
been detected. On the other hand, it may increase the expected present discounted value
of the joint cartel profits as the expected fine in case of a conviction decreases. However,
note that V12 is discontinuous in the fine discounts. If R1 and R2 increase up to the point
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where reporting under Amnesty Plus gets so attractive that an individually stable cartel
breaks down after the detection of the other cartel, V12 decreases drastically. However, if
the fine discounts then continue to increase, V12 rises again. This scenario may recur if the
second cartel is also individually stable and breaks down after the detection of the other
cartel as the firms’ reporting incentives increase. The net effect of Amnesty Plus therefore
depends on the strength of its effect, first, on the firms’ reporting incentives and, second,
on V12. It may thus be either pro- or anti-competitive. We now examine this net effect in
each of the three possible constellations of cartel formation under the EU antitrust policy.
3.4.1. No cartel formed under the EU policy: a neutrality result
Proposition 2 If both cartels are individually unstable, i.e. δ < δ˜(q, θ1), Amnesty Plus is
neutral: the firms form no cartel both under the EU and the US policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for the proof is as follows: Proceeding by backward induction, we take
the creation of both cartels as given and examine the Nash Equilibrium after the AA has
detected one of the cartels. Since both cartels are individually unstable, each firm has a
dominant strategy in reporting the remaining cartel after the first detection. Thus, the only
Nash equilibrium in the remaining market is the firms’ simultaneous denunciation of the
cartel. Each firm may be first to apply for Amnesty Plus, with a 50% chance. Examining
the joint stability condition, we find that, for any possible value of R−k, the expected
present discounted value each firm gets when forming both cartels is always smaller than
the optimal unilateral deviation which takes place in both markets. This signifies that if no
cartel is individually stable under the EU Leniency Program, an ever so generous Amnesty
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Plus policy cannot have any stabilizing effect. As a consequence, Amnesty Plus is neutral
in this case.
3.4.2. One cartel formed under the EU policy: a potential anticompetitive effect
In Lemma 3 we give the expression for the joint stability threshold which we then use
to formulate Proposition 4.
Lemma 3 If cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2, but cartel 2 does not survive the
detection of cartel 1, i.e. max
(
δ˜(q, θ1), δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))
≤ δ < max
(
δ˜(q, θ2), δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
))
,
the two cartels are jointly stable if and only if
δ ≥ 1
2(1− q)2 −
1
4(1− q)2 θ2
(
R1
F2
q(1− q)− q(3− q)
)
≡ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 If cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, i.e. δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ <
δ˜(q, θ2), Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive effect on cartel formation if and only if
max
(
δ˜(q, θ1), δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
))
≤ δ < δ˜(q, θ2)
This condition defines a non-empty range of values of δ if and only if
R2 <
(1 + qθ2)(pi1 − qF1)
(1− q)(1− qθ2) and R1 >
1 + q
1− qF2 +
2pi2
1− q
Amnesty Plus then encourages the firms to form the individually unstable cartel 2 which
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they would not have formed under the EU policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 suggests that Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive effect by sta-
bilizing a cartel which would not have been sustainable under the EU Leniency Program
in the presence of another cartel which is individually stable. Note that for this anticom-
petitive effect to potentially occur, the firms must form cartel 1 but not cartel 2 under the
EU policy for a non-empty range of discount factor values. For this to be the case, the
individual stability thresholds for markets 1 and 2 must differ. However, if θ1 = θ2, that is,
if the fines are proportional to the collusive profits or the markets are perfectly symmetric,
these thresholds are identical, and Amnesty Plus cannot have any anticompetitive effect.
We sketch the proof of Proposition 4 as follows: If the individually stable cartel 1 is
detected, reporting the individually unstable cartel 2 is a dominant strategy for each firm.
Hence, the firms report cartel 2 and may save part of the fine already imposed. Amnesty
Plus thus decreases a firm’s expected fine from a cartel conviction. The firms form both
cartels if the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation, which occurs in market 2 only,
does not exceed the value of the joint creation of the cartels. Two conditions have to hold.
First, cartel 1 must be not only individually stable but also robust to a detection of cartel
2. Hence, the robustness condition must hold for a non-empty range of values for δ within
the interval [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[. This is true if the robustness threshold for cartel 1 lies below
the individual stability threshold for cartel 2. We can show that
δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
< δ˜(q, θ2)⇐⇒ R2 < (1 + qθ2)(pi1 − qF1)(1− q)(1− qθ2) (3.2)
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Second, the cartels must be jointly stable. For the joint stability condition to hold for a
non-empty range of values for δ within the interval [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[, it is necessary and
sufficient that the joint stability threshold lies below the individual stability threshold for
cartel 2. We find that
δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
< δ˜(q, θ2)⇐⇒ R1 > 1 + q1− qF2 +
2pi2
1− q (3.3)
Combining conditions (3.1) and (3.2), three situations are possible:
i/ R2 ≤ pi1+qF11−q
If the fine discount in market 2 is low enough, cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel
2 for all δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[. If inequality (3.3) is satisfied, and the joint stability
condition holds, the firms form both cartels whereas, in the absence of Amnesty Plus,
they would have formed cartel 1 alone. Otherwise, the firms collude only in market
1, and Amnesty Plus is neutral.
ii/ pi1+qF11−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The formation of the two cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if both
cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2 and the cartels are jointly stable. In this case,
Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive effect. However, if the robustness condition for
cartel 1 is not satisfied, the firms cannot sustain the remaining cartel after one cartel
detection, and the joint stability condition never holds. As a consequence, the firms
form only cartel 1.
iii/ R2 ≥ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
In this case, the fine discount under Amnesty Plus in market 2 is too high such that
the robustness condition for cartel 1 cannot be satisfied. Hence, no cartel survives
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the detection of the other cartel, and the joint stability condition does not hold. The
firms form only the individually stable cartel 1, and Amnesty Plus is neutral.
Corollary 5 Amnesty Plus has no anticompetitive effect on cartel formation if the fine
discount a firm gets under Amnesty Plus for cartel −k does not exceed the fine for the
reported cartel k, i.e. R−k ≤ Fk.
Proof. Note that if R1 ≤ F2 the condition R1 > 1+q1−qF2 + 2pi21−q does not hold, and the joint
stability condition cannot be satisfied for δ within the interval [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[. It follows
from Proposition 4 that Amnesty Plus cannot have any anti-competitive effect in this case.
Finally, R2 ≤ F1 is always true since F1 ≥ F2 ≥ R2.
Corollary 5 suggests that, as a simple rule to avoid any stabilizing effect of the Amnesty
Plus policy, the size of the fine discount granted in one market should not exceed the fine a
non successful Amnesty Plus applicant would have incurred in the other market. This rule
is sufficient but not necessary. Intuitively, if R−k ≤ Fk, each firm gets a negative expected
payoff from reporting cartel k after the detection of cartel −k. This is because both firms
report cartel k simultaneously and thus, with probability 12 , each firm has to pay a fine
which is higher than the possible fine discount. The expected present discounted value each
firm gets from the joint formation of the cartels decreases and cannot exceed the payoff
from the optimal unilateral deviation. Hence, if cartel 2 is individually unstable such that
the firms report it after the detection of cartel 1, the two cartels can never be jointly stable.
By keeping the fine reduction low, the AA therefore can avoid any anticompetitive effect
of the Amnesty Plus policy.16
16Consider the interaction of n ≥ 2 firms on markets 1 and 2. We suppose that, if all the firms report a
cartel simultaneously, each firm is first with probability 1
n
. As the first firm reporting is the only company
eligible for the fine discount under Amnesty Plus, a firm’s expected payoff from reporting cartel k when
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3.4.3. Both cartels formed under the EU policy: a potential pro-competitive effect
Proposition 6 If both cartels are individually stable, i.e. δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2), Amnesty Plus has
a pro-competitive effect on cartel formation if and only if at least one of the cartels is not
robust and the two cartels are not jointly stable. In particular:
i/ If R2 ≤ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2) , Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect for a non-empty
range of values of δ if and only if pi2+qF21−q < R1 <
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q .
ii/ If R2 >
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) , Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect for a non-empty
range of values of δ for any value of R1 ∈ ]0, F1].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 suggests that Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive effect by desta-
bilizing a cartel which would have been sustainable under the EU policy. The sketch of the
proof is as follows: Amnesty Plus decreases the expected present discounted value of prof-
its each firm gets when forming both cartels if, following the detection of one individually
stable cartel, the firms report the other individually stable cartel to benefit from the fine
discount. V12 may then fall below the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation which
occurs in market 2 only. As a consequence, the firms would anticipate that the cartels
are not jointly stable and form only the more profitable of the cartels. To examine the
exact circumstances under which the firms form both cartels, we need to find the expected
discounted value each firm gets from the formation of both cartels and compare it to the
payoff from the optimal deviation. Since both cartels are individually stable, each cartel
everyone else reports is 1
n
R−k − n−1n Fk. We have 1n [R−k − (n− 1)Fk] ≤ 0 if and only if R−k ≤ (n− 1)Fk.
It is then straightforward that if R−k ≤ (n− 1)Fk holds for n = 2, it holds a fortiori for n > 2.
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survives the detection of the other cartel if and only if the robustness condition holds.
Combining conditions (3.1) and (3.2), four possible situations arise:
i/ R1 ≤ pi2+qF21−q and R2 ≤ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The individual stability condition in market 2 is more stringent than the robustness
conditions for both cartels. Hence, each cartel survives the detection of the other
cartel for all δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2). Not surprisingly, the expected present discounted value
each firm gets from forming both cartels turns out to be always weakly greater than
the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation. As a consequence, the firms form
both cartels. Amnesty Plus is neutral because the firms form also both cartels under
the EU policy.
ii/ R1 > pi2+qF21−q and R2 ≤ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
The individual stability condition in market 1 is more stringent than the robustness
condition in this market. Cartel 1 therefore always survives the detection of cartel
2. Cartel 2 however survives the detection of cartel 1 only if it is robust. If the
robustness condition for cartel 2 is satisfied, the analysis is the same as in i/. Hence,
the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation does not exceed the expected present
discounted profits from the joint creation of the cartels. The firms form both cartels,
and Amnesty Plus is neutral. However, if cartel 2 is not robust, the firms form both
cartels if and only if the joint stability condition holds. Amnesty Plus has a pro-
competitive effect in the case where this condition is not satisfied. The firms form
only cartel 1 in the US whereas they would have formed both of them in the EU.
iii/ R1 ≤ pi2+qF21−q and R2 > (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 2 is individually stable and robust and therefore always survives the detection
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of cartel 1. Cartel 1 however survives the detection of cartel 2 only if it is robust.
If the robustness condition for cartel 1 holds, then the analysis is the same as in
i/. The firms do not find the optimal unilateral deviation profitable and create both
cartels. If cartel 1 is not robust, the firms form both cartels if and only if the joint
stability condition holds. Otherwise, they form only cartel 1, and Amnesty Plus has
a pro-competitive effect.
iv/ R1 > pi2+qF21−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Each cartel survives the detection of the other cartel only if it is robust. If both
cartels are robust, the firms form both cartels, and Amnesty Plus is neutral. If either
one or none of the robustness conditions holds, the firms form both cartels if and only
if the joint stability condition holds. In particular, if none of the cartels is robust, the
joint stability condition anyway holds for a non-empty set of discount factor values
if the conviction probability q is small enough. Otherwise, the firms form only cartel
1, and Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect.
3.5. Discussion
We illustrate our main findings from sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 by means of Figures
3.1 to 3.4. Note in particular that Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict the results only for the case
where F1 >
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q . In Figure 3.1, we show the net effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel
formation as a function of the fine discount R1 for a given R2 ≤ pi1+qF11−q such that cartel
1, whenever it is individually stable, always survives the detection of cartel 2. Amnesty
Plus is neutral for all values of δ if R1 is sufficiently small, i.e. R1 ≤ pi2+qF21−q . Amnesty
Plus has a pro-competitive effect on cartel formation for intermediate values of R1, i.e.
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pi2+qF2
1−q < R1 <
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q , and for values of δ such that both cartels are individually
but not jointly stable and such that cartel 2 is not robust to a detection of cartel 1. This
region is labeled with a “+”. The firms form only cartel 1 in the US whereas they would
have formed both cartels in the EU. As a measure of the size of the effect, we use the
width of the relevant interval of values for δ on the y-axis. Hence, we can say that the pro-
competitive effect increases between pi2+qF21−q and R
∗
1 where it finally reaches its maximum.
Beyond R∗1, this effect decreases and goes to zero as R1 increases to
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q . R
∗
1 is
determined by the intersection of the robustness threshold of cartel 2 and the joint stability
threshold when cartel 1 is robust which both do not depend on R2. As a consequence,
the maximum size of the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus which is the difference
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R∗1
pi2
)
−δ˜(q, θ2) does not involve R2 neither. In the region labeled with a “-”, Amnesty
Plus has an anticompetitive effect on cartel formation. This effect occurs for higher values
of R1, i.e. R1 >
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q , and for values of δ such that cartel 1 is individually stable and
robust whereas cartel 2 is not, and the two cartels are jointly stable. The firms form both
cartels in the US whereas, in the absence of Amnesty Plus, they would have formed cartel
1 alone. The size of the anticompetitive effect increases as R1 increases from
2pi2+(1+q)F2
1−q
to F1.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≤ pi1+qF11−q
Figure 3.2 depicts the net effect of Amnesty Plus for a given R2 such that pi1+qF11−q <
R2 <
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) . The only difference with respect to Figure 3.1 is that the robustness
threshold for cartel 1 is now above its individual stability threshold. The region where
Amnesty Plus has an anticompetitive effect may thus be truncated at the level of the
robustness threshold for cartel 1. Hence, the potential anticompetitive effect of Amnesty
Plus may be more limited while its potential pro-competitive effect remains the same.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of Amnesty Plus if pi1+qF11−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
LENIENCY PROGRAMS FOR MULTIMARKET FIRMS 171
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we show the net effect of Amnesty Plus for a given R2 ≥
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) . From Proposition 4 we know that Amnesty Plus cannot have any anti-
competitive effect in this case. Moreover, note that, in contrast to Figures 3.1 and 3.2,
Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect on cartel formation for a non-empty range of
values of δ for any value of R1 > 0. In Figure 3.3, the conviction probability q is very small.
In this case, the highest discount factor value for which the pro-competitive effect occurs is
close to the individual stability threshold of cartel 2. Hence, the size of the potential pro-
competitive effect is rather small. Note in particular that Amnesty Plus cannot have any
pro-competitive effect if cartel 1 is robust to a detection of cartel 2. The pro-competitive
effect only occurs if cartel 1 is not robust, and both cartels are individually but not jointly
stable. The interval of discount factor values where these conditions jointly hold is never
empty. The value of R∗1 for which the pro-competitive effect is maximal corresponds to
the intersection of the robustness threshold for cartel 2 and the joint stability threshold
when both cartels are not robust. Note that, as the latter depends on both R1 and R2, R∗1
depends here on R2.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≥ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2) and q is very small
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Figure 3.4 displays the effect of Amnesty Plus with q not “too small”. There are two
main differences with respect to Figure 3.3. First, the region where the pro-competitive
effect of Amnesty Plus occurs is larger. Second, the pro-competitive effect may appear
even if cartel 1 is robust to a detection of cartel 2. If this happens, the value of R∗1 is at
the intersection of the robustness threshold for cartel 2 and the joint stability threshold
when cartel 1 is robust. R∗1 does therefore not depend on R2.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of Amnesty Plus if R2 ≥ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2) and q is not too small
3.6. EC Leniency Program with multimarket trigger strate-
gies
Suppose now that the firms try to sustain repeated collusion by consciously exploiting
their multimarket contact and using multimarket trigger strategies. Each firm cooperates
in market k = 1, 2 as long as its partner does. If one firm unilaterally deviates from
the illegal agreement in one of the markets, the co-conspirator reacts with a reversion to
competition in both markets. As a deviation in one market triggers punishment not only
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in the market where the deviation occurred but also in the market where the collusive
agreement has been respected, the optimal deviation always takes place in both markets
simultaneously. By linking the punishment across markets, firms can potentially transfer
slack enforcement power from market 1 to market 2 and sustain collusion in both markets
for values of δ for which only cartel 1 would have been sustainable under single-market
contact. We state the formal argument in the following proposition:17
Proposition 7 There exists a threshold pi2(q) < pi1 such that:
a- If pi2 < pi2(q), i.e. the asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 is sufficiently strong,
the use of multimarket trigger strategies enhances the firms’ ability to collude relative
to the use of standard trigger strategies. In other words, there exists a threshold
δ¯(q, θ1, θ2, λ) ∈]δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[ such that:
i/ If δ < δ˜(q, θ1), no cartel is formed.
ii/ If δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ < δ¯(q, θ1, θ2, λ), cartel 1 is formed whereas cartel 2 is not.
iii/ If δ¯(q, θ1, θ2, λ) ≤ δ, both cartels are formed.
b- If pi2(q) ≤ pi2 ≤ pi1, i.e. the asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 is sufficiently weak,
the use of multimarket strategies does not affect the firms’ ability to collude relative
to the use of standard trigger strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In Bernheim and Whinston (1990), multimarket contact does not affect collusive be-
havior if the markets are identical (provided that firms are identical and there are constant
17In what follows we suppose that θ1 < θ2. If θ1 = θ2, multimarket trigger strategies cannot have any
effect on the firms’ ability to collude.
LENIENCY PROGRAMS FOR MULTIMARKET FIRMS 174
returns to scale). In our model, multimarket contact turns out to be irrelevant not only for
identical markets but also for markets which are not too different in terms of profitability.
This finding can be interpreted as a somewhat broader version of the irrelevance result of
Bernheim and Whinston (1990), and it has a straightforward explanation. In the presence
of an antitrust policy, the firms’ may use multimarket trigger strategies to sustain cooper-
ation on both markets just as long as the AA does not detect one of the cartels. However,
if the AA detects one of the cartels, the firms cannot use multimarket punishment there-
after, and they can sustain the remaining cartel in subsequent periods only if this cartel is
individually stable. Antitrust enforcement may thus shorten the time period during which
the firms use multimarket trigger strategies and therefore, it may limit the effect these
strategies can have on the ease to sustain cooperation on both markets.
Nonetheless, if markets 1 and 2 are sufficiently asymmetric, the use of multimarket
trigger strategies does strengthen the firms’ ability to collude. In particular, the firms form
both cartels for a larger range of discount factor values.
3.7. US Amnesty Program with multimarket trigger strate-
gies
Let us now examine whether the firms may influence the effectiveness of the Amnesty
Plus policy by using multimarket trigger strategies. To do this, we need to know how the
use of multimarket strategies affects the individual stability, robustness and joint stability
conditions.
Consider first the individual stability and the robustness conditions: After the detection
of a cartel in one market, the firms interact only in the one remaining market. Since,
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without multimarket contact, the firms cannot link punishment across markets, they have
to use standard trigger strategies to sustain the remaining cartel. The individual stability
and the robustness conditions as well as the resulting thresholds therefore are the same as
in section 3.4.
Second, consider the joint stability condition: The use of multimarket trigger strategies
may alter the optimal unilateral deviation and thereby affect the joint stability condition.
This is because the optimal unilateral deviation occurs always in the two markets with
multimarket trigger strategies whereas, with standard trigger strategies, a firm may find it
optimal to deviate in one market only. More precisely, if cartel 1 is individually unstable,
i.e. δ < δ˜(q, θ1), we have shown that the optimal unilateral deviation under both strategies
is to deviate in both markets. Hence, the use of multimarket strategies does not affect the
joint stability condition and thereby the neutrality of Amnesty Plus. However, if cartel
1 is individually sustainable, i.e. δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ1), we have shown that the optimal unilateral
deviation occurs only in market 2 when the firms use standard trigger strategies but takes
place in both markets when they use multimarket trigger strategies. The joint stability
condition V12 ≥ V1 + 2pi2 when trigger strategies are standard becomes V12 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2
when strategies link markets. Since V1 ≥ 2pi1 whenever δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ1), the use of multimarket
strategies makes the joint stability condition less stringent. Hence, the firms form both
cartels for a larger range of discount factor values if they use multimarket rather than
standard trigger strategies. In particular, for values of δ such that 2pi1 + 2pi2 ≤ V12 <
V1 + 2pi2 the firms form both cartels when they use multimarket strategies whereas they
would have formed only cartel 1 with standard trigger strategies.
From Proposition 7 we know that, if the markets 1 and 2 are sufficiently similar in
terms of profitability, multimarket trigger strategies do not affect the set of discount factor
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values for which the firms create only one, respectively, two cartels, under a policy without
Amnesty Plus. However, since the use of multimarket trigger strategies may lower the joint
stability threshold, the firms may anyway want to use these strategies to strengthen the
anticompetitive effect and weaken the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus when it is
included in the leniency policy. If the asymmetry between the markets is strong enough,
the use of multimarket strategies enlarges the region of discount factor values for which the
firms form both cartels. Hence, the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus may occur for
a larger range of discount factor values. At the same time, however, the use of multimarket
strategies makes the joint stability condition less stringent and thereby the anticompetitive
effect of Amnesty Plus more likely to occur. Similarly, the set of discount factor values for
which the firms form only cartel 1 and for which Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive
effect shrinks with the use of multimarket trigger strategies. However, the joint stability
condition becomes less stringent, and the occurrence of the anticompetitive effect more
likely. As a consequence, if the markets differ sufficiently in terms of profitability, the net
effect of the multimarket trigger strategies is ambiguous.
3.8. Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the firms’ incentives
to engage in cartel activities. We develop an infinitely repeated interaction framework to
highlight the mechanism through which Amnesty Plus encourages, discourages or has no
effect on cartel formation when firms use standard and multimarket trigger strategies. US
success stories suggest that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. Our analysis shows that
this intuition is not always correct.
We find that Amnesty Plus may have an anticompetitive effect by stabilizing a cartel
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which is individually unstable in the presence of another cartel which is individually stable.
If the latter cartel is detected, the firms report the former in the hope of a discount in the
fine already imposed. Hence, Amnesty Plus decreases a firm’s expected fine from a cartel
conviction such that, for each firm, the joint creation of the cartels may result in an expected
discounted value of profits larger than the payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation. The
firms would anticipate that the cartels are jointly stable and form both cartels whereas only
one of them would have been created under the EU Leniency Program.
Our results also show that, Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive effect by desta-
bilizing a cartel which is individually stable. Amnesty Plus decreases the expected present
discounted value of profits each firm gets when forming both cartels if, following the detec-
tion of one individually stable cartel, the firms report the other individually stable cartel
to benefit from the fine discount. The value of the joint creation may then fall below the
payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation. The firms anticipate that the cartels are not
jointly stable and form only the more profitable of the cartels whereas they would have
formed both cartels under the EU policy.
We have also examined whether the firms can exploit their multimarket contact by link-
ing punishment across markets. Amnesty Plus is implemented by the antitrust authority
and inherently links the markets. We find that if the markets do not differ substantially
in terms of profitability, the use of multimarket trigger strategies can partly offset the
destabilizing effect of Amnesty Plus whereas it does not directly affect the firms’ ability
to collude. Firms may thus want to adopt multimarket trigger strategies even if their use
does not directly facilitate collusion.
Our findings suggest that an antitrust policy with Amnesty Plus may help to increase
cartel deterrence insofar as its potential anticompetitive effect could be avoided. We have
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shown that, by setting the size of the fine discount granted in one market such that it
does not exceed the fine a non successful Amnesty Plus applicant would have incurred in
the other market, the antitrust authority can avoid any stabilizing effect of this policy. In
view of this result, we believe that, for future research, it might be particularly fruitful to
elaborate on a thorough normative analysis of how an optimal Amnesty Plus policy should
be designed.
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3.10. Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note first that if the firms create both cartels at the beginning
of a period, the probability that the AA detects both cartels during this period is q2, that
it detects cartel 1 (cartel 2) whereas it does not detect cartel 2 (cartel 1) is q(1 − q), and
that it detects none of the cartels is (1− q)2. These probabilities follow directly from the
independence assumption on the AA’s detection technology.
i/ Assume that δ < δ˜(q, θ1). In this case, both cartels are individually unstable. The
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firms know that, regardless of their reporting decisions right after the detection of one
cartel, they will not be able to sustain the remaining cartel in the following period.
Hence, there are two possible Nash Equilibria at the end of a period where the AA
detects only one of the cartels: either both firms report the remaining cartel k where
each firm gets an expected payoff of −12Fk or both firms do not report cartel k where
each firm gets a payoff of 0. Since we are looking for the best collusive subgame-
perfect equilibrium, we focus on the Pareto superior equilibrium where the firms do
not report the remaining cartel. The expected present discounted value each firm
gets from the creation of both cartels is
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1)
+ q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V1
+
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V2
(3.4)
Since V1 < 2pi1 and V2 < 2pi2, the optimal unilateral deviation occurs in both markets.
The two cartels are then jointly stable if and only if
V12 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2
From expression (3.4), it follows that V12 ≤ V1 +V2 < 2pi1 + 2pi2. Hence, the optimal
unilateral deviation results in a higher payoff than the expected present discounted
value each firm gets when forming both cartels. As a consequence, the two cartels
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are not jointly stable, and the firms do not form both cartels. Since V1 < 2pi1 and
V2 < 2pi2, the firms do neither form one cartel alone and thus, they form no cartel at
all.
ii/ Assume that δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ < δ˜(q, θ2). In this case, if the firms form both cartels but
the AA detects cartel 2, then, if cartel 1 is not reported, the firms will again form
cartel 1 in the next period. However, if the AA detects cartel 1, the firms will not
form cartel 2 in the next period. As in case i/, if one cartel is discovered, the firms do
not report the remaining cartel in the absence of Amnesty Plus. Hence, the expected
present discounted value each firm gets from the creation of both cartels is
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1)
+ q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2 + δV1) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q) +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2 = V1 +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V2<2pi2
(3.5)
Since V1 ≥ 2pi1 and V2 < 2pi2, the optimal unilateral deviation is to deviate in
market 2 only. This deviation results in a payoff of V1 + 2pi2 which is greater than
V12. Hence, the two cartels are not jointly stable, and the firms therefore do not form
both cartels. However, since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, it
is a Nash Equilibrium to form cartel 1 alone but not to form cartel 2 without cartel
1.
iii/ Assume that δ˜(q, θ2) < δ. In this case, if the firms form both cartels but the AA
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detects one of them, they will again form the remaining cartel in the next period.
Hence, the expected present discounted value each firm gets from the creation of both
cartels is
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1 + δV2)
+ q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2 + δV1) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q) +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q) = V1 + V2 (3.6)
The optimal deviation occurs in market 2 only (see step 1 in Proof of Proposition 6)
which results in a payoff of V1 + 2pi2. Since V2 ≥ 2pi2 this payoff is weakly smaller
than V12. Hence, the creation of the two cartels is a Nash Equilibrium. Since Vk > 0
which implies that V12 > V1 and V12 > V2, the payoff from the joint creation of the
cartels is higher than the payoffs from both the Nash Equilibrium where the firms
form only cartel 1 and the Nash Equilibrium where the firms form only cartel 2. As
a consequence, the firms form both cartels.
Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed in 3 steps. In step 1, we show that the optimal
unilateral deviation occurs in both markets. In step 2, we determine the expected present
discounted value V12 a firm gets from the creation of the two cartels. We then show in step
3 that the joint stability condition can never be satisfied for any value of δ.
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Step 1. Since both cartels are individually unstable we know that V1 < 2pi1 and
V2 < 2pi2. Hence, it must be true that 2pi1 + 2pi2 > V1 + 2pi2 and 2pi1 + 2pi2 > 2pi1 + V2.
The optimal unilateral deviation therefore takes place in both markets.
Step 2. After the detection of one cartel, reporting the remaining cartel is a dominant
strategy for each firm. This equilibrium strategy gives each firm an expected payoff of
1
2R1 − 12F2 after the detection of cartel 1 and 12R2 − 12F1 after the detection of cartel 2.
The expected present discounted value V12 is then
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1 + 12R1 −
1
2
F2)
+ q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2 + 12R2 −
1
2
F1) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
which we rewrite as
V12 =
pi1 + pi2 − q(F1 + F2)
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V1+V2
− q(1− q)
2
(
1− δ(1− q)2
)(F1 + F2 −R1 −R2) (3.7)
Step 3. For the two cartels to be jointly stable, it is necessary and sufficient that the
payoff from the optimal unilateral deviation does not exceed V12, that is
V12 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2
From equation (3.7), we know that V12 ≤ V1 + V2 and as both cartels are individually
unstable, we have V1 + V2 < 2pi1 + 2pi2. Hence, the joint stability condition never holds,
and the firms do not form these cartels together. Moreover, since V1 < 2pi1 and V2 < 2pi2,
the firms neither form one cartel alone.
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Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that the optimal unilateral deviation takes place only
in market 2 (step 1). We then determine the expected present discounted value V12 each
firm gets when forming both cartels (step 2) and derive the joint stability condition from
which we easily get the joint stability threshold (step 3).
Step 1. Since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, we have V1 ≥ 2pi1
and V2 < 2pi2. It follows from these two inequalities that V1 + 2pi2 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2 > V2 + 2pi1.
The optimal unilateral deviation therefore occurs in market 2 only.
Step 2. After the detection of the individually stable cartel 1, it is a dominant strategy
for each firm to report the individually unstable cartel 2. The expected present discounted
value V12 is:
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1 + 12R1 −
1
2
F2)
+q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2 + δV1) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
We rewrite this expression as
V12 = V1 +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2 +
q(1− q)
2
(
1− δ(1− q)2
)(R1 − F2) (3.8)
Step 3. The formation of both cartels constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if a firm has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the collusive agreements in both markets. For the
two cartels to be jointly stable it is thus necessary and sufficient that V12 ≥ V1 + 2pi2. As
V12 ≥ V1, the joint stability condition also implies that whenever the formation of both
cartels is a Nash Equilibrium, it leads to higher profits than the Nash Equilibrium where
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the firms form cartel 1 only. Rewritten on δ the joint stability condition becomes
δ ≥ 1
2(1− q)2 −
1
4(1− q)2 θ2
(
R1
F2
q(1− q)− q(3− q)
)
≡ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
The formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
.
Proof of Proposition 4. Depending on the fine discount in market 2, we mainly
distinguish three situations:
i/ R2 ≤ pi1+qF11−q
As δ˜(q, θ1) ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
, cartel 1 survives a detection of cartel 2 for all δ ∈
[δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[. The expected present discounted value V12 each firm gets from
the creation of both cartels is given in equation (3.8). The formation of both cartels
is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
.
ii/ pi1+qF11−q < R2 <
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
As δ˜(q, θ1) < δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
< δ˜(q, θ2), cartel 1 survives a detection of cartel 2 if and
only if δ ∈ [δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
, δ˜(q, θ2)[. Hence, if δ < δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
the expression for
V12 is the same as in equation (3.7). Since V12 ≤ V1 + V2 < V1 + 2pi2, the payoff
from the optimal unilateral deviation is always strictly higher than the expected
present discounted value, and the formation of both cartels is not a Nash Equilibrium.
However, if δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
the expression for V12 is given in equation (3.8), and the
formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium only if δ ≥ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
.
iii/ R2 ≥ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
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Under this condition we know that δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
. Cartel 1 does never sur-
vive a detection of cartel 2 for any value of δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[, and the expression
for V12 is given in equation (3.7). Since V12 ≤ V1 + V2 < V1 + 2pi2, the formation of
both cartels is not a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6. We proceed in 2 steps. In step 1, we show that the optimal
unilateral deviation takes place only in market 2. In step 2, we determine the exact
circumstances under which the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus occurs.
Step 1. Since both cartels are individually stable, we have V1 ≥ 2pi1 and V2 ≥ 2pi2. It
follows that V2 + 2pi1 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2, and it is thus sufficient to show that
V1 + 2pi2 ≥ V2 + 2pi1
which is the same as
V1 − 2pi1 ≥ V2 − 2pi2 ⇐⇒ pi1
(
1− qθ1
1− δ(1− q) − 2
)
≥ pi2
(
1− qθ2
1− δ(1− q) − 2
)
The above inequality holds because pi1 ≥ pi2, θ1 ≤ θ2 and the expressions in the brackets
are positive. The optimal unilateral deviation therefore takes place only in market 2 and
yields a payoff of V1 + 2pi2.
Step 2.
i/ R1 ≤ pi2+qF21−q and R2 ≤ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
As δ˜(q, θ2) ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
and δ˜(q, θ2) ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
, each cartel survives the de-
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tection of the other cartel for all δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2). Thus, the expected present discounted
value V12 each firm gets when forming both cartels is:
V12 = q2(pi1 + pi2 − F1 − F2) + q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F1 + δV2)
+q(1− q)(pi1 + pi2 − F2 + δV1) + (1− q)2(pi1 + pi2 + δV12)
We can rewrite this expression as
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q) +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q) = V1 + V2
Since V2 ≥ 2pi2, the payoff from the unilateral optimal deviation does not exceed V12,
and the formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium. The firms create
both cartels, and Amnesty Plus is neutral.
ii/ R1 > pi2+qF21−q and R2 ≤ (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 1 survives the detection of cartel 2 for all δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2) whereas cartel 2 survives
the detection of cartel 1 if and only if δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
. If δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, the
analysis is the same as in i/ and leads to the result that the firms form both cartels,
and Amnesty Plus is neutral. However, if δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ < δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, the expression
for V12 is given in equation (3.8). The firms form both cartels only if the joint
stability condition holds, that is δ ≥ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
. From Proposition 4, we know
that δ˜(q, θ2) > δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
if R1 > 1+q1−qF2 +
2pi2
1−q . We thus distinguish between two
subcases:
a/ R1 > 1+q1−qF2 +
2pi2
1−q
Since δ˜(q, θ2) > δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
, we have δ > δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
for all δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2), δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)[
.
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The firms form both cartels for any δ in this interval.
b/ R1 ≤ 1+q1−qF2 + 2pi21−q
Since δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
, the firms form both cartels if δ ≥ δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)
whereas they form only cartel 1 if δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2), δ˘
(
q, θ2,
R1
F2
)[
. In the latter
case, Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect on cartel formation.
iii/ R1 ≤ pi2+qF21−q and R2 > (1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)(1−q)(1−qθ2)
Cartel 2 survives the detection of cartel 1 for all δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2), whereas cartel 1 survives
the detection of cartel 2 if and only if δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
. If δ ≥ δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
, the
analysis is the same as in i/ and leads to the result that the firms form both cartels.
However, suppose now that δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ < δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
. For this range of discount
factor values, we derive the expression for V12 from equation (3.8) by swapping 1 and
2, that is
V12 = V2 +
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)2 +
q(1− q)
2
(
1− δ(1− q)2
)(R2 − F1) (3.9)
The formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if the cartels
are jointly stable. This is equivalent to
(
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)2 −
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A≤0
+
(
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q) − 2pi2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B≥0
(3.10)
+
q(1− q)
2(1− δ(1− q)2)(R2 − F1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C≤0
≥ 0
Note that inequality (3.10) does not depend on R1. Let us show that the set of
values δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2), δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)[
which satisfies inequality (3.10) is not empty if the
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detection probability is small enough. Setting δ to its upper bound δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)−
,
the terms A and C go to 0 as q → 0 whereas the term B goes to pi2
1− R2
pi1+R2
− 2pi2.
This expression is strictly positive since R2 >
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) > pi1. Hence, we can
conclude that for q sufficiently small and δ close enough to δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
, condition
(3.10) holds. Moreover, we can say that the set of values δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2), δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)[
which does not satisfy condition (3.10) is never empty whatever the value of q > 0.
This is so because inequality (3.10) does not hold for δ = δ˜(q, θ2) and thus, due to the
continuity of the LHS of (3.10) with respect to δ, it does not hold for δ sufficiently
close to δ˜(q, θ2). Therefore, the set over which Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive
effect within the interval
[
δ˜(q, θ2), δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)[
is never empty.
iv/ R1 > pi2+qF21−q and R2 >
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2)
We have δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
≥ δ˜(q, θ2) and δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
≥ δ˜(q, θ2).
If δ ≥ max
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))
the firms form both cartels, and Amnesty
Plus is neutral. If δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
≤ δ < δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
we get V12 from equation (3.8),
and the analysis is the same as in ii/. If δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
≤ δ < δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
)
we
get V12 from equation (3.9), and the analysis from iii/ applies. If δ˜(q, θ2) ≤ δ <
min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))
the expression for V12 is given in (3.7), and the
firms form both cartels if and only if the joint stability condition holds, that is
(
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)2 −
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D≤0
+
(
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2 − 2pi2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E≥0 or E≤0
(3.11)
+
q(1− q)
2(1− δ(1− q)2)(R1 +R2 − F1 − F2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F≤0
≥ 0
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Let us show that the set of values δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2),min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))[
which satisfies inequality (3.11) is not empty if q is sufficiently small. Setting δ to
its upper bound min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))−
, the terms D and F go to 0 as
q → 0 whereas the term E goes to pi2
1−min
(
R2
pi1+R2
,
R1
pi2+R1
)−2pi2 which is strictly positive
since R2 >
(1+qθ2)(pi1−qF1)
(1−q)(1−qθ2) > pi1 and R1 >
pi2+qF2
1−q > pi2. Therefore, for q sufficiently
small and for δ close enough to min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))
condition (3.11)
holds. Moreover, the set of values δ ∈
[
δ˜(q, θ2),min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))[
which does not satisfy condition (3.11) is never empty for any value of q > 0. This
is because condition (3.11) does not hold for δ = δ˜(q, θ2) and, due to the continuity
of its LHS with respect to δ, it does not hold for δ sufficiently close to δ˜(q, θ2).
Therefore, the set over which Amnesty Plus has a pro-competitive effect within the
interval
[
δ˜(q, θ2),min
(
δ̂
(
q, θ2,
R1
pi2
)
, δ̂
(
q, θ1,
R2
pi1
))[
is never empty.
Proof of Proposition 7. Note first that when firms use multimarket strategies, the
optimal unilateral deviation is to deviate in both markets since punishment occurs in both
markets. A firm’s payoff from such an optimal deviation is 2pi1 + 2pi2.
i/ Assume that δ < δ˜(q, θ1). From the analysis of the EU antitrust policy when firms
use standard trigger strategies and, especially, from the proof of Proposition 1, we
know that the expected present discounted value V12 each firm gets from the creation
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of both cartels is equal to expression (3.4):
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<V1
+
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<V2
≤ V1 + V2 < 2pi1 + 2pi2
A unilateral deviation in both markets is therefore always profitable, and the two
cartels are not jointly stable. Hence, the firms do not form both cartels. Moreover,
since V1 < 2pi1 and V2 < 2pi2, they do not form only one of the cartels either.
ii/ Assume that δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ < δ˜(q, θ2). From (3.5) we get the expression for V12 which
is:
V12 = V1 +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤V2<2pi2
Since cartel 1 is individually stable whereas cartel 2 is not, it is a Nash Equilibrium
to form cartel 1 alone, whereas it is not a Nash Equilibrium to form cartel 2 without
cartel 1. The formation of both cartels is the best collusive equilibrium if and only if
V12 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2. Note that this condition is less stringent than its counterpart when
firms use standard trigger strategies, i.e. V12 ≥ V1+2pi2. The joint stability condition
is therefore more easily satisfied with multimarket strategies which supports the
intuition that multimarket contact is basically pro-collusive. We provide, however,
a more detailed analysis of this argument: Note that, since V12 is increasing in δ
over [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[, a necessary and sufficient condition for the inequality V12 ≥
2pi1 + 2pi2 to hold over a non-empty range of values of δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[ is that
V12
(
δ˜(q, θ2)−
)
> 2pi1 + 2pi2. After some algebraic manipulations, we can write the
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following:
V12
(
δ˜(q, θ2)−
)
− (2pi1 + 2pi2) = 2pi1 q(θ2 − θ1)1− qθ2 − 2pi2
q(1 + qθ2)
1− qθ2 + q(1 + qθ2)
Therefore,
V12
(
δ˜(q, θ2)−
)
> 2pi1 + 2pi2 (3.12)
⇐⇒
(θ2 − θ1)
(
1− qθ2 + q(1 + qθ2)
)
1− q2θ22︸ ︷︷ ︸
term A
pi1
pi2︸︷︷︸
term B
> 1
We show that term A is increasing in θ2 over [θ1, 1q − 2] by differentiating it with
respect to θ2. Since θ2 =
F (pi2)
pi2
is decreasing in pi2, term A is also decreasing in pi2
over [0, pi1]. Term B, which is the same as 1λ , is clearly decreasing in pi2. Then, the
LHS of inequality (3.12) which is the multiplication of terms A and B is decreasing
in pi2 over [0, pi1]. Moreover, it is continuous in pi2, goes to +∞ as pi2 −→ 0 and
takes the value 0 for pi2 = pi−1 . Using the intermediate value theorem, we can say
that there exists a threshold pi2(q) such that inequality (3.12) is satisfied if and only
if pi2 < pi2(q). Hence, we distinguish two subcases:
– If pi2 < pi2(q) then V12 > 2pi1 + 2pi2 for δ = δ˜(q, θ2)−, whereas V12 < 2pi1 + 2pi2
for δ = δ˜(q, θ1). Since V12 is continuous and increasing in δ, we can again
use the intermediate value theorem to conclude that there exists a threshold
δ¯(q, θ1, θ2, λ) = δ¯ such that V12 < 2pi1 + 2pi2 for δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ¯[ and V12 ≥ 2pi1 +
2pi2 for δ ∈ [δ¯, δ˜(q, θ2)[. Hence, the formation of both cartels is the best collusive
equilibrium for δ ∈ [δ¯, δ˜(q, θ2)[ but is not an equilibrium for δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ¯[.
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– If pi2 ≥ pi2(q) then V12 ≤ 2pi1 + 2pi2 for δ = δ˜(q, θ2)−. It follows that the
inequality V12 < 2pi1 + 2pi2 holds for all δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[ which implies that
forming both cartels is never a Nash Equilibrium for δ ∈ [δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)[.
iii/ Assume that δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2). In this case, we get the expression for V12 from (3.6), that
is:
V12 =
pi1 − qF1
1− δ(1− q) +
pi2 − qF2
1− δ(1− q) = V1 + V2 ≥ 2pi1 + 2pi2
From the above inequality, it is straightforward that the formation of both cartels is
the best collusive equilibrium for all δ > δ˜(q, θ2).
3.11. Appendix B: Extensions
3.11.1. Appendix B1: Relaxation of the assumption θ2 ≥ θ1
Suppose now that the opposite assumption θ1 > θ2 holds. The direct implication, albeit
somewhat counterintuitive, is that cartel 2 is easier to sustain than the more profitable
cartel 1, i.e. δ˜(q, θ2) < δ˜(q, θ1).
It is straightforward that Proposition 1 remains valid, provided that we reverse the
subscripts 1 and 2. Hence, under the EU antitrust policy, the firms form a cartel if and
only if it is individually stable.
Proposition 2 remains true, but we have to substitute δ˜(q, θ2) for δ˜(q, θ1), or more
generally, if we do not make any assumption on the size of θ1 relative to θ2, we substitute
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min
(
δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)
)
for δ˜(q, θ1). Hence, if no cartel is individually stable, the firms do
not form any of the cartels under the US antitrust policy, and Amnesty Plus is still neutral.
It is easy to show that by reversing the subscripts 1 and 2, the first part of Proposition
4 still holds. However, whereas the necessary and sufficient conditions for Amnesty Plus
to have an anticompetitive effect which we provide in the second part of Proposition 4
may be satisfied under the initial assumption θ2 ≥ θ1, the reverse is not true. One of the
new conditions defining a non-empty range of values of δ for which Amnesty Plus has an
anticompetitive effect would be R2 > 1+q1−qF1 +
2pi1
1−q . Hence, since we have R2 ≤ F2 ≤ F1 <
1+q
1−qF1 +
2pi1
1−q , the latter condition cannot be satisfied, and the potential anticompetitive
effect of Amnesty Plus cannot occur.
Proposition 6 remains valid, although we have to substitute δ˜(q, θ1) for δ˜(q, θ2). More
generally, if we do not want to make any particular assumption on the relative size of θ1
and θ2, we substitute max
(
δ˜(q, θ1), δ˜(q, θ2)
)
for δ˜(q, θ2). Hence, Amnesty Plus may still
have a pro-competitive effect on cartel formation.
3.11.2. Appendix B2: Unrestricted strategy choice
We relax the assumption that the firms can form a cartel in a period t > 0 only if
this cartel has been formed in the previous period. The key difference with respect to our
initial time structure is that, if the firms form only one cartel in some period, and the AA
detects this cartel during this period, they still have to possibility to form the other cartel
in the following period. More precisely, we modify the timing within a period t ≥ 1 as
follows: If no cartel has been convicted in the previous period, the time structure of the
latter applies to the current period. If both cartels have been formed and convicted in the
previous period, the firms compete in both markets. If either one cartel has been formed
and not convicted or both cartels have been formed and only one has been convicted, the
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timing is the same as the one presented in stages 0 to 3 of our initial set-up.
The modification of the time structure does not affect our results under the EC Le-
niency Program. In particular, Proposition 1 remains valid. Neither does the modification
affect the results under the US Amnesty Program with Amnesty Plus for δ < δ˜(q, θ1) and
δ˜(q, θ1) ≤ δ < δ˜(q, θ2). Both the neutrality of Amnesty Plus result in Proposition 2 and
the result on the potential anticompetitive effect of Amnesty Plus stated in Proposition 4
still hold.
Allowing for an unrestricted strategy choice, however, alters our results in the region
where Amnesty Plus may have a pro-competitive effect, i.e. for δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2). The fact that
the firms may now start forming a cartel in a period t ≥ 1 gives rise to a new equilibrium
where they form cartel 1 until it is detected and then form cartel 2. This is an equilibrium
because for δ ≥ δ˜(q, θ2), both cartels are individually stable. Amnesty Plus cannot prevent
such an outcome. Each firm gets an expected payoff V 21 such that
V 21 = q(pi1 − F1 + δV2) + (1− q)(pi1 + δV 21 )
The AA detects cartel 1 with probability q in which case the firms form cartel 2 in the
following period. With probability (1− q) the AA does not detect cartel 1, and the firms
form it again in the following period. Solving the above equation for V 21 we get
V 21 = V1 + q
δ
1− δ(1− q)V2
For the joint formation of both cartels to be the most profitable equilibrium, two conditions
must hold: First, V12 ≥ V1 + 2pi2, i.e. the optimal unilateral deviation must not be
profitable, second, V12 ≥ V 21 , i.e. the equilibrium where the firms form both cartels must
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be more profitable than the equilibrium where the firms form first cartel 1 and then only,
if detected, cartel 2. We can combine these two conditions as follows:
V12 ≥ max(V1 + 2pi2, V 21 ) = max
(
V1 + 2pi2, V1 + q
δ
1− δ(1− q)V2
)
It is straightforward that the above condition is weakly more stringent than the condition
V12 ≥ V1 + 2pi2. Moreover, it is strictly more stringent than the latter for at least some
values of the parameters δ and q. This is because q δ1−δ(1−q)V2 = q
δ
1−δ(1−q)
pi2−qF2
1−δ(1−q) and
limδ→1
(
limq→0 q δ1−δ(1−q)
pi2−qF2
1−δ(1−q)
)
= +∞. Hence, for small values of q the expression
q δ1−δ(1−q)V2 can be greater than 2pi2 for values of δ sufficiently close to 1.
We have shown that allowing for an unrestricted strategy choice does not affect the
potential anticompetitive effect of Amnesty Plus but has an ambiguous impact on its pro-
competitive effect. On the one hand, the region where the pro-competitive effect occurs
may be larger because it may be more difficult to achieve the joint stability of the cartels.
On the other hand, since Amnesty Plus can only deter the formation of cartel 2 as long as
cartel 1 goes undetected, the pro-competitive effect of Amnesty Plus, if it occurs, is weaker
relative to our previous findings.
Chapter 4
Regulation Stringency and
Efficiency: Individual versus Relative
Regulation1
4.1. Introduction
Various regulatory schemes are used in practice. One dimension along which regulation
contracts may differ is whether they are based on the regulated firm’s own performances
or on other firms’ performances. More specifically, when a sector consists of regional
monopolies, firms can be regulated on the basis of their own efficiency but they can also
be regulated by means of a relative performance regulatory scheme, such as yardstick
competition (Shleifer 1985). The underlying idea of yardstick competition is the regulation
of these firms using constructed benchmarks that are based on costs of all other firms in the
considered industry, but are independent of the costs of the firm the benchmark is created
1In this chapter we explore in a more general framework an issue studied in Ebel and Lefouili (2008),
except for subsection 4.4.3. which is a reprint of subsection 5.2 of the latter paper.
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for. Due to this independence, firms are expected to have higher incentives to reduce and
reveal their costs (Shleifer 1985, Dalen, 1998, Tangerås 2002). Yardstick competition has
been implemented in utility industries in many countries, such as the electricity industry
in the UK, Switzerland, Chile and Germany,2 the water industry in the UK and Italy and
the gas distribution sector in Japan3. It has also been used in the bus industry in Norway
and the telecommunications sector in the US.4
This paper examines how cost reduction incentives are affected by the stringency of
regulation when ex post price-cap schemes are used.5 We analyze the cost reduction efforts
of symmetric local monopolies under two types of regulation. First, we assume the ceiling
price set for each firm to depend on its own realized cost. We refer to this regulation
regime as individual regulation. Second, we deal with the case where the ceiling price for
a given firm depends on the average of the realized marginal costs of the other firms in
the industry. We refer to this regulation regime as relative regulation. We do not allow for
transfers on the part of the regulator, thus departing from most of the literature on yardstick
competition.6 Our approach is motivated by the empirical observation that most regulators
set prices using some regulatory rule without making any transfer to the regulated firms.
Though it is clear that making side payments leads to less deadweight loss than setting
prices higher than marginal costs, there are some rationales for not using transfers. First,
2See Jamasb and Politt (2001) for an extensive survey of different regulation practices in electricity
markets around the world.
3See Suzuki (2008)
4See FCC (1997).
5Ex post regulation is used in Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, see Jamasb & Pollitt[2001] and
Farsi et al.[2007].
6To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that examines yardstick competition without transfers
on the part of the regulator is Shleifer (1985). In a short extension to his main analysis, he characterizes
the optimal regulatory scheme when the only regulatory tool is the price. However, he does not show how
higher regulated prices would affect the firms’ cost reduction incentives, which is the focus of this paper.
Moreover, he does not establish that the second-best outcome the regulator is willing to implement through
the proposed scheme is the unique equilibrium whereas the regulatory contracts studied in this paper are
shown to induce a unique equilibrium in terms of cost reductions.
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collecting public funds is costly and, second, making transfers may increase the likelihood
of regulatory capture since it is more likely there will be a lack of transparency relative to
a situation where the only regulatory tool is the price.
We model the stringency of regulation through a mark-up parameter, which we suppose
to be exogenously given. Since we do not specify the regulator’s objective function, we argue
that it is possible to embed our analysis in a more general framework than the standard
normative one where a regulator maximizes the usual utilitarian social welfare function.
In particular, our analysis could be used in a framework where regulators’ decisions are
influenced by interest groups such as lobbies7 and therefore need not result in a socially
desirable value of the mark-up. Furthermore, the only informational assumption made
in our analysis is that realized costs are observable to the regulator. Hence, as in Shleifer
(1985), we do not discard the possibility of a lack of information on the part of the regulator,
in particular about the cost reduction technology and the regulated firms’ initial efficiency.
We show that the cost reduction level is decreasing in the mark-up under relative
regulation while it is increasing in the mark-up under individual regulation. Thus a more
stringent regulation encourages cost reduction under relative regulation while it undermines
the incentives to reduce costs under individual regulation. We also show that a more
stringent regulation leads to a decrease in the regulated price under relative regulation while
its effect on the price under individual regulation is ambiguous. Due to those differences,
there may be a tension between encouraging cost reductions and minimizing prices under
individual regulation while this is not true under relative regulation. Note that in the
case of regulation with transfers, prices are set equal to marginal costs by regulators who
wish to achieve allocative efficiency, and consequently they are negatively related to cost
7For an overview of lobbyism activities in the European Union, see Svendsen(2002).
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reduction. This makes it possible to derive the comparative statics on prices from those on
cost reductions. In our setting, prices are affected by the regulatory tool (the mark-up) in a
direct way and not only indirectly through cost reductions, which makes the price analysis
not just a corollary of the cost reduction analysis.
We show that relative regulation cannot be implemented if the mark-up is too small.
Indeed, the artificial competition induced by relative regulation can be so intense that
it does not allow regulated firms to break-even. Furthermore, we extend our model by
allowing firms to undertake quality-improving investments. We show that our central
result that cost reduction investment is undermined by a more lenient relative regulation
holds in a setting where firms can conduct quality investments as well. However it is
couterbalanced by the positive effect of a more lenient relative regulation on the incentives
to enhance quality.
Dalen (1998) also compares individual regulation to yardstick competition. He considers
an asymmetric information framework and investigates firms’ informational rents (granted
through transfers) and their incentives for conducting industry-specific and firm-specific in-
vestments. He finds that the optimal regime for encouraging investments depends crucially
on their nature: yardstick competition leads to more firm-specific investments and individ-
ual regulation entails more industry-specific investments. In his paper, the advantages of
yardstick competition are strongly related to the reduction of the regulator’s informational
problem and her ability to make firms reveal their costs with less distorsion under this
regime. This a major difference with our paper since we rather focus on the artificial com-
petition between regulated firms induced by relative regulation (as in Shleifer, 1985). Our
paper has two other important differences with Dalen (1998). First, the latter allows for
lump-sum transfers on the part of the regulator while we do not. Second, our focus is not
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on comparing the investment levels under individual regulation and yarsdstick competition
when both schemes are socially optimal but rather on comparing how firms react to less
stringent (and potentially sub-optimal) regulation under the two regimes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic set-up is presented in
Section 4.2. In this section we also characterize the optimal cost reduction and price of an
unregulated monopoly, which can be seen as a benchmark to which the outcomes under
regulation may be compared. In Section 4.3, we study how the incentives to reduce costs
and the prices are affected by the stringency of regulation when an individual scheme is
used by the regulator. Section 4.4 is devoted to relative regulation and more specifically
to the determination of the equilibrium cost reductions and prices and their comparative
statics with respect to the mark-up parameter. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2. The basic set-up
Consider N symmetric local monopolies.8 We suppose that all markets are character-
ized by the same demand function D(.). We assume that fixed production costs are zero
and we denote by c the initial (constant) marginal cost of all firms. Firm i = 1, 2, ..., n can
reduce its marginal cost from c to c− ui by spending an amount C(ui)9
The assumptions we will set on the demand function D(.) and the investment cost func-
tion C(.) are closely regulated to the existence and unicity of an unregulated monopoly’s
optimal cost reduction and price. Therefore, we start by writing the maximization program
of the firms if they were not regulated, where we drop the subscript i because all firms and
8E.g. electricity network providers, railway system operators, hospitals, etc.
9C(.) can also be interpreted as the manager’s disutility function from realizing efficiency gains. Note
that all firms share the same investment cost function C(.).
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markets are symmetric:
max
u∈[0,c],p∈[0,+∞[
pi(u, p) = D(p)(p− (c− u))− C(u) (4.1)
We suppose that the following assumptions hold:
A1 : D(c) > 0 and there exists a ∈ ]c,+∞[ ∪ {+∞} such that D (a) = 0. If a < +∞
then D is continuous over [0, a] , twice differentiable over [0, a[ and strictly decreasing over
[0, a[ while D (p) = 0 over [a,+∞[ . If a = +∞ then D is twice differentiable and strictly
decreasing over [0,+∞[ .
This assumption is fulfilled by the vast majority of usual demand functions (linear, iso-
elastic,...). Note that we allow for demand functions that reach zero for a finite price as
well as demand functions that reach zero only for an infinite price.
A2 : The function p→ pD(p) is strictly concave over [0, a[ .
This assumption means that a firm’s gross revenue is strictly concave in its price (over the
set of prices for which the demand is not zero). This is the case whenever the demand
function is either concave or not too convex. Indeed, assumption A2 can be rewritten as
the inequality D” (p) < −2D
′(p)
p where the right-hand side is strictly positive over [0, a[.
Assumptions A1 and A2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of the monopoly price when
the firm produces with its initial marginal cost c. Anticipating on a notation we will use in
lemma 1 (see below), we denote pM (0) the monopoly price when the firm produces with
its marginal cost c.
A3 : The function C is three times differentiable over [0, c[ . In case C(c) < +∞, this
property extends to [0, c]. Furthermore C ′ ≥ 0, C” > 0 and C ′′′ ≥ 0.
The concavity assumption captures the idea that it becomes costlier to reduce the marginal
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cost as the firm becomes more efficient. The assumption about the third derivative of C is
a technical assumption (fulfilled by a wide range of functions) which is quite standard in
the regulation literature.10
A4 : D (0) < C ′(c) and D
(
pM (0)
)
> C ′ (0) .
As it will be made clear below this assumption ensures that corner solutions do not arise
under the unregulated monopoly regime. More specifically, the first inequality ensures
that an unregulated monopoly does not find it optimal to reduce its marginal cost to zero
(which would be quite unrealistic), while the second inequality implies that an unregulated
monopoly finds it optimal to invest a strictly positive amount to decrease its marginal cost.
Note that the first inequality is automatically satisfied if C ′(c) = +∞ and the second one
always holds if C ′ (0) = 0.
A5 : (C ′)−1 oD is either strictly concave or linear over [0, a[ .11
Given that C ′ is weakly convex and strictly increasing (see A3), we can state that h ≡
(C ′)−1 is weakly concave and strictly increasing. Hence A5 holds whenever the demand
function D is concave or not too convex (relative to h) . Indeed A5 can be rewritten as
D” ≤ − (h”oD)×D′2h′oD where the right-hand side is a weakly positive function.
A6 : DD′ is either strictly convex or linear over [0, a[ .
This technical assumption is fulfilled by a wide range of demand functions including linear
and iso-elastic demands as well as polynomial demands having the form D(p) = (a− p)n .12
Assumption A6, along with A5, ensures the uniqueness of the solution to the maximization
10See chapter 4 of Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Tangerås (2002).
11Note that this assumption is a bit stronger than assuming (C′)−1 oD to be weakly convex. We do not
make the latter assumption because it will allow the function (C′)−1 oD to be strictly convex over a subset
of [0, a[ and linear over the remaining subset which can raise problems about the unicity of the solution to
the different maximization programs examined in this paper. The same applies for assumption A6.
12Note that, in all the mentioned examples, D
D′ is linear.
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program of an unregulated monopoly.
We first present some results regarding the behavior of an unregulated monopoly in terms
of cost reduction and pricing.
Lemma 1 For any u ∈ [0, c], there exists a unique price pM (u) that maximizes pi(p, u).
Moreover, the monopoly price pM (u) is strictly decreasing and either strictly convex or
linear in u.
Proof. See Appendix
This lemma states that a decrease in the monopoly’s marginal cost yields at most a pro-
portional decrease in the monopoly price. This is used to establish the unicity result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The unregulated monopoly’s maximization program (4.1) has a unique so-
lution
(
uM , pM
)
and the optimal cost reduction uM is in the interval ]0, c[ .
Proof. See Appendix
Now that we have characterized the firms’ behavior in case they are not regulated, we
examine how their decisions are affected by regulation.
4.3. Individual regulation
Under individual regulation, firms are regulated on the basis of their own production
costs. The regulator does not make transfers to the firm and sets for each firm i a ceiling
price depending on its realized marginal cost c − ui.13 More specifically, we assume that
13Such a cost based regulation method can be found in the regulation of the german electricity industry
for example.
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the ceiling price is given by:
pmaxi = µ(c− ui),
where µ ≥ 1 is a mark-up parameter that can be interpreted as an inverse measure of
regulation stringency.
Since the firms are symmetric and are treated independently, we can again drop the sub-
script i when writing the maximization program of an individually regulated firm:
max
u∈[0,c],p∈[0,+∞[
pi(u, p) = D(p)(p− (c− u))− C(u) (4.2)
subject to the regulatory constraint:
p ≤ µ(c− u).
Before stating the formal result on the optimal cost reduction of an individually regulated
firm, let us identify the effects of a cost reduction on its profit. First, there is an obvious
negative cost effect. Second, there is a negative margin effect since cost reduction will
decrease the price the firm will be allowed to set . Third, there is a positive demand effect
since cost reduction will result in lower price and therefore in higher demand.
Proposition 3 For any µ ≥ 1, there exists a unique pair (uI(µ), pI (µ)) that maximizes the
regulated firm’s profit subject to the individual regulatory constraint. Denoting µM = p
M
c−uM ,
there exists a unique threshold µ˜ ∈ [1, µM[ such that
1. If 1 ≤ µ ≤ µ˜, the regulated firm does not invest in cost reduction and the regulatory
constraint is binding: uI(µ) = 0 and pI (µ) = µc.
2. If µ˜ < µ < µM , the regulated firm invests a strictly positive amount in cost reduction
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and the regulatory constraint is binding: uI(µ) > 0 and pI (µ) = µ(c− uI(µ)).
3. If µ ≥ µM , the regulated firm behaves as an unregulated monopoly: uI(µ) = uM and
pI (µ) = pM
Moreover, µ˜ = 1 if and only if C ′(0) = 0 and D(c) + cD′(c) ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition (3) shows that the demand effect outweights the cost effect and the margin
effect for sufficiently lenient regulation constraints (i.e. sufficiently high values of the mark-
up µ), hence resulting in a strictly positive investment in cost reduction. If the regulation
constraint is too stringent, the cost effect and the margin effect dominate the demand effect
which yields no investment. However it is shown that whenever c is high enough14 and
the marginal investment cost is very small for weak cost reductions, the regulated firm
has an incentive to reduce its marginal cost even if the mark-up is arbitrarly close to 1
(but different from 1). The proposition also shows that there exists a monopoly-replicating
mark-up, that is, a value of the mark-up above which the regulatory constraints are not
binding which means the regulated firm will be able to implement the monopoly outcome.
Let us now see how the stringency of the regulation policy affects each of the three
identified effects. An increase in the mark-up does not affect the cost effect but it positively
affects both themargin effect and the demand effect. Therefore, the overall effect of a higher
mark-up on the investment incentives is a priori ambiguous. The next proposition provides
a clear-cut result.
Proposition 4 The cost reduction under individual regulation uI(µ) is weakly increasing
in the mark-up parameter µ . More specifically, it is constant over [1, µ˜] , strictly increasing
14The condition D(c) + cD′(c) ≤ 0 has this interpretation because A2 implies that D(c) + cD′(c) is
strictly decreasing in c.
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over
[
µ˜, µM
]
and constant over
[
µM ,+∞[ .
Proof. See Appendix
This proposition states that a decrease in the stringency of the regulatory constraint
yields (weakly) more investment in cost reduction. A regulator that is mainly concerned
with productive efficiency could then encourage cost reductions by granting relatively high
mark-ups. The question that arises at this stage is whether such increase of productive
efficiency comes at the expense of a decrease in allocative efficiency. The next proposition
provides an answer to this question.
Proposition 5 The price pI (µ) is strictly increasing in µ over [1, µ˜] and constant over[
µM ,+∞[ but the effect of a higher mark-up µ on the price pI (µ) is ambiguous over]
µ˜, µM
[
.
A sufficient condition for pI (µ) to be strictly decreasing in µ over
]
µ˜, µM
[
is that
(c− u)C” (u) ≤ C ′ (u) for all u ∈ [0, c].
If this condition does not hold then pI (µ) may be increasing in µ over
]
µ˜, µM
[
. This
is for instance true if the demand is linear, i.e. D (p) = a − p and the investment cost
function is quadratic, i.e. C (u) = 12γu
2.
Proof. See Appendix .
Relaxing the regulatory constraint, i.e. granting a higher mark-up, affects the regulated
price through two effects: a direct effet that captures the way the mark-up affects the price
for an unchanged level of marginal cost, and an indirect one that captures how the mark-
up affects the price through its effect on cost reduction. The two effects are opposite since
the former increases the price whereas the second decreases the price. More formally, for
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µ ∈ ]µ˜, µM[:
dpI (µ)
dµ
= c− uI(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (direct effect)
−µdu
I(µ)
dµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 (indirect effect)
In the case of µ ∈ [1, µ˜], the indirect effect does not exist since there is no investment
in cost reduction. But whenever the mark-up is in the range
]
µ˜, µM
[
, the overall effect
depends on which of the two effects outweighs the other one. If the direct effect outweighs
the indirect one then the regulated price increases if the regulatory constraint is relaxed
(i.e. if the mark-up increases), which is quite intuitive. However, proposition (5) suggests
that the former result does not always hold: the indirect effect may outweigh the direct
effect leading to a decrease of the price in the mark-up parameter. This means that the
regulated price decreases if the regulatory constraint is made more lenient, which is rather
counter-intuitive. The following examples illustrate the two possibilities:
Example 1 : D (p) = a− p and C(u) = γ ln
(
c
c−u
)
Under this specification, the condition (c− u)C” (u) ≤ C ′ (u) is fulfilled. Denoting η =
1
µ and assuming that µ ∈
]
µ˜, µM
[
, straightforward calculations lead to dp
I(η)
dη =
pI(η)
1−η > 0
which implies that pI (η) is strictly increasing in η or equivalently that pI (µ) is strictly
decreasing in µ.
Example 2: D (p) = a− p and C (u) = 12γu2
Under this specification, the condition (c− u)C” (u) ≤ C ′ (u) is not fulfilled. Assuming
that µ ∈ ]µ˜, µM[, we find that pI (µ) = aµ(µ−1)+µγc2µ(µ−1)+γ which is shown to be strictly increasing
in µ in the proof of proposition (5).
Hence, there exists a tension between productive efficiency and allocative efficiency
when the direct effect of the mark-up on the price outweighs the indirect one: a less
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stringent individual regulation policy increases the cost reduction incentives but at the
expense of a higher price. In this case, allocative efficiency is improved under individual
regulation with respect to the unregulated monopoly regime but this comes at the expense
of a loss in productive efficiency. If the indirect effect of the mark-up on the price outweighs
its direct effect, there is no such tension: a less stringent individual regulation induces more
investment and weaker prices. In the latter case, the interesting following results holds:
both allocative and productive efficiency are higher if the firms are not regulated at all
rather than regulated under an individual scheme based on a mark-up µ ∈ ]µ˜, µM[. Thus,
in this case, there is no justification for an individual regulation based on such a mark-up
because, it will not only decrease cost reduction relative to the no regulation regime, but
it will lead to higher prices as well. However, individual regulation can still be relevant
to the regulator if she is mainly concerned with minimizing prices and the initial cost c is
weaker than the monopoly price pM after cost reduction. In this case, the regulator may
still prefer setting µ = 1, hence inducing u = 0 but p = c rather than leaving the monopoly
unregulated.
4.4. Relative regulation
The fundamental idea of yardstick competition is the construction of a benchmark, on
which firms are regulated. This benchmark is generally constructed in such a way that
the cost reduction of firm i does not directly affect the price firm i is regulated on.15 In
our model, we assume, as in Shleifer (1985), that the benchmark for firm i is based on the
15Hence, if there was no strategic interaction, firms would fully benefit from cost reduction.
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average of realized marginal costs of all other N − 1 firms, that is,
c− u¯i = c− 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
uj .
where u¯i = 1N−1
∑
j 6=i
uj .
Here again, we do not allow for lump-sum transfers. The regulator can only set a
ceiling price for each firm i, which is based on c− u¯i and guarantees additionally a mark-
up captured by a parameter µ ≥ 1. More specifically, the ceiling price for firm firm i is
given by
pmaxi = µ (c− u¯i)
The timing of the game is as follows:
The cost reduction stage: Once informed of the value of the mark-up parameter µ, all firms
decide simultaneously and independently of their level of cost reduction.
The pricing stage: The regulator observes the realized costs c−ui, i = 1, 2, ..., n and informs
each firm i of its ceiling price µ (c− u¯i) . Then each firm i = 1, 2, ..., n sets its price pi
subject to the regulatory constraint pi ≤ µ (c− u¯i). We assume that the firms commit to
serve the demand addressed to them (hence quantity is not a strategic variable).
We determine now the game’s subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
4.4.1. Cost reduction and pricing under relative regulation
The following lemma characterizes the unique equilibrium of the pricing stage given the
cost reductions realized by the firms at the cost reduction stage.
Lemma 6 The pricing stage has a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by each firm
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i playing the dominant strategy that consists of setting its price to:
p∗i (ui, u¯i) = min
(
µ (c− u¯i) , pM (ui)
)
Moreover, ((u1, p∗1 (u1, .)) , (u2, p∗2 (u2, .)) , ..., (un, p∗n (un, .))) is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the two-stage game if and only if for each i = 1, 2, ..., n the pair ((ui, p∗i (ui, u¯i)))
is a solution to the maximization program
max
ui∈[0,c],pi∈[0,a]
pi(ui, pi) = (pi − c+ ui)D(pi)− C (ui) , (4.3)
subject to the regulatory constraint
pi ≤ µ (c− u¯i) ,
Proof. See Appendix
Since there is no strategic interaction between the firms at the pricing stage, it is possible
to describe the subgame perfect equilibrium(a) of the sequential game in a simultaneous-
like way as shown in lemma (6). This makes the determination of the equilibrium(a) easier
relative to the standard way of solving for SPEs using backward induction, in particular
because the maximization program in this lemma is a constrained version of the unregulated
monopoly’s program (4.1) which has been already solved. The following lemma gives the
best response function of a regulated firm when the relative regulation scheme is used.
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Lemma 7 The best response of firm i in terms of cost reduction depends on u¯i as follows:
ui (u¯i) =

(C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u¯i)) if u¯i > c− pMµ
uM if u¯i ≤ c− pMµ
and the optimal price of firm i given u¯i is:
p∗i (ui (u¯i) , u¯i) =

µ (c− u¯i) if u¯i > c− pMµ
uM if u¯i ≤ c− pMµ
Proof. See Appendix
Unsurprisingly the best response of a firm i depends on the other firms’ cost reductions
only through the ceiling price computed on the basis of these cost reductions. Since C ′
is strictly increasing (see A3) then (C ′)−1 is strictly increasing which results in the strict
increasingness of ui (u¯i) over
]
c− pMµ , c
]
. It follows that ui (u¯i) is weakly increasing over
[0, c] . Since for any (i, j) such that i 6= j an increase in uj yields an increase of u¯i, it
follows that an increase in uj entails (weakly) an increase in ui (u¯i) . This means that
the variables ui are strategic complements. This is an important feature of the "artificial
competition" induced by relative regulation. Note that the best response function ui (u¯i)
shifts downwards as the mark-up increases. The intuition behind this result is that a higher
mark-up has a negative effect on demand, which decreases the marginal positive effect of
cost reduction on the gross profit.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the two-stage regulation game for any mark-up parameter µ.
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Proposition 8 1. If 1 ≤ µ < µM then there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
to the relative regulation game. This equilibrim is symmetric and characterized by all
firms reducing their costs by u∗ (µ) defined as the unique solution in u to the equation
u = (C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u)) over the interval
]
c− pMµ , c
]
, and setting their prices to p∗ (µ) =
µ (c− u∗ (µ)).
2. If µ ≥ µM then there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the relative
regulation game. This equilibrim is symmetric and chacterized by all firms behaving as
unregulated monopolies, that is, reducing their costs by uM and setting their prices to pM .
Proof. See Appendix.
The following proposition states that the reaction of regulated firms (in terms of cost
reduction) to a decrease in the stringency of relative regulation is completely opposite to
their reaction under individual regulation.
Proposition 9 The equilibrium cost reduction under relative regulation u∗ (µ) is strictly
decreasing in the mark-up parameter µ over
[
1, µM
]
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this quite surprising result is a follows. A higher mark-up makes
a firm anticipate it will be able to set a higher price. Since this will result in a lower
demand, the marginal effect of cost reduction on its profit will be weaker, which decreases
its incentives to carry out cost-reducing investments. The key difference with the individual
regulation case is that firm’s cost reduction has no direct effect on its demand which rules
out the (positive) demand effect that appears under individual regulation. However the
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two other (negative) effects are still at work under relative regulation and both of them
are reinforced by a higher mark-up.
Let us now turn to the effet of regulation stringency on the equilibrium price. In
contrast to individual regulation, the direct and indirect effet of a higher mark-up on the
price are not opposite under relative regulation. Both lead to a higher price which yields
the clear-cut result stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium price under relative regulation is strictly increasing in
the mark-up parameter µ over
[
1, µM
]
.
Proof. Follows immediately from p∗ (µ) = µ (c− u∗ (µ)) and proposition (9).
Hence, there is no tension between productive efficiency and allocative efficiency under
relative regulation: a more stringent regulation policy improves both of them. This suggests
that regulators should grant low mark-ups when they use relative schemes similar to the
one described in this paper. However, this result has to be mitigated for at least two reasons
that we present below.
4.4.2. The participation constraint
Proposition 11 The equilibrium profit under relative regulation pi (u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) is strictly
increasing in the mark-up µ over
[
1, µM
]
. Moreover, there exists a threshold µ0 ∈
]
1, µM
[
such that pi (u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) ≥ 0 if and only if µ ≥ µ0.
Proof. See Appendix
The regulation stringency affects negatively the regulated firms’ equilibrium profits
through two channels. The direct effect is that a smaller mark-up results in a smaller price
which yields a decrease of the profit. But there is also an indirect effect: a smaller mark-
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up increases the over-investment of the regulated firms relative to their private optimal
investment uM . In this sense a smaller mark-up makes the artificial competition between
the regulated firms more intense.
Proposition (11) suggests that a regulator cannot set too small a mark-up without
risking to make firms not accept the regulatory contract in the first place or shut down if
they were active on the market previously. Such problem would not occur if the regulator
were able to make lump-sum transfers to the regulated firms.
4.4.3. Quality investment
In addition to efficiency, improving (or at least maintaining) quality is commonly seen
as an important objective of regulation. To analyze the effect of a more stringent relative
regulation on the incentives to invest in quality, we assume now that the regulated firms
can undertake, simultaneously with their cost reduction, a quality-enhancing investment
that shifts the demand upwards.
Focusing on the case of a linear demand D(p) = a − p, we suppose that a regulated
firm can increase the demand in its market from D(p) = a − p to D(p, θ) = a + θ − p if
it incurs an investment cost Ψ (θ) = 12λθ
2. This means that from the firms’ point of view,
a quality-enhancing investment "enlarges" the market they operate in: the market size
increases from a to a+ θ. Thus, for a given θ ≥ 0, the analysis in the basic set-up without
quality investments remains true, whenever we take into account the fact the new market
size is a+ θ. It is then important to look at how the relevant thresholds are affected by the
market size. Most importantly, it is straightforward to show that under the assumption
a < γc (this is D (0) < C ′(c) in the linear-quadratic setting considered here), the monopoly
replicating mark-up is given by µM (a) = (a+c)γ−a2γc−a , which is increasing in a. This entails
REGULATION STRINGENCY AND EFFICIENCY 216
that for any given θ ≥ 0, it holds that µM (a) ≤ µM (a+ θ).
The maximization program of firm i, given the cost reduction efforts of the other firms, is
the following:
max
ui∈[0,c],pi∈[0,a],θi∈[0,+∞[
pii(ui, pi, θi) = (pi − c+ ui)(a+ θi − pi)− 12γu
2
i −
1
2
λθ2i
under the regulatory constraint
pi ≤ µ (c− u¯i) .
We focus on the values of the mark-up parameter in the range
[
µ0, µ
M (a)
[
and we assume
hereafter that c > 1 and λ > 1. The latter assumption ensures that there exists a threshold
θ¯ (depending only on a) such that the net profit pii(pi, ui, θi) is smaller than pii(pi, ui, 0) for
any θi ≥ θ¯, independent of the values of µ ∈
[
µ0, µ
M (a)
[
, pi ∈ [c, a] , ui ∈ [0, c], u¯i ∈ [0, c] .
This implies that maximizing the function θi −→ pii(pi, ui, θi) over the interval
[
0, θ¯
]
is
equivalent to maximizing it over the interval [0,+∞[ . Consequently, by assuming that
a + θ¯ ≤ γc, we are sure that we can conduct the same analysis as in the case without
quality investment without risking to discard a potential maximizing value of θi. Since
µM (a) ≤ µM (a + θ), the assumption µ ∈[µ0, µM (a)[ entails that for any given θ ≥ 0,
we have: µ ≤ µM (a + θ). Then we derive from the analysis of the case without quality
investment that the regulatory constraint is binding and that the solution to the program
max
ui∈[0,c],pi∈[0,a]
pii(pi, ui, θi) is given by:
ui (u¯i, θi) =
1
γ
(a+ θi − µc+ µu¯i)
pi (u¯i) = µ (c− u¯i) .
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At this point we need to maximize pii(pi (θi, u¯i) , ui (θi, u¯i) , θi) with respect to θi. Using the
first-order condition, we get:
θi (u¯i) =
γc (µ− 1) + a− µc− (γ − 1)µu¯i
λγ − 1 ,
which leads to the investment best response function of firm i :
ui (u¯i) = ui (u¯i, θi (u¯i)) =
aλ− c− µc (λ− 1) + µ (λ− 1) u¯i
λγ − 1 .
Solving these N equations, it is straightforward to show that the unique Nash equilibrium
is symmetric and characterized by:
uˆ (µ, γ, λ) =
λ(a− µc) + c(µ− 1)
λ(γ − µ) + µ− 1
θˆ (µ, γ, λ) =
(µ− 1)(γc− a)
λ(γ − µ) + µ− 1
pˆ (µ, γ, λ) = µ
λ (γc− a) + c− 1
λ(γ − µ) + µ− 1 .
From the above expressions of uˆ (µ, γ, λ) , θˆ (µ, γ, λ) and pˆ (µ, γ, λ) , it is straightforward to
derive the following proposition that shows how the equilibrium cost reducion, price and
quality are affected by the mark-up parameter µ and the cost parameters γ and λ.
Proposition 12 1. The equilibrium cost reduction uˆ (µ, γ, λ) is decreasing in the mark-up
parameter µ, and in the investment cost parameters γ and λ.
2. The equilibrium quality θˆ (µ, γ, λ) is increasing in the mark-up parameter µ and the
cost-reducing investment cost parameter γ and is decreasing in the quality investment cost
parameter λ.
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3. The equilibrium price pˆ (µ, γ, λ) is increasing in the the mark-up parameter µ and in
the investment cost parameters γ and λ.
This proposition shows that the cost-reduction (respectively the price) is decreasing
(respectively increasing) in the mark-up like in the case without quality investment. Hence
the result that a more lenient regulation policy, i.e. a higher mark-up, affects negatively
the investment in cost reduction holds. However, an increase in the mark-up value affects
positively the investment in quality. This is partly due to the fact that the firms are
regulated only with respect to their costs. Under this assumption, the marginal benefit of
enlarging the demand through higher quality is clearly increasing in the mark-up.
The previous proposition also states that the more costly the investment in quality the
lower the cost reduction realized by the firms. The logic behind this result is as follows: a
more costly investment in quality induces less quality enhancement which entails a lower
market size, which leads to lower cost reduction incentives. Furthermore, we showed that
the investment effort in quality is increasing in the cost of efficiency-improving investments.
Hence, when cost reduction becomes costlier, the regulated firms have an incentive to shift
some of their investment from cost reduction to quality improvement. Finally, note that
the previous analysis can be applied to any demand-enhancing investment and not only to
quality investments.
4.5. Conclusion
This paper aims to shed some light on how a more lenient regulation policy could affect
some potentially conflicting objectives of a regulator. More specifically, it investigates the
effect of regulation stringency on productive and allocative efficiency under individual and
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relative regulation when the regulator cannot make transfers to firms.
One of the messages of this paper is about the consequences of granting high mark-
ups to regulated firms. In the case of individual regulation, the conventional wisdom that
a higher mark-up leads to higher investment is true and may serve as a justification for
granting high mark-ups, particularly if the regulator is mainly concerned with encouraging
cost reduction investments. This justification cannot be used when firms are regulated
using relative performance schemes since in this case, high mark-ups entail not only high
prices but weak cost reductions as well. This is due to the fact that the potential tension
between allocative and productive efficiency under individual regulation does not appear
under its relative counterpart, making it socially desirable to grant relatively small mark-
ups, which means using a quite stringent relative regulation.
However, the regulator has to take into account the effect of regulation stringency on
the regulated firms’ participation constraint and incentives to conduct quality-improving
investments. Indeed, a very stringent regulation makes the artificial competition under
relative performance schemes very intense, which may result in negative profits for the
regulated firms. Anticipating that they will not be able to break-even, the firms will not
accept the regulatory contract in the first place. Moreover, quality-improving investments,
and more generally any demand-enhancing investments, are negatively affected by the
stringency of relative regulation. Therefore, if improving quality has an important weight
in the regulator’s objective, she might want to provide more lenient regulatory schemes
in order to encourage investments in quality even if this comes at the expense of lower
investments in cost reduction.
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4.7. Appendix
Proof of lemma 1:
Note first that for any u ∈ [0, c] and p ∈ [c− u, a[, we have ∂2pi
∂p2
= 2D′ (p)+(p− c+ u)D”(p) <
0. This is obviously true if D”(p) < 0 but it also holds if D”(p) ≥ 0. Indeed, in the latter
case rewritting ∂
2pi
∂p2
as ∂
2pi
∂p2
= [2D′ (p) + pD”(p)] − (c− u)D”(p) allows to see that ∂2pi
∂p2
remains negative in this case as well because 2D′ (p) + pD”(p) ≤ 0 (see A2). Furthermore,
the first derivative ∂pi∂p = D
′ (p) (p− c+ u) + D (p) goes to a strictly negative value as p
goes to a whereas it is strictly positive for p = c − u. This ensures that for any u ∈ [0, c]
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there exists a unique price pM (u) that maximizes in p the profit function piM (u, p) and
this price is the unique solution in p of the FOC ∂pi∂p = 0 . Let us now show that p
M (u)
is strictly decreasing in u. Using the implicit function theorem we can state that pM (u)
is differentiable and ddup
M (u) =
−(1+pM (u))D′(pM (u))
∂2pi
∂p2
(pM (u),u)
which is strictly negative since the
numerator is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly negative. Moreover we can
show that pM (u) is either strictly convex or linear in u. Indeed the FOC definining pM (u)
can be rewritten as u = c − p + D(p)D′(p) which yields
(
pM
)−1 (p) = c − p + D(p)D′(p) . Then as-
sumption A6 entails that
(
pM
)−1 is either linear or strictly convex. Combining this with
the fact that pM is decreasing, we conclude that pM is either strictly convex or linear.
Proof of proposition 2:
The result that pM (u) is decreasing in u (see lemma 1) allows to state that pM (u) ≤
pM (0) for all u ∈ [0, c] . Thus maximizing piM (u, p) over [0, c] × [0,+∞[ is equivalent to
maximizing it over [0, c] × [0, pM (0)] . Now we are sure that piM (p, u) has at least one
global maximum because [0, c] × [0, pM (0)] is a compact set and the function piM (., .) is
continuous over this set. Let us show that such a global maximum is necessarily reached
at an interior point. It is clear that it cannot be reached at a point (u, p) such that p = 0.
Furthermore, ∂pi∂u (c, p) = D (p)−C ′(c) ≤ D (0)−C ′(c) < 0 which entails that a maximum
cannot be reached at a point (u, p) such that u = c. Finally, a maximum cannot be reached
at a point (u, p) such that u = 0: otherwise, it would be reached at the point
(
0, pM (0)
)
but this is impossible because ∂pi∂u
(
0, pM (0)
)
= D
(
pM (0)
)−C ′ (0) > 0 (by assumption A4)
which shows that for sufficiently small positive values of u the value of piM (u, pM (0)) is
greater than piM (0, pM (0)). We now know that the global maximum(a) is (are) necessarily
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interior and thus characterized by the FOCs

D (p) + (p− c+ u)D′(p) = 0
D (p)− C ′ (u) = 0
which we rewrite as: 
u =
(
pM
)−1 (p)
u = (C ′)−1 oD (p)
We know that the curves of the two functions p→ (pM)−1 (p) and p→ (C ′)−1 oD (p) meet
at least once (since we showed the existence of an interior maximum). Furthermore note
that both functions are decreasing in p, the first one is either strictly convex or linear (see
the proof of proposition 1) and the second one is either strictly concave or linear (see A5).
If we had strict convexity and strict concavity we could directly state that their curves
meet at most twice. However, even with the weaker properties we have on those functions,
this will hold. Indeed, the only case where they can meet in more than two points is the
special case where they are both linear and identical. The following analysis will make it
clear that this is impossible due to A4 and will show that the curves cannot meet twice
neither in the (relevant) domain defined by u ≥ 0 and p ≥ 0. The assuption A4 states
that D
(
pM (0)
)
> C ′ (0). Along with A1, this yields pM (0) < D−1oC ′ (0) which means
that the curve of the first (either linear or strictly convex) function meets the horizontal
axis defined by u = 0 in a point on the left of the point where the curve of the second
(strictly concave or linear) function meets this axis. Given the shapes of the two functions,
this would not hold if the curves met twice in the domain defined by u ≥ 0 and p ≥ 0,
or if they were identical. We can then rule out both those cases and state that the curves
of the functions p → (pM)−1 (p) and p → (C ′)−1 oD (p) meet only once. Thus, we can
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state the uniqueness of the solution to the maximization program (4.1) which we denote by(
uM , pM
)
instead of
(
uM , pM
(
uM
))
. Note that we also showed that pi(u, p) has no local
maximum over [0, c]× [0,+∞[ but its unique global maximum.
Proof of proposition 3:
Note that the existence of at least one solution to the maximization program (4.2) is
easily derived from the fact that the profit function is continuous in both its arguments
and the (constrained) domain over which it is maximized is compact.
We first deal with the simpler case, that is µ ≥ µM . Under this condition, the pair(
uM , pM
)
satisfies the pricing constraint p ≤ µ(c−u). Since (uM , pM) is the unique solution
to the unconstrained maximization program (4.1), we can state that in case µ ≥ µM it is as
well the unique solution to the maximization program (4.2) (the constraint is not binding
except for the special case µ = µM ).
Assume now that 1 ≤ µ < µM . In this case, (uM , pM) does not fulfill the pricing
constraint p ≤ µ(c − u). Since we know from the proof of proposition 2 that pi(u, p) has
no local maximum over [0, c] × [0,+∞[ but its unique global maximum, the pricing con-
straint is necessarily binding. The maximization program (4.2) amounts then to maximizing
pi(u, µ(c− u)) = (µ− 1) (c− u)D(µ(c− u))−C(u) with respect to u over [0, c] . The strict
concavity of this function with respect to u results from the strict concavity of the function
p→ pD(p) (asumption A2), the linearity of u→ µ(c−u) and the strict convexity of C (as-
sumption A3). Thus we can state that u→ pi(u, µ(c− u)) reaches its maximum over [0, c]
at a unique point uI (µ) which results in a unique optimal price pI (µ) = µ(c− uI(µ)). To
determine whether uI(µ) = 0 or uI(µ) 6= 0, it is sufficient to compare the (total) derivative
of pi(u, µ(c−u)) with respect to u computed for u = 0 with 0. It is straightforward to show
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that this derivative is − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] − C ′(0). Therefore uI(µ) = 0 if and
only if C ′(0) ≥ − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] . Consider the set:
A =
{
µ ∈ [1, µM] / uI(µ) = 0} = {µ ∈ [1, µM] / C ′(0) ≥ − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)]}
and denote µ˜ = supA (A is not empty since 1 ∈ A). Note first that µ˜ ∈ A (due to the
continuity of D) and that µ˜ < µM since uI(µM ) = uM > 0. To establish that A = [1, µ˜],
it is sufficient to show that if µ1 is in the interval
[
1, µM
]
but does not belong to A, then
all elements of the interval
[
µ1,µ
M
]
do not belong to A. To show this we use the following
result: in each point where the function µ→ − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] is positive, its
derivative is positive. Indeed the derivative of this function with respect to µ is given
by − [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)]− (µ− 1) c [2D′ (µc) + µcD” (µc)] which is positive whenever the
term− [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] is positive since the remaining term− (µ− 1) c [2D′ (µc) + µcD” (µc)]
is always positive due to assumption A2 (that entails that 2D′ (µc)+µcD” (µc) < 0 because
2D′(p) + pD′′(p) is the second derivative of pD(p)). This result has the following straight-
forward implication: whenever the function µ → − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] reaches a
positive value at some point, say µ1, it remains above this positive value for all µ ≥ µ1.
Consider now µ1such that µ1 ∈
[
1, µM
]
and µ1 /∈ A. The latter condition implies that the
function − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] is above C ′(0) ≥ 0 at the point µ = µ1. Using the
previous result it follows that − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] > C ′ (0) for all µ ∈ [µ1,µM]
which means that all the elements of the interval
[
µ1,µ
M
]
do not belong to A. This is
sufficient to state that µ1 cannot be weakly smaller than µ˜ since this would entail that
µ˜ /∈ A. Hence [1, µ˜] ⊂ A. Since the reverse inclusion holds as well, it follows that A = [1, µ˜]
which means that uI(µ) = 0⇔ µ ∈ [1, µ˜] .
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Let us now show that µ˜ = 1 if and only if C ′(0) = 0 and D(c) + cD′(c) ≤ 0.
Suppose that µ˜ = 1.Then C ′(0) < − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] for any µ ∈ ]1, µM] .
Since the right-hand side of the latter inequality goes to 0 as µ goes to 1, it must hold that
C ′(0) ≤ 0 which results in C ′(0) = 0 since the reverse (weak) inequality is true as well (see
A3). Moreover from the inequality C ′(0) < − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] we derive that
D (µc) + µcD′ (µc) < 0 for any µ ∈ ]1, µM] which entails that D(c) + cD′(c) ≤ 0 since the
left-hand side of the latter inequality goes to D(c) + cD′(c) as µ goes to 1.
Conversely suppose that C ′(0) = 0 and D(c) + cD′(c) ≤ 0. Since p→ D (p) +pD′ (p) is
decreasing over [0, a[ (because of A2) and c < a, it is true that D (µc)+µcD′ (µc) < D(c)+
cD′(c) ≤ 0 for all µ ∈ ]1, µM] which yields − (µ− 1) [D (µc) + µcD′ (µc)] < 0 = C ′ (0) for
all µ ∈ ]1, µM] . It follows that uI (µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ ]1, µM]. This entails that µ˜ = 1.
Proof of proposition 4:
Denote g (u, µ) = pi (u, µ (c− u)) and let µ ∈ ]µ˜, µM[ . For such a µ the optimal cost
reduction uI(µ) is defined as the unique solution in u to the FOC, that is ∂g∂u(u
I(µ), µ) = 0.
Differentiating this equation with respect to µ we get that:
∂g
∂µ∂u
(uI(µ), µ) +
∂2g
∂u2
(uI(µ), µ).
duI
dµ
= 0
which yields
duI
dµ
= −
∂g
∂µ∂u(u
I(µ), µ)
∂2g
∂u2
(uI(µ), µ)
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We have:
∂g
∂µ∂u
= − [D (µ (c− u)) + µ (c− u)D′ (µ (c− u))]
−(µ− 1) (c− u) [2D′ (µ (c− u)) + µ (c− u)D′′ (µ (c− u))]
Using the FOC ∂g∂u(u
I(µ), µ) = 0 = −(µ−1) [D (µ (c− u)) + µ (c− u)D′ (µ (c− u))]−C ′(u)
we find that
∂g
∂µ∂u
(uI(µ), µ) =
C ′(uI(µ))
µ− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−(µ− 1) (c− uI(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
2D′
(
µ
(
c− uI(µ)))+ µ (c− uI(µ))D′′ (µ (c− uI(µ)))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 because this is the value of d2
dp2
(pD(p)) at p=µ(c−uI(µ))
Thus, the cross derivative ∂g∂µ∂u(u
I(µ), µ) is strictly positive. Furthermore, ∂
2g
∂u2
(uI(µ), µ) <
0 because g is strictly concave with respect to u (even if g were not concave the inequality
would hold because the function g(., µ) reaches an interior maximum at uI(µ)). We now
can state that du
I
dµ > 0 which entails that u
I(µ) is strictly increasing in µ over
]
µ˜, µM
[
.
Proof of proposition 5:
The results that pI (µ) is strictly increasing in µ over [1, µ˜] and constant over
[
µM ,+∞[
are straighforward corollaries of proposition (4).
Assume now that µ ∈ ]µ˜, µM[ . We showed in the proof of proposition (3) that in this
case the regulatory constraint is binding and that solving the maximization program (4.2)
(in the two variables u and p) amounts to solving a maximization program in the variable
u only by replacing p in the profit function by its constrained value µ (c− u) . Likewise, it
also amounts to solving the following maximization program in p only by replacing u in
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the profit function by c− pµ :
max
p∈[0,µc]
pi
(
c− p
µ
, p
)
=
(
1− 1
µ
)
pD (p)− C
(
c− p
µ
)
Since uI(µ) is the unique solution in u to the FOC of the maximization program written
as a function of u, then pI (µ) = µ
(
c− uI(µ)) is the unique solution to the FOC of the
maximization program written as a function of p:
(
1− 1
µ
)[
pD′ (p) +D (p)
]
+
1
µ
C ′
(
c− p
µ
)
= 0
Denoting η = 1µ and p
I (η) instead of pI (µ) , it follows that:
(1− η) [pI (η)D′ (pI (η))+D (pI (η))]+ ηC ′ (c− ηpI (η)) = 0
Differentiating this equation with respect to η and writing pI instead of pI (η) we get that:
dpI
dη
=
[
pID′
(
pI
)
+D
(
pI
)]
+
[
ηpIC”(c− ηpI)− C ′ (c− ηpI)]
2D′ (pI) + pID′′ (pI)− (pI)2C” (c− ηpI)
The denominator is strictly negative since it is the value at p = pI of the second derivative
of a strictly concave function. The first term of the numerator pID′
(
pI
)
+D
(
pI
)
is strictly
negative. Indeed using the FOC, it is equal to −ηC
′(c−ηpI)
(1−η) < 0. Thus a sufficient condition
for pI to be strictly increasing in η and thus decreasing in µ is that the remaining term in
the numerator is weakly negative. This is true if uC”(c− u) ≤ C ′ (c− u) for all u ∈ [0, c]
or equivalently if (c− u)C” (u) ≤ C ′ (u) for all u ∈ [0, c] .
If the investment cost function is quadratic, i.e. C (u) = 12γu
2, the latter condition
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does not hold. In this case, under a linear demand D (p) = a − p we find that the cost
reduction under individual regulation is uI(µ) = (2µc−a)(µ−1)2µ(µ−1)+γ (for µ ∈
]
µ˜, µM
[
) which yields
pI (µ) = aµ(µ−1)+µγc2µ(µ−1)+γ . Using again the variable η =
1
µ , the latter expression can rewritten
as pI (η) = a−η(a−γc)
2−2η+γη2 . Some tedious computations lead to
dpI
dη =
η2γ(a−γc)+2γ(c−aη)
(2−2η+γη2)2 . Note
first that the monopoly-replicating mark-up in this case is given by µM = (a+c)γ−a2γc−a which
results in µM − ac = (a−c)(a−γc)c(2γc−a) . Note also that the assumption D (0) < C ′(c) is equivalent
in the linear-quadratic model to a < γc which allows to state that µM < ac . This entails
that c− aµ < 0 (or equivalently that c− aη < 0) for any µ ∈
]
µ˜, µM
[
. Using this inequality
and a < γc we can now state that dp
I
dη < 0 for any η ∈
]
1
µM
, 1µ˜
[
. Hence, pI is decreasing in
η and thus strictly increasing in µ.
Proof of lemma 6:
Note first that a firm’s profit is not affected by the price set by the other firms. The
maximization program of firm i in the pricing stage is:
max
pi∈[0,a]
pi(ui, pi) = (pi − c+ ui)D(pi)− C (ui) (4.4)
subject to the regulatory constraint
pi ≤ µ (c− u¯i)
We showed in the proof of lemma 1 that pi(pi, ui) is strictly concave in pi over [0, a] . Then
the solution to this maximization program is min
(
µ (c− u¯i) , pM (ui)
)
. Therefore we can
state that the unique equilibrium of the pricing stage is characterized by each firm i setting
its price to p∗i (ui, u¯i) = min
(
µ (c− u¯i) , pM (ui)
)
, which is a dominant strategy.
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Proof of lemma 7:
By definition, p∗i (ui, u¯i) is the equilibrium price of firm i given its own cost reduction
and the average cost reduction of the other firms in the first stage. Then
((u1, p∗1 (u1, .)) , (u2, p∗2 (u1, .)) , ..., (un, p∗n (un, .))) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
only if for each i, ui is a solution to the maximization program max
ui∈[0,c]
pi(p∗i (ui, u¯i) , ui).
Moreover p∗i (ui, u¯i) is a solution to the maximization program (4.4) then ui is a solution to
the maximization program max
ui∈[0,c]
pi(p∗i (ui, u¯i) , ui) if and only if ((ui, p
∗
i (ui, u¯i))) is a solution
to the maximization program (4.3).
Proof of proposition 8:
If u¯i ≤ c− pMµ then pM ≤ µ (c− u¯i) , that is,
(
uM , pM
)
satisfies the relative regulatory
constraint. Given this, the solution to the constrained maximization program (4.3) is
the same as the the solution to the unconstrained maximization program (4.1), that is(
uM , pM
)
.
If u¯i > c− pMµ then pM > µ (c− u¯i) , that is,
(
uM , pM
)
does not satisfy the regulatory
constraint. First, the maximization program (4.3) has a solution because the objective
function is continuous and the domain of maximization is compact. Second, we showed
in the proof of proposition 1 that the function pi(u, p) has no local maximum over [0, c]×
[0,+∞[ but its unique global maximum. Therefore we are sure that the constraint is
binding. It follows that solving for the maximization program (4.3) amounts to solving the
maximization program:
max
ui∈[0,c]
pii(ui, µ (c− u¯i)) = (µ (c− u¯i)− c+ ui)D(µ (c− u¯i))− C (ui)
The function w : ui → pii(ui, µ (c− u¯i)) is strictly concave (its second derivative is−C ′′ (ui) <
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0). Futhermore, w′ (0) = D(µ (c− u¯i)) − C ′ (0) > D
(
pM
) − C ′ (0) > 0 (the first inequal-
ity results from pM > µ (c− u¯i) and the second one from assumption A4), and w′ (c) =
D (0)−C ′ (c) < 0 (see A4). We can conclude that the unique solution to the previous max-
imization program is interior and thus characterized by the FOC: D(µ (c− u¯i)) = C ′ (ui)
which we rewrite as ui = (C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u¯i))
Proof of proposition 9:
Let us first establish the following preliminary result:
Preliminary lemma: Let α ∈ ]0, c] and let g : [0, c] → [0, c] be a strictly increasing
and differentiable function. Assume further that g is either strictly concave or linear, and
g (c) < c. The following holds:
1- If g (α) ≤ α then g (u) < u for all u ∈ ]α, c] .
2- If g (α) > α then there exists a unique solution u∗ ∈ ]α, c[ to the equation g (u) = u.
Moreover g (u) > u for all u ∈ [α, u∗[ and g (u) < u for all u ∈ ]u∗, c] .
Proof of the preliminary lemma:
Let us first deal with a linear g. The linearity of g implies that for all u ∈ ]α, c] :
g (u)− u = g (α) + (u− α) .g (c)− g (0)
c
− u
which is strictly decreasing in u because g(c)−g(0)c ≤ g(c)c < 1. Thus,
- if g (α)− α ≤ 0, then g (u)− u < 0 for all u ∈ ]α, c] .
- if g (α) − α > 0, then using the fact that u → g (u) − u is continuous and strictly
decreasing, g (c) − c < 0, we state that: first, there exists a unique u∗ ∈ ]α, c[ to the
equation g (u) = u (we apply the intermediate value theorem) and second, g (u) > u for
all u ∈ [α, u∗[ and g (u) < u for all u ∈ ]u∗, c] .
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We now tackle the case of a strictly concave g.
-If g (α) ≤ α, we derive from the strict concavity of g that g′ (α) < g(α)−g(0)α ≤ g(α)α ≤ 1.
Using again the strict concavity of g we state that g′ (t) ≤ g′ (α) < 1 for any t ∈ [α, c]
which yields g (u) < g (α) + (u− α) ≤ u for all u ∈ ]α, c] .
-If g (α) > α, we state that there exists at least one solution to the equation g (u) = u
over ]α, c[ . Indeed the function g (u) − u is continuous, takes a strictly negative value at
u = α and a strictly positive value at u = c, which entails that it is equal to 0 at least in
one point of the interval ]α, c[ (we apply the intermediate value theorem). To show that
this point is unique, it is sufficient to show that in a point u∗such that g (u∗) = u∗, we
necessarily have g′ (u∗) < 1, which will ensure that g (u)−u remains strictly negative after
it reaches 0 (by a similar reasoning to that of the case g (α) ≤ α). As g is strictly concave,
we have: g′ (u∗) < g(u
∗)−g(α)
u∗−α =
u∗−g(α)
u∗−α < 1 which establishes the unicity of u
∗. Since g is
continuous, g (α) > α (resp. g (c) < c) and g (u) 6= u for all u ∈ ]α, u∗[ (resp. u ∈ ]u∗, c]) ,
then g (u) > u (resp. g (u) < u) for all u ∈ ]α, u∗[ (resp. u ∈ ]u∗, c]). QED.
Let us apply the previous lemma to g : u → (C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u)) and α = c − pMµ .
Note that g
(
c− pMµ
)
= uM which yields g
(
c− pMµ
)
≤ c− pMµ ⇔ µ ≥ p
M
c−uM = µ
M . Hence,
we have to distinguish two cases:
Case 1: µ < µM
In this case, the equation u = (C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u)) has a unique solution over
]
c− pMµ , c
]
that we denote by u∗ (µ) . Since the best response of firm i to all other firms reducing their
costs by u∗ is ui (u∗) = u∗, all firms reducing their costs by u∗ (µ) and setting their prices
to p∗ (µ) = µ (c− u∗ (µ)) is an equilibrium. Let us show that this is the unique equilib-
rium. To do so, consider a Nash equilibrium and denote (u∗1, u∗2, ..., u∗n) the cost reductions
realized by the firms i = 1, 2, ..., n in this equilibrium.
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First note that u∗i > c− p
M
µ for all i. Indeed the best response function ui (.) takes values
in the interval
[
uM , (C ′)−1 oD (0)
]
which entails that u∗i ≥ uM . Under the assumption
µ < µM , it holds that uM > c − pMµ which yields u∗i > c − p
M
µ . Hence, we can state that
u∗i = (C
′)−1 oD (µ (c− u¯∗i )) = g (u¯∗i ) .
Second let us show that u∗1 = u∗2 = ... = u∗n = u∗ (µ) . To establish this result it is
sufficient to show that u∗max ≤ u∗ (µ) ≤ u∗min where u∗min = minu∗i and u∗max = maxu∗i . On
the one hand, since u∗max ≥ u¯∗max , u∗max = g (u¯∗max), and g is strictly increasing, we have:
g (u∗max) ≥ u∗max. Using the preliminary lemma, we can state then that u∗max ≤ u∗ (µ) .
On the other hand, since u∗min ≤ u¯∗min, u∗min = g (u¯∗min), and g is strictly increasing, it
follows that g (u∗min) ≤ u∗min. Using here again the preliminary lemma, we derive that
u∗min ≥ u∗ (µ) . Hence we obtain u∗max ≤ u∗ (µ) ≤ u∗min. This conludes the proof under case
1.
Case 2: µ ≥ µM
In this case, uM ≤ c − pMµ . Using lemma (7), we get that ui
(
uM
)
= uM which is
sufficient to state all firms investing reducing their costs by uM and setting their prices to
pM is a Nash equilibrium. Let us now show that this is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
relative regulation game.
Note first that it is obviously the unique equilibrium in which firms reduce their costs
by ui ≤ c− pMµ .
Now let us show ad absurdum that there is no equilibrium in which firms reduce their
cost by ui > c− pMµ . Suppose that such an equilibrium exists and denote (u∗1, u∗2, ..., u∗n) the
cost reductions realized in this equilibrium, and u∗min = minu
∗
i and u
∗
max = maxu
∗
i . Since
g
(
c− pMµ
)
≤ c− pMµ because µ ≥ µM , then applying part 1 of the preliminary lemma we
obtain that g (u∗i ) < u
∗
i for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. In particular this implies that g (u
∗
max) < u
∗
max.
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Since g is strictly increasing and u¯∗max ≤ u∗max we know that g (u¯∗max) ≤ g (u∗max) . This yields
g (u¯∗max) < u∗max which contradicts the fact that u∗max = g (u¯∗max) . This concludes the proof
under case 2.
Proof of proposition 11:
For any µ < µM , the equilibrium cost reduction is defined by the condition u∗ (µ) =
g (µ, u∗ (µ)) where g (µ, u) = (C ′)−1 oD (µ (c− u)) . Differentiating with respect to µ we
obtain:
du∗ (µ)
dµ
(
1− ∂g
∂u
(µ, u∗ (µ))
)
=
∂g
∂µ
(µ, u∗ (µ))
Since D is decreasing and (C ′)−1 is strictly increasing (because C ′ is strictly increasing),
g (µ, u) is strictly decreasing in µ for any u < c. In particular this is true for u = u∗ (µ)
which leads to ∂g∂µ (µ, u
∗ (µ)) < 0. Furthermore, we showed in the proof of proposition (10)
(more specifically in the proof of the preliminary lemma used to establish this proposition)
that the derivative of g with respect to u is strictly smaller than 1 at the fixed point. In a
setting where g depends upon µ as well this result writes as: ∂g∂u (µ, u
∗ (µ)) < 1. Hence, we
can conclude that du
∗(µ)
dµ =
∂g
∂µ
(µ,u∗(µ))
1− ∂g
∂u
(µ,u∗(µ))
< 0 which means that u∗ (µ) is strictly decreasing
in the mark-up parameter µ over
[
1, µM
[
. This property extends to
[
1, µM
]
since the
equality g
(
µM , uM
)
= uM ensures that u∗ (µ) is continuous at point u = uM .
Proof of proposition 12:
Let µ ∈ [1, µM[ . All firms reducing their costs by u∗ (µ) and setting their prices to
p∗ (µ) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. According to lemma (6), it follows that
(u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) is the solution to the maximization program:
max
ui∈[0,c],pi∈[0,a]
pi(ui, pi) = (pi − c+ ui)D(pi)− C (ui) ,
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subject to the regulatory constraint
pi ≤ µ (c− u∗ (µ)) ,
This shows that the maximization domain expands if µ increases, which ensures that
pi (u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) is weakly increasing in µ. Moreover, it is strictly increasing in µ because
the constraint (which depends on µ) is binding.
We have: pi (u∗ (1) , p∗ (1)) = −C (u∗ (µ)) < −C (uM) < 0 and pi (u∗ (µM) , p∗ (µM)) =
pi
(
uM , pM
)
> 0. Since pi (u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) is continuous and stricly increasing in the mark-
up µ over
[
1, µM
]
, we conclude (using the intermediate value theorem) that there exists a
(unique) threshold µ0 ∈
]
1, µM
[
such that pi (u∗ (µ) , p∗ (µ)) ≥ 0 if and only if µ ≥ µ0.
Conclusion
Cette thèse, constituée de quatre contributions en économie de l’innovation et de la
concurrence, a essentiellement cherché à répondre aux questions suivantes:
1. Dans un environnement où la protection par le brevet est incertaine, quel est l’effet
de la taille de l’innovation sur le choix du régime de protection de la propriété intellectuelle
adopté par l’innovateur?
2. Comment le pouvoir de marché d’un innovateur sur le marché des licences est-il
affecté par l’incertitude portant sur la validité du brevet?
3. Le programme de clémence Amnesty Plus a-t-il comme effet de dissuader la création
de cartels ou au contraire d’encourager leur formation?
4. Une politique de régulation des prix plus contraignante diminue-t-elle les incitations
d’une entreprise régulée à réduire ses coûts?
En réponse à la première question, et dans un cadre d’innovation de procédé dont la
taille est mesurée par la réduction de coût qu’elle permet, nous établissons que la taille de
l’innovation est un élément crucial dans la décision d’un innovateur quant au choix entre
brevet et secret. D’une part, les innovations mineures sont toujours brevetées tandis que les
innovations intermédiaires ne le sont que si la probabilité que le brevet soit valide et enfreint
est suffisamment grande. D’autre part, un innovateur peut trouver optimal de protéger son
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innovation par le secret industriel lorsque son innovation est drastique. Par ailleurs, nous
montrons que les accords à l’amiable pour éviter, ou résoudre, un conflit juridique entre
le détenteur d’un brevet et un infracteur potentiel peuvent prendre diverses formes, dont
celle d’un contrat de licence permettant de répliquer les profits espérés que les deux parties
obtiendraient si le litige avait lieu. Des accords collusifs, dont le cas extrême est celui d’un
accord permettant de répliquer le profit de monopole, sont également possibles et appellent
à une vigilance de la part des autorités de la concurrence. Un paiement forfaitaire accordé
par le détenteur du brevet à un tiers peut aussi être une manière d’éviter le litige, comme
cela a été parfois observé dans le secteur pharmaceutique. Nous mettons en évidence dans
ce chapitre une première conséquence de la prise en compte du caractère incertain du
brevet, puisqu’ un titre de protection parfaite serait toujours préférable au secret, dans
la mesure où une infraction ne donnerait lieu à aucun dommage dans le cas du secret.
Le travail a été prolongé par l’analyse d’une forme de dommages alternative à la notion
d’enrichissement indû, à savoir celle afférente au manque à gagner (lost profit). Les résultats
de ce prolongement, non présentés dans cette thèse, corroborent ceux du premier chapitre.
En réponse à la deuxième question, nous distinguons deux types de licences, celles avec
redevance fixe et celles avec redevance unitaire (i.e. une redevance proportionnelle à la
production). Nous montrons que le schéma avec redevance unitaire peut permettre au
détenteur d’un brevet incertain de réaliser un profit supérieur au profit espéré qu’il aurait
réalisé si la validité du brevet était testée avant que l’accord de licence ne soit conclu.
Par contre, lorsque la licence prend la forme d’une redevance fixe, ceci n’est plus possible.
L’incertitude qui porte sur la validité du brevet affecte donc le choix du régime optimal de
licence du point de vue du détenteur du brevet, et c’est là une deuxième conséquence du
caractère probabiliste de la propriété intellectuelle. Le détenteur d’un brevet incertain peut
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préférer un régime de licence avec redevance unitaire alors qu’il aurait préféré un régime
de redevance fixe si la validité du brevet était certaine.
En réponse à la troisième question, nous étudions les effets potentiels du programme
"Amnesty Plus" qui permet à une firme d’obtenir une réduction d’amende pour partic-
ipation à un cartel si elle dénonce un second cartel. Nous montrons que sous certaines
circonstances, ce programme peut avoir un effet anti-concurrentiel consistant à stabiliser
un cartel qui n’aurait pu être soutenu sans le lien entre marchés créé par Amnesty Plus.
Nous montrons néanmoins qu’il est possible d’éviter cet effet négatif potentiel en respectant
une règle simple lors de la conception de ce programme. Nous montrons également que les
entreprises peuvent être amenées à utiliser des stratégies de déclenchement multi-marchés
sous Amnesty Plus pour contrer (partiellement) l’effet pro-concurrentiel d’Amnesty Plus
ou renforcer son effet anti-concurrentiel alors même que ces stratégies n’auraient eu aucun
effet collusif en l’absence d’Amnesty Plus.
Enfin, en réponse à la quatrième question, nous observons qu’une politique de régu-
lation qui ne contraint pas trop le niveau des prix régulés peut encourager les entreprises
à réduire leurs coûts lorsque la régulation se fait sur les performances propres de chaque
entreprise régulée. Il s’ensuit une tension potentielle entre les deux objectifs d’efficacité
allocative (niveau du prix régulé) et d’efficacité productive (réduction des coûts) dans le cas
d’une régulation individuelle. Cette tension disparaît lorsque les entreprises sont régulées
selon un schéma de performance relative: les deux objectifs sont parfaitement alignés dans
ce cas. Autrement dit, une politique de régulation relative plus contraignante augmente
l’investissement en gains d’efficacité et induit des prix moins élevés. Ce résultat est néan-
moins nuancé par deux forces qui pourraient dissuader un régulateur d’appliquer une poli-
tique trop stricte: la contrainte de participation des entreprises peut ne plus être satisfaite
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si le mark-up autorisé par le régulateur est faible, et les investissements en amélioration de
la qualité sont pénalisés par une régulation excessivement contraignante.
Au total, nos travaux nous auront permis de contribuer à améliorer la compréhension
d’un certain nombre de problèmes complexes qui sont au coeur de la réalité économique.
Certes, bien des questions posées appellent des prolongements multiples. De même, les
améliorations potentielles souhaitables restent nombreuses. Enfin, les tests empiriques,
absents de cette thèse, offrent des opportunités importantes. Mais il nous semble que le
propos d’une thèse est au mieux de servir d’étape dans un processus d’innovation cumula-
tive. L’auteur ne peut qu’espérer que ce modeste objectif a été atteint.
